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ABSTRACT
EAST EUROPEAN SECURITY REVISITED:
INSTITUTIONS, POW ER. AND SECURITY
Blagovest Tashev
Old Dom inion University, 2001
Director: Dr. Donald J. Zeigler

Drawing on the literatures on democratization, security studies, and small states
this dissertation explores the relationship o f small states’ domestic and international
institutionalization and their security. Small states have limited power not only to affect
their environm ent but also to guarantee national security. Small states, it is hypothesized,
enhance their security through the consolidation of domestic institutions and the
accumulation of capacities provided by their participation in capacity-reach international
institutions.
The dissertation tests the hypothesis by applying the comparative method to the
post-communist states o f Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, and Lithuania. The three case
studies analyze the effects of dom estic institution-building and integration in international
institutions on the security of each state. The study analyzes the policies that the three
states applied in the last ten years after the collapse of communism, which led to a
profound transformation o f their national security.
The most important finding o f this dissertation is that the security of each o f the
states was determined not only by external factors, traditionally identified by realist
approaches, but also by domestic factors. States that were able to quickly consolidate
their political institutions were able to achieve not only a greater degree of integration in
international institutions but also a greater level of security. Hence, states' attem pts to
enhance their security should not only seek formal alliances and integration in powerful
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international institutions but also a domestic institutional strength that would enable the
state to achieve a further international integration and a greater capacity to address what
the population perceives as security threats, both domestic and external. Thus, the
security of small states is best achieved not only by attaining traditional security
guarantees, i.e. alliances, but also by strengthening domestic institutions.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

In a threat-rich environment, the security o f a small state is a function of the
capacities of the state. The capacities of the state, in turn, depend on the strength o f the
domestic institutions and the capacities the state can derive and utilize from capacity-rich
international institutions. The stronger the small state in terms of the level of
institutionalization o f domestic institutions, and the higher the level of integration o f the
state in a stable, highly integrated, and capacity-rich core o f states, the more secure the
small state.
After regaining freedom to participate actively in international relations, the states
of Eastern Europe em barked on a difficult process o f a profound political, economic, and
social transformation. This process is taking place within a security void. Having lost the
security guarantees provided by the Soviet Union, the small states of the region found
themselves dangerously exposed to both external and internal security challenges and
risks. The requirements of political and socio-economic transition challenged the ability
of the states to respond to the growing demands o f a newly mobilized domestic public
and individuals. Externally, restive diaspora, past unsettled scores among neighbors,
regional conflicts, and an unpredictable, yet always threatening-looking Russia,
heightened the perception of security threats in the states of the region. Most of them
were quick to seek deep integration in West European and Atlantic institutions, some of
which posses supranational functions. This process indicates that rather than seek
complete autonomy o f action. East European states opted to face challenges and threats
The format for this dissertation follows current style requirements of the Chicago
Manual o f Style, 14th ed. (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1993).
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by partially surrendering their sovereignty and autonomy in a larger institutional context.
O f course, security is not the only national concern prompting this process. It is also
motivated by the states’ attempts to define their identities in a new polity. This foreign
policy seems to be defined as much by societal preferences as by the structure of the
European international system.
The struggle for power as a means o f achieving security is still an enduring
characteristic o f international politics. According to realism, the dom inant school of
international relations, states, regardless o f their size, address security challenges through
the accumulation o f power. What is different about power at the end o f the 20lh century,
however, is its nature and sources. Yet, realism fails to provide a com prehensive
framework for the study o f how small states address the new type of challenges to their
security. While big states still can face security threats through enhancing their military
power, small states are forced to look for other sources o f power and security.
Thus there em erge questions pertaining to the security of East European countries
under post-Cold W ar conditions. How does one account for the ability o f Eastern
European states to face challenges, indeed, to ensure their security? Is security a function
of the state's ability to withstand external threats through military force? O r does it
depend on the capacity to keep its citizens content and its society cohesive? What are the
sources of security in Eastern European countries after the Cold War?
Historically, security threats to East European states have derived from the
region’s geostrategic position between powerful and expansionist empires: Russia and
later the Soviet Union in the east, the Ottom an Empire and later Turkey in the south, and
Germany and A ustria in the west. The region’s geostrategic vulnerability was
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exacerbated by its states’ political, econom ic, and social backw ardness.’ Furthermore,
situated at the junction o f major foreign empires. Eastern Europe had an explosive mix of
nations exposing militant nationalism which often threatened both neighbors and its own
ethnic groups. In this environment, international relations in the region were
characterized by great-pow er rivalry for domination over the states, realpolitik, and
balance o f power. Eastern Europe has traditionally been what Martin W ight called a
“buffer zone:” a group o f weak states between stronger pow ers which try to deny
domination over the states to their rivals.' In these conditions. East European states had
little room for maneuvering and their security options were extremely limited.
After the disintegration of the Soviet empire, the states o f Eastern Europe
regained their independence and became active participants in international politics. Most
o f them, however, were quick to seek deep integration in W est European and Atlantic
institutions. This seems to suggest that rather than seek com plete autonom y o f action
after freeing themselves from hegemonic domination. East European states prefer to face
external challenges by partially surrendering their autonomy within a larger institutional
context. This foreign policy orientation seems to be as much a national choice based on a
traditional quest for security as it is a result o f the structure o f the international system.
The main point here is that changes in the international system increased the freedom of
choice of the small states; their behavior is not tied to the realist notions o f balancing and
bandwagoning to the sam e extent as was evident during the Cold War.

’Daniel Chirot, ed.. Origins o f Backwardness in Eastern Europe: Economics and
Politics from the M iddle Ages Until the Early Twentieth Century (Berkeley: University o f
California Press, 1989).
'M artin Wight, Pow er Politics (London: Penguin. 1979), 160-1.
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W ith the decline o f direct military threats, alliances and other tools became less
appropriate responses to security problems, which are mainly related to internal
capacities and international vulnerabilities and instabilities. National coherence and
international stability are increasingly im portant requirements for national security.
Although security still remains a function o f power one needs to look at the nontraditional ingredients that define its nature rather than m erely its military, econom ic and
other more readily quantifiable, and already extensively analyzed, elements.
Allan C. Lambom writes that “much o f what is traditionally meant by pow er does
involve the government’s capability to mobilize resources.'0 The state has an interest in
increasing its revenues, which enables it to address both dom estic demands for resources,
and international challenges and requirements. In the early European experience the
search for security prompted states to build administrations and institutions capable of
extracting resources needed to enhance the states’ power.4 Pow er then meant military
power capable o f resisting foreign and domestic challenges and enlarging the state’s
territorial possessions. On the eve of the 21st century, however, only a small fraction of
the resources extracted by the state goes to sustaining its m ilitary power. Yet, in the
international context, the states need resources to alleviate international pressures
stemming from balance o f paym ent deficits, external debt and adjustments to structural
changes in the global econom y.
O f course, one might point out that the globalization o f politics and econom ics
places severe constraints on the autonomy o f state choices and actions and thus
Alan C. Lambom, “ Power and the Politics of Extraction,” International Studies
Quarterly 27, no. 2 (June 1983). 126.
4Charles Tilly, ed.. The Formation o f Nation-States in Western Europe (Princeton:
Princeton University Press. 1975).
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circumscribes state power. International trade and finances, the argument goes, have
grown explosively. Economic booms and recessions spread more rapidly from country to
country. Interest rates in one country affect rates in others. Those chances have crippled
the ability o f national governments to decide their interest rates, exchange rates, and trade
policies. Economic integration and com petition have rendered governments im potent in
their traditional tasks of guaranteeing econom ic and social benefits to citizens.
However appealing this reasoning might be, it fails to appreciate the still
considerable, if not growing, power o f the state. Regardless o f growing integration,
national governments have increased the extent to which they control resources. In fact
since 1980 the public spending ratio has increased from 36 percent of the G D P to 40
percent.3 It is true, however, that integration and globalization have increased the
intensity and severity of long existing constraints on government policies. Global markets
have shortened the distance between an event and its consequences, and denied
governments room for maneuvering and vital time to adopt policies to respond. States
must often react in a crisis-like environm ent wherein time for response is short, the threat
to national economy and well-being is apparent, and instruments for dealing with these
crises are limited.
It is hard to account for these conflicting portraits of the power and autonom y of
the state in the post-Cold W ar conditions o f globalization as states operate in two
intersecting arenas. In the first arena governm ents interact with foreign leaders,
international organizations, international corporations, and transnational actors. The
second arena encompasses the domestic sphere: states exert authority over society and
interact with its institutions, leaders, and the public in general.
3“The Myth of the Powerless State," The Economist (7 O ctober, 1995), 15.
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In such an environm ent, small and fragile post-communist democracies face
especially grave risks. Transition to a free market requires em bracing the rules and
principles o f the world econom y, including exposure to highly competitive econom ic
pressures. The restructuring o f economies often involves borrowing from international
institutions or financial markets which, in turn, com es with the commitment to meet
financial obligations. A lag in economic modernization, lack o f competitive practices,
and, very often, outright inept leadership turns the conditions o f globalization into
challenges to the stability o f transition countries. According to the stated objective of
joining European and Atlantic institutions, most post-communist countries adopted
reforms that required the com plete alteration o f the way the states participate in the global
economy.
The external challenges to the ability o f post-communist countries to integrate
into the European and Atlantic institutions are not. however, the only tests that confront
them. The goal o f building market-based dem ocracies requires domestic reforms that
alter the ways the states extract and redistribute scarce resources. Concurrently, states
come under pressure from m ultiple demands for democratization, resources, and values.
Different, often opposing, interests challenge the state's capacity to satisfy expanding
demands and test the state's ability to resolve conflicts peacefully. The politicization of
social forces, or what Samuel Huntington calls praetorian politics, exposes the
weaknesses o f political institutions to mediate and moderate political action.6 Trade
unions, ethnic groups, political parties and social groups confront each other in the
absence o f an established institutional framework capable of channeling high levels of

6Samuel S. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1968), 194-98.
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political participation and demands. Thus the stability, indeed, sometimes the survival of
the state hinges on its capacity to create institutions and procedures which channel
domestic political action and respond to demands from within and without. In other
words, the security o f the state depends to a large extent on the political capacity of the
state.

The Security o f Sm all States in Eastern Europe

After the C o ld War, critical perspectives shifted security analysis toward a more
inclusive framework by questioning the dichotomous. zero-sum thinking o f realism. The
changing nature o f the state, particularly its conspicuously diminishing ability to address
traditional and non-traditional threats, prom pts a redefinition of security concepts and
fundamental assum ptions about the nature o f international conflict. This dissertation,
while recognizing the problematique of various security conceptions, utilizes the state as
the major unit of analysis, though not the single unit of analysis. The variables included
in the study pertain to the state as well as to societal structures. This approach is based on
the assumption that som e of the threats to national security emanate not only from outside
but also from within states. Kalevi Holsti goes even further by questioning the
assumption that the problem of war is prim arily a problem o f relations between states.
“Security between states,” he argues, “... has become increasingly dependent upon
security within states ... The problem of contem porary and future politics, it turns out. is
essentially a problem o f domestic politics.”7 A com prehensive analysis o f international

?Kalevi J. H olsti, The State, War, a n d the State o f War (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press. 1996), 21.
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security must, therefore, include international, national and societal dimensions that to
various degrees affect security on both the national and international levels.
The validity o f many critiques of a state-centric vision and traditional definitions
o f security does not, however, eliminate the need for analyzing the state sources of
security and threats. Evidence o f the state’s inability to respond to challenges and threats
is not proof of the existence o f an alternative political entity better suited to address them.
Weakened, inadequate, and sometimes impotent, the state still rem ains a strong player,
and therefore a legitimate unit of analysis. In addition, in contrast to the industrialized
world where under the conditions o f globalization the traditional state may have given
way to the “virtual state,” societies, which have yet to fully em brace liberal democratic
practices and market economy, lack the essential social, econom ic, and political
capacities and therefore rely on state-driven transitions. Such states still seem
unchallenged by other political organizations in their ability to m obilize and redistribute
resources and manage social and political conflicts. Similarly, the state in Eastern Europe
is widely expected to provide security to individuals, groups, nation, and borders.
States in post-communist transition are not immune to the larger processes
affecting the rest of the world. Deep political and economic crises in Russia in the
summer of 1998 led to the downgrading of Central Europe’s G D P forecasts, despite the
low trade turnout between the two regions. The econom ic crisis led to generally negative
sentiments of portfolio investors toward em erging markets, irrespective of the
discrepancy of the economic performance between Russia and Central Europe.8 This is

8Kelvin Done. “Central Europe: Region’s Growth Forecasts Revised Down.” The
Financial Times (28 August, 1998). Available from http://w w w .ft.com ; INTERNET.
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indicative of Eastern Europe’s newly found exposure to international challenges which is
in marked contrast to its Cold W ar insulation.
In addition to their recently gained international autonomy, the states o f Eastern
Europe embarked on a transition to dem ocracy and a m arket econom y in a security
environment profoundly altered by the end of the Cold War. However, the manner in
which the new environm ent affects the security of the post-com m unist countries has not
been systematically investigated.
One of the explanations for the lack o f com prehensive insights into the security of
the Eastern European countries is that realism -the dom inant school o f political thoughthas been fixated with the study o f great powers. The problem of w ar and security in the
theoretical literature on international relations has been characterized as essentially a
great power phenomenon. In addition, realism 's preoccupation with sta te 's survival fails
to provide an agenda for the study o f small states.9 Ever since Annette Baker F ox's The
Power o f Small States, seen as the main inspiration for the security-oriented small state
approach, realist studies have attempted to explain the resilience o f sm all states despite
the lack o f military capabilities.10 Thus, following the realist logic for all Eastern
European states, preservation of the country is supposedly their main foreign policy

9For definitions o f the small state concept see R obert Rothstein L., Alliances and
Small Powers (New York: Colum bia University Press, 1968), 29: D avid Vital, Inequality
o f States (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 8; Peter R. Baehr. “Small States: A
Toll of Analysis?” World Politics 27, no. 3 (April 1975): 456-66.
l0Annette B. Fox, The Power o f Sm all States: Diplom acy in W orld War II
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1959). For a short history of the small state
approach, see Wilhelm Christm as-M oller, “Some Thoughts on the Scientific
Applicability of the Small State Concept: A Research H istory and a D iscussion,” in
Otmar Holl. ed.. Small States in Europe a n d Dependence (Boulder, CO : W estview Press,
1983): 35-53.
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objective. Yet currently most o f these states’ sovereignty is not contested by any power in
the European system.
Lack o f realists' interest in the small state security problem has an even more
fundamental explanation. Realists, and especially neorealists, w hile explicit that domestic
variables are outside their subject foci, recognize that there exists a particular relationship
between the systemic and dom estic. Kenneth Waltz argues that the international
environment “can tell us what pressures are exerted and what possibilities are posed by
the system o f different structure, but it cannot tell us just how, and how effectively, the
units of the system will respond to these pressures and possibilities.” 11 The international
structure constrains and conditions behavior but ultimately it is domestic actors who must
assess domestic and international conditions and requirements and implement policies
necessary for their survival. “Each state,” Waltz asserts, “arrives at policies and decides
on action according to its own internal processes, but its decisions are shaped by the very
presence of other states as well as by interactions with them.” 12 Indeed, the constraints
explain the similarities of behavior by states with comparable positions of power w ithin
the system, but fail to account for their behavioral differences. States vary in their
domestic structure and policies and therefore address the challenges o f the international
environment in different ways. “T o explain the expected differences in national
responses, a theory would have to show how the different internal structures of states
affect their external policies and actions.” 13 Neorealism, however, has confined itself to

11Kenneth Waltz, Theory o f International Politics (Reading, PA: AddisonWesley. 1979), 71.
'“Ibid.. 65.
' ’Ibid., 122-23.
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the study o f environment as a primary determinant of state behavior, since the structure
of the international system cannot be reduced to variables in its component units.
Systemic liberalism, on the other hand, is commonly seen as more hospitable to
domestic level variables. Jenifer Sterling-Folker summarizes the difference between
liberalism and realism in their treatment of state behavior as the “disagreement over
whether process or environment is a primary determinant for actor interest and
behavior.” 14 Bureaucracies, elections, political parties, and interest groups are essentially
multiple processes and commonly thought to fit the process-based theory o f liberalism.
Sterling-Faulkner. however, faults liberalism in failing to treat these as independent
variables and instead renders them as dependent variables in order to claim that systemic
processes have an impact on domestic actors. Alternatively, she asserts that “the
combination o f environment and process means that the systemic and domestic can act as
simultaneous independent variables in the realist argument.”
For structural realists, the process serves the function o f ensuring state survival.
Ultimately, it is domestic actors, however, who recognize threats, assess their extent and
formulate policies to achieve security. While the environm ent stimulates the drive for
survival and security, it is the domestic process that accounts for the particular state
behavior. In order to explain varied state responses o f similarly situated actors, realism
needs to incorporate process-based theorizing. In fact, system atic approaches to bridge
the gap between international politics and com parative politics are already em erging. The
first is based on the logic of two-level games as originally advanced by Robert Putnam .13

l4Jenifer Sterling-Folker, “ Realist Environment, Liberal Process, and DomesticLevel Variables.” International Studies Quarterly 41, n o .l (M arch 1997), 22.
l5Robert D. Putnam. “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic o f Two-Level
Games,” International Organization 42, no. 3 (Summer 1988): 427-60. See also Peter B.
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National leaders, while seeking deals with their international partners, must ensure the
acceptance of such agreements by relevant domestic actors. Another approach bridging
the gap between domestic politics and international relations is provided by the concept
o f domestication o f the international system: the process by which the international
system becomes less anarchic and more rule-governed. This process is not simply
integration among states based on interdependence, but more on “structural merger o f the
constituting principles, that is, their constitutions.” 16 No doubt, the large literature on
European integration best represents such an approach.
Theoretical problems with the study o f small state security were compounded by
the lack o f agreement on the analytical usefulness o f the small state concept.17 Due to its
dominant position in the field o f international relations theory, the American scholarly
com munity declared small state approaches irrelevant to the understanding of world
politics. By the mid 1970’s small state studies became rare. Realist and neorealist
approaches have made only cursory references to the security of the small states in the
framework of the great power politics. Hans M orgenthau, for example, stresses that “the
protection of the right o f a weak nation that is threatened by a strong one is then
determined by a balance of power as it operates in that particular situation ... the small

Evans. Harold K. Jacobson and Robert D. Putnam, eds., Double-Edged Diplomacy
(Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1993).
l6For a discussion of attempts to breach the gap between international relations
and comparative politics see, Jam es A. Caporaso. “Across the Great Divide: Integrating
Comparative and International Politics,” International Studies Quarterly 41, no. 4
(D ecem ber 1997): 563-92.
l7See Baehr.
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nation must look for the protection of its rights to the assistance o f powerful friends."1*
Realism generally treats the security and survival o f small states as achievable only
through system wide m easures, i.e., balance o f power, rather than enhancing national
power. Even then small states can preserve independence only if great pow ers consider
this in their own interest. The end o f the Cold War, however, once again revived the
interests in small states as they became free to pursue independent foreign policies.
The goal o f this dissertation is to analyze the security o f small states. T he analysis
is grounded in the realist perspective and joins the debate on the changing nature of
security in the post-Cold W ar era. The end of rigid bipolarity enabled small states to gain
more freedom of action in their quest to guarantee national security. The changed
environment gives even more credibility to voluntarism as a mode of thought in realism the belief that decision m akers have effective choice and ability to affect o u tco m es.19
Thus, the post-communist countries of Eastern Europe represent an excellent test ground
to analyze the security o f small states. All countries shared com m on experience in terms
of political and constitutional system, were subordinated to the Soviet Union, and
enjoyed the same security arrangements. Following the end o f com munism, facing new
structural constraints and conditions domestic actors initiated assessments o f internal and
international conditions in order to formulate and implement new policies and strategics
for national security. The post-communist period presented conditions for the empirical
study of the internal processes which account for behavioral similarities and differences

18

Hans J. M orgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
1964). 295.
19For a recent exam ple o f the voluntarist conception grounded in the realist
tradition see Henry Kissinger, Does America N eed a Foreign Policy ? Toward a
Diplomacy fo r the 21st C entury (N ew York: Simon and Schuster. 2001).
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am ong countries with comparable position in the international system. In the post
com munist decade Eastern European countries achieved different levels of security and
experienced different security dynam ics for which external factors account only partially.
Obviously, internal factors and processes, too, affected external policies and actions.
Having lost long-existing security arrangements, the states made deliberate choices based
on assessment of internal and external factors that resulted in different security outcomes.
This dissertation utilizes the insights provided by major bodies o f literature on
small states, security, realism, and democratization to explore the security of small states.
For this purpose, the study uses the cases o f three post-communist states including
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, and Lithuania. The three countries started to formulate
new security policies at the same time and achieved different levels o f security. The
dissertation chooses three transition countries as the dynamic political, social, and
econom ic transformation enables the analysts to identify empirically the variations in
domestic and international processes and factors that determine differences in security
outcomes. The study attem pts to join the recent efforts in bridging the gap between the
systemic approach o f realism and dom estic level variables and providing a systemic
approach for the study o f small state security.
This study contends that the security of the small state is a function of its power.
The power of a small state, on its part, can be analyzed by investigating the state's
capabilities and the distribution of capabilities in the subsystem o f which the state is a
member. In order to better understand the security and power o f small states, the study
will explore two sources o f state pow er—the capabilities of national institutions and the
capabilities the state can derive from its membership in core international institutions.
The stronger the state in terms of the level o f institutionalization o f domestic institutions.
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and the higher the level o f integration o f the state in a stable and highly integrated core of
states, the more secure the state. In other words, the security o f small East European
states is to a great extent a function o f the degree o f institutionalization of domestic
institutions and the levels o f political, social, and econom ic integration in Western
institutions. Domestic and international institutions are tw o major sources of a small
state’s pow er in the modem international system.

Content o f the Study

The dissertation explores the relationship between a small state's domestic
institutionalization and integration in international institutions and the ability of the state
to ensure its national security. The study investigates the ability o f small states in the
process o f profound political, economic, and social reform s to guarantee their security.
M ore specifically, the study focuses on states in Eastern Europe which faced a
fundam entally transformed security environment and w hich sought to attain security
while transforming their regim es’ type.
C hapter II explores the current theoretical debate over the changing nature of
security. The discussion sets the stage for understanding the process of reevaluation and
the reconceptualization of security in the three states during the post-communist
transition. The first section surveys the theoretical state o f the field in the context of the
recent attem pts to redefine the concept. The next section describes the theoretical context
in which the debate on the security concept takes place including the debate over the
changing role of the state and the transformation of state sovereignty. The next section
surveys the state of literature on East European security after the Cold War. It identifies
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the major approach used in the literature to the study o f security in the region and the lack
o f systemic and theoretical approaches to the study o f the subject.
Chapter III describes the dissertation’s theoretical model, which draw s on existing
theory. This chapter builds a theoretical argument that can be summed up as follows. The
security of a small state is a function o f its power. In contrast to the past, however, the
power of the small state is not determ ined exclusively by its military pow er and
participation in a military alliance but rather by the strength o f its domestic institutions
and the capacities the state can utilize from international institutions, which possess
ample military, political and economic capacities. In other words, the security of a small
state depends on the strength o f its domestic institutions and the capacities derived from
international institutions.
The following section identifies the two independent variables including domestic
institutionalization and international integration. It also identifies the dependent variable
security. The next section operationalizes the independent variables and the dependent
variable. Drawing on the large body of democratization literature, the first independent
variable, domestic institutionalization, will be measured by the analysis o f five factors, or
variables, which account for the degree o f institutional strength.
The next section describes the second independent variable, international
integration. The operationalization o f this variable is based on the organizing concept of
core-periphery interaction. The concept places states on a core-periphery continuum,
from belonging to the core to having no relationship with the core. The core represents a
stable group of states organized in an institutional fram ework possessing great military,
political and economic powers which provides, am ong other things, a high level of
security to its members against internal and external threats. This section provides an
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empirical method o f identifying the state's place on the core-periphery continuum, which
provides a corresponding set of pow er capabilities to the state. A ccording to the adopted
theoretical model and consistent with the realist approach, the state’s relative power
capabilities depend not only on the state’s absolute capabilities derived from the state’s
specific place on the core-periphery continuum but also on the distribution of capabilities
derived from the core in the state's regional environment. Just as neorealism
distinguishes between capabilities as actor’s attributes and the distribution of capabilities
as a structural com ponent, this dissertation defines a set of core-periphery interactions as
an attribute and the distribution o f core-periphery interaction in the subsystem as its
structural component. For this purpose the theoretical model distinguishes between the
interaction of the state with the core—designated as flow in this study—and the
distribution o f the interactions o f the state’s neighbors with the core—called stock. In
other words, the state's capabilities derived from the core is the flow, and the distribution
of capabilities derived from the states in the regional environm ent is the state's stock. The
state’s flow is m easured by the level o f integration in international institutions
representing the core states and the amount of economic interaction, including trade and
investments, between the state and the core. The state’s stock is m easured by gauging the
neighboring states’ integration in the core, including their m em bership in the core’s
institutions.
The next section o f the chapter defines and operationalizes the dependent
variable, national security. The discussion builds on the contem porary debate over the
changing nature o f security. Accordingly, the theoretical model adopts a more inclusive
definition of security, which goes beyond the traditional conceptualization o f security as
freedom from military threats and instead incorporates additional elem ents, including
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internal security and societal security. Security is seen as both an objective state and as a
matter o f official and popular perceptions. The last section o f the chapter describes the
methodology including the three case studies and the criteria for their selections.
The following three chapters are case studies of dom estic institutionalization and
international integration and their effects on security. C hapter IV, drawing on the rich
body of empirical studies on the post-com munist transition in Eastern Europe, evaluates
the degree of domestic institutionalization in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Lithuania
as measured by the five factors associated with institutional strength. A separate section
is devoted to each country. Based on the discussion in previous sections, the final section
provides a comparison o f domestic institutionalization by ranking the three countries on
an ordinal scale.
Chapter V evaluates the degree o f international integration with the European
Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (N A TO ) of each of the three
states. The first section describes the decision of the European Union to integrate East
European countries and the process to achieve this goal. The next section provides an
overview of the emergence o f NATO as the only robust security institution in post-Cold
W ar Europe and its expansion to the East.
The next section o f Chapter V sheds light on the three countries’ attempts to join
the EU. It evaluates the states’ degree o f integration in the Union by identifying the
phases each country has gone through in the process of joining the institution. For this
purpose. Chapter V draw s on documents produced by the Union, which evaluate the
countries’ progress in m eeting m embership criteria. In addition, the chapter identifies
important Union decisions to begin new phases in the negotiations with each country as
evidence o f the country’s degree of integration in the institution. The next section traces
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the three countries’ degree o f integration with NATO. It traces the phases o f each
country’s process of increasing interaction with the Alliance and the transformation o f its
military structure to meet the membership criteria.
The next section evaluates the economic transactions between each country and
the core countries. For this purpose, the section analyzes the trade flow between each
state and the EU using trade statistics. Another section gauges the level of integration by
estimating each state’s foreign direct investment originating in the EU.
Another section in C hapter V evaluates each state’s stock. For this purpose the
section provides estimates o f the neighboring states’ integration in the core based on their
relationships with the EU and NATO. The relationships range from membership to
adversarial relations. The section also includes evaluation of public and official support
for integration in the EU and NATO.
Based on the discussion in the previous sections, the last section of the chapter
provides a comparison of international integration in the core among the three countries.
Separate figures compare the three states' flows and stock by placing them on ordinal
scales. The higher the values o f the country’s flow and stock, the higher the country's
degree of integration in the core.
Chapter VI investigates the dependent variable, national security. Separate
sections are devoted to each o f the three states. Each section surveys the objective
security of each of the three countries in the post-communist period, the evolution o f the
official conceptualization o f national security and the evolution of popular perceptions of
security. The last section of C hapter VI provides a comparison of the degrees o f national
security placing the countries on ordinal scale from most secure to least secure. The three
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cases are ranked by summing up the three values assigned for objective security, official
perception of security and popular perception of security.
Chapter VII summarizes the main findings o f the dissertation. It also joins two
major debates—the sources o f security in Eastern Europe and the security o f small states.
The first debate is rather limited both in its theoretical scope and depth, and empirical
range. The current literature on East European security is devoted mainly to the
discussion of policy issues including the proposed N ATO enlargement, interstate
relations and their effects on international politics, and ethnic conflicts. Accordingly,
security is conceptualized in traditional terms and participation in military alliances is
assumed to provide the answer to security threats and risks. When the contributions to
this literature, firmly grounded in the neorealist tradition o f international relations,
provide analyses o f the domestic politics in the countries o f Eastern Europe the authors
see various factors not as variables in the theoretical model to explain the security of the
countries but rather as factors which either facilitate or inhibit the countries' ability to
join Euro-Atlantic institutions which would enhance national security. Invariably, the
studies either propose policies that would accelerate the process of NATO expansion, or
more rarely, warn about the policy implications of incorporating rather diverse societies—
with deep political and ethnic divisions and economic problem s-into already strained
Euro-Atlantic institutions.
The other body of literature, which focuses on the security o f the small state, is
written mostly from a realist perspective and defines security as a function o f power
relations among the great pow ers-o r less frequently, am ong the dominate regional
players. Thus the security of small states is determined by exogenous factors and very
little is attributed to the independent action of national decision makers. W hile providing
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empirical evidence of varying outcomes resulting from specific choices, the studies
investigating the decision-making process within the state alm ost always point to the
limitations im posed by the states’ small size and little power. T his neorealist approach to
the study o f small states, however, is limited in its explanatory pow er when applied to
security in the post-Cold W ar period. The final chapter of this dissertation attempts to
contribute to the literature on small state security by focusing on the significant effect of
preferences and choices on the security of the state. The end o f the rigid bipolarity o f the
Cold War provided decision makers with greater room to m aneuver and thus there
emerged a need to investigate what within the state determines its foreign policy choices
and what are the internal sources o f security.
The last chapter also deals with another weakness of the traditional neorealist
approach as applied to small states—the little attention paid to internal factors as
determinants o f security. Thus the role of domestic institutions as an element of power is
an often ignored variable in the existing literature. The last chapter addresses this
shortcoming by identifying ways to include national institutions in a modified realist
approach to the study of small states’ security. O ne o f the most im portant findings of this
study is that security policies are influenced not only by the international environment
and context but also by domestic politics and more specifically by institutional processes.
Thus, international actors interested in enhancing the security o f sm all states should focus
their efforts not only at providing external guarantees to national security but also at
strengthening national institutions. In fact, powerful national institutions will provide
security in the long run as international security institutions are structurally limited in
their ability to address the new security threats and risks. Furtherm ore, the expectations
and security perceptions of populations relate to the functions o f national institutions as
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the public increasingly sees challenges to emanate not only from without but also from
within the state.
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CH APTER II
PREVIOUS R ESEA R C H ON STATE SECURITY

The goal of this chapter is tw ofold. First, it describes the current theoretical
debate over the changing nature o f security and the role of the state and state sovereignty
in the post-Cold W ar environment. The first section surveys the state of the field in the
context of recent attem pts to redefine the concept. It sheds light on the theoretical
attempts that reflect empirically identifiable processes of reconceptualization o f security
underway in the international system . The second section places the debate in the context
o f recent attempts to redefine the functions and place of the nation-state in the
international system. Second, the chapter surveys the literature on East European security
after the Cold War and identifies the dom inant theoretical approach used in the stuffy of
the subject.

The Literature on Security

Since the end o f the Cold W ar scholars have advocated the need for a broader
concept of security. In the post-W orld W ar II period, security was seen as the absence of
military threat. Now, however, a broader definition must incorporate political, economic,
environmental, societal, and m ilitary security.1 The broader concept takes into account
the multidimensional character o f security threats and enables the analysts to turn to the
most threatening problem in each area. Even those who find the state as an adequate unit

'Barry Buzan, People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in
International Relations (Chapel Hill: University o f North Carolina Press, 1983).
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of analysis argue for a position that views security as a holistic concept that breaks the
confines o f the realist framework with its military and power orientations.2
To be sure, basic differences about the security paradigm have long existed.
Thucydides, John Hobbes, Nicolo Machiavelli. Emmanuel Kant and Hugo G rotius. in
specific historical settings, outlined the main tenets of future concepts of security.
According to realists, the nation-state system, not unlike the pre-state chaos described by
Hobbes, lacks common rules and institutions o f law enforcem ent.3 W ar and the pursuit of
power are the primary means to ensure national security and survival.
Hugo Grotius, the precursor of modem liberalism in international politics,
challenged the Hobbesian view o f the world by contending that states are limited in their
struggle with each other by common rules and institutions. To G rotius. values and norms,
particularly ones that are codified in international law, are im portant in maintaining order
and security among states. Grotians, like Hobbesians, accept the state-centric vision of
the international system, but contend that rules, norm s, and laws and institutions
significantly modify state behavior.4

'K en Booth. “Security and Emancipation." Review o f International Studies 17, no.
4 (October 1991). 313-26.
Thom as Hobbes, Leviathan, The Matter, Forme, and Pow er o f a Com mon
wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civill (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1965).
■^The English School and pluralists owe much to G rotius’ study of norms and
laws. See Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study o f O rder in World Politics (New
York: Colum bia University Press, 1977); Ken Booth and Steve Smith, eds.. International
Relations Theory Today (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. 1995);
Barry Buzan. “From International System to International Society: Structural Realism
and Regime Theory Meet the English School,” International Organization 47, no. 3
(Summer 1983): 327-52; Barry Buzan, Richard Little and Charles Jones. The Logic o f
Anarchs: Neorealism to Structural Realism (New York: Colum bia University Press,
1993)
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Against the Hobbesian realist image. Emmanuel Kant proposes a vision o f
perpetual peace—an enlightened political order forged by a community o f humankind.
The modem liberal tradition-inspired by the Kantian belief in republicanism, federalism,
and global citizenship—not unlike Hobbes, accepts the state-centric vision o f the
international system, but contends that reason and moral commitments o f individuals can
subsume narrow national interests.
The debate about security after the Cold W ar has led to different interpretations of
the meaning and nature o f the concept. Some authors have attempted to broaden the
neorealist conception o f security to incorporate a wider range of threats, including
economic, environm ental, migration, and human rights issues.3 Richard Ullman suggests
a definition of security that includes threats to quality of life and the range o f policy
choices available to both governmental and non-governmental entities. Jessica Mathews
argues that the definition should include dem ographic, environmental and sustainable
development issues. Others have attempted to shift the debate from its state-centric focus
to the level of international, global, regional, societal, and individual security as well as
state security.6

3Jessica Tuchm an Mathews, "Redefining Security.” Foreign Affairs 68, no. 2
(Spring 1989): 162-77; Brad Roberts. “Human Rights and International Security,"
Washington Quarterly 13, no. 2 (Spring 1990): 65-75: Myron Weiner. “Security.
Stability and International Migration,” International Security 17. no. 3 (W inter 1992-93):
91-126; Richard Ullman, “ Redefining Security." International Security 8, no. 1 (Sum m er
1983): 129-53.
6Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda fo r International Studies in
the Post-Cold War Era (London: Harvester W hcatsheaf. 1991); Ole W acver. Barry
Buzan, Morton Kelstrup, and Pierre Lcmaitre. Identity, Migration and the New Security
Agenda in Europe (London: Pinter, 1993); J. Ann Tickner, Gender and International
Relations: Feminist Perspective and Achieving G lobal Security (New York: Colum bia
University Press, 1992); Barry Buzan, Ole W aever and J. de Wilde. Security: A New
Framework fo r Analysis (Boulder. CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998).
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O f course, challenges to the traditional approaches to security studies are not new;
a large body of literature on European integration has generated propositions that hard
core security problems can be partially resolved or mitigated by non-military approaches.
Integration theories first developed by David Mitrany, Ernst Haas and Karl Deutsch
em phasize the effect o f interdependence, political choice, and supranational institutions
on national and international security.7 While the realists view international interaction as
basically a zero-sum game, integrationists claim that interaction can be turned into a
posilive-sum game in which there are mutual benefits to be gained. In fact, the early
proponents of integration theory recognize the difficulty which security dilemmas and
threats pose to cooperation. W hat distinguishes them from realists, how ever, is their
effort not toward understanding conflict among states but toward defining the conditions
and processes which lead to cooperation. In fact, making a realistic assessm ent of
international politics, integrationists, particularly Haas, emphasize that political elites
m ust perceive cooperative behavior to be in their rational self-interest.
What non-realist attempts have in common is their criticism of the state-centric
orientation o f neorealist perspectives. They question w hether the state can be an adequate
provider of security when security is defined in terms o f economic, cultural, and
ecological as well as politico-military terms. Most critics of neorealism agree that

7See Karl Deutsch, ed.. Political Community a n d the North Atlantic Area:
International Organization in the Light o f Historical Experience (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1957); David M itrany, “The Prospect o f Integration: Federal or
Functional?” in Joseph S. Nye, ed.. International Regionalism: Readings (Boston: Little.
Brown & Co., 1968); Em st B. Haas, The Uniting o f Europe (Stanford: Stanford
University Press. 1968).
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policies intended to ensure security at all levels require a fundamental revisiting of
traditional concepts and theories associated with thinking about security.8
One common criticism leveled at attempts to expand the security agenda or the
levels on which security is analyzed points to their failure to explain how the newly
emerging issues or levels o f analysis are to be brought together. Keith Krause notes that
the “new thinking on security” fails to confront the ontological underpinnings of the
traditional concept o f security and does not provide a new analytical core to the concept.9
In fact, lack of a clearly defined concept of security, he argues, prevents many authors
from distinguishing between “threats" and “problems” and thus overloading analytical
frameworks. More often, however, authors implicitly accept the traditional concept of
security by conceding that an issue becomes a threat when “it feeds into process that can
lead to violent conflict.”
David Baldwin argues that the problem o f defining security after the Cold War is
even more significant than the perceived lack of a widely accepted concept. Reviewing
the state of security studies as an academic field. Baldwin finds that most efforts to define
security are. in fact, m ore concerned with defining policy agendas o f nation-states while
little attention is devoted to clarifying the meaning of security.10 Consequently, security
appears to be “a confused or inadequately explicated concept." T o be sure, this
shortcoming is endem ic not only to recent attempts at conceptualization but also to
8See R. B. J. W alker, One World, M any Worlds: Struggles fo r a Just World Peace
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1988). See also Booth: Booth and Smith.
'Keith Krause, “T h eo rizin g Security, State Formation and the Third W orld” in
the Post-Cold W ar W orld,” Review o f International Studies 24. no. I (January 1998):
125-36.
l0David A. Baldwin, “The Concept o f Security,” Review o f International Studies
23, no. I (W inter 1997): 5-26.
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neorealism, the theory o f international politics which posits security as one of the primary
motivations of nation-states. Neorealism limits the object o f study by constricting the
range of relevant theories applied to understand security, and norm atively. limits itself to
national security.11 Instead, Baldwin proposes that students o f security need to address
the concept by specifying its problematic. Basic questions such as “what is security?”;
“security for whom?” ; “security for which values ?” ; “ from what threats ?” ; etc., need to
be addressed in order to conceptualize security. Others, too, point out that the field
suffers not only from the absence o f a common understanding o f w hat security is. but
also what its most relevant research questions are.12
Attempts o f critical perspectives to broaden the agenda of security studies are
viewed from the neorealist perspective as making the field theoretically ineffectual.
Alternative approaches are seen as providing no clear explanatory framework, which is
most clearly reflected in the lack of concomitant empirical research. In the neorealist
account, the field is about “the study of the threat, use. and control of military force...."1’
The state-centered orientation o f the field is reflected in the conceptualization o f security
as state security, threat as the military force applied by the state, and the state as the
unchallenged political authority in world politics. Accordingly, recent security studies in

MSee Edward A. Kolodzicj, “Renaissance in Security Studies? Caveat Lector!”
International Studies Quarterly 36. no. 4 (December 1992): 421-38.
'"See Helga Haftendom , “The Security Puzzle: Theory Building and DisciplineBuilding in International Security," International Studies Q uarterly 35, no. I (March
1991): 3-17; As early as 1962 Arnold W olfers cautioned that national security “may not
have any precise meaning at all.” See, Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration:
Essays in International Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1962), 147.
1 Stephen M. Walt, ‘T h e Renaissance of Security Studies," International Studies
Quarterly 35, no. 2 (June 1991), 212.
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the neorealist field have remained in the more traditional state-centric framework to
advance historically tested approaches to addressing security issues.14
Most o f the students o f security came to embrace the neorealist perspective as the
only approach to offer a systematic way to investigate the subject. The dominance o f the
neorealist perspective rests on the confidence that the field has evolved into a scientific
discipline which involves few foundational assumptions and generates empirically
testable hypotheses. O f these, the existence o f foundational assum ptions in the neorealist
perspective is central to the claim to scientific knowledge. Indeed, realists and neorealists
might disagree on whether the sources of insecurity are exogenous or indigenous to the
state but both agree that, under the conditions of anarchy—which is another foundational
claim -it is the interaction of states that gives rise to it. Thus, the assumption that the state
is the subject o f security conditions dominates the discipline and precludes the
introduction o f m ore inclusive conceptions o f security. G rounded in a number of
assumptions about the reality of international politics, the neorealist security perspective
can reject alternative approaches, which attempt to bring new issues into the security
agenda as not m eeting the expectations about what observable facts represent threats and
insecurities.
An im portant reevaluation o f the concept o f security from a neorealist
perspective, which attempts to go beyond this state-centric focus, is Barry Buzan's
People, States a n d Fear. Buzan broadens the definition of security to include freedom

14Ibid.; See also John Mearsheimer, “A Realist Reply,” International Security 20,
no. I (Summer 1995): 82-93; Charles Kupchan and Cliford Kupchan, "Concerts,
Collective Security, and the Future o f Europe,” International Security 16, no. I (Summer
1991), 114-61; H enry Kissinger, "Balance o f Power Sustained,” in Graham T. Allison
and Gregory F. Treverton, eds.. Rethinking Am erica ’.v Security: Beyond Cold War to New
World Order ( S e w York: W. W. Norton, 1992).
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from military, political, societal, econom ic and environmental threats. Security is
examined from the perspectives of the state and the international system as well as of the
individuals. Yet, according to Buzan, the state remains the most important provider of
security. The evolution toward “strong states,” he argues, will result in a greater degree of
security to the individuals as well as the society. International security, on its part, can be
attained through the conjunction of the strong-state evolution and the move toward what
he calls “mature anarchy.”

The Broader Debate

These and other attempts revisiting the concept o f security reflect a broader
debate on the nature o f the state after the Cold War. New approaches challenge the
traditional realist-neorealist-neoliberal debate in international relations.13 The
proliferation of international institutions and regimes, the growing inability o f nation
states to respond to increasing public dem ands from within, and inability o f states to
unilaterally face the challenges of globalization and interdependence have challenged the
accepted concepts of sovereignty and state. Views range from the spirited defense of the
tenacious principle o f sovereignty and the pow er of the states16 to the insistence that

l3David A. Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary
Debate (New York: C olum bia University Press, 1993); Robert O. Kcohane, ed.,
Neorealism and Its C ritics (New York: C olum bia University Press, 1986); Kenneth
Waltz, ‘T h e Emerging Structure of International Politics,” International Security 18, no.
2 (Fall 1993): 44-79: Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, “The Promise o f
Institutionalist Theory,” International Security 20, no. 1 (Summer 1995): 39-51.
l6John M earsheimer. “ Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold
War.” International Security 15. no. 1 (Sum m er 1990): 5-56.
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markets have overtaken the states.17 In between, there is a growing body o f literature
which investigates the broad transformation o f sovereignty and power of the nation
states. Rather than see the state as withering away, this approach claims that, as a political
organization, the nation-state is adjusting to the changing conditions in the global system.
The spiraling growth of financial transactions and the free flow of capital and labor have
created what Richard Rosecrance calls the “virtual state,” a political unit with a
transformed concept of sovereignty.18
The large body of literature on European integration, too, points to the divergent
processes of integration and disintegration, which transfer authority from nation-states to
sub-national and supranational political units. In a related process, relations between
industrial democracies have com e to rest on consensus rather than force. Undoubtedly,
the major powers are today less inclined to resort to force to resolve their differences.
It seems only natural that the dominant tradition in security studies, neorealism,
has a difficult time addressing the question of how the transformed international security
environment would affect the various aspects of state structure and its nature in general.
There is no realist theory o f the state and domestic institutions, merely simplified
assumptions about them. The state is seen as a constant; the post-Cold War context might
have altered the behavior o f states, but its core structures, functions and goals remain
unchanged.
l7See Immanuel W allerstein, Geopolitics and Geoculture: Essays on the
Changing World-System (Cam bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Susan Strange.
States and Markets: An Introduction to Political Economy (London: Frances Pinter,
1988): Susan Strange, The Retreat o f the State: The Diffusion o f Power in the World
Economy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
l8Richard Rosecrance. ‘T h e Rise of the Virtual State,” Foreign Affairs 75, no. 4
(July/August 1996): 45-61; See also Richard Rosecrance. The Rise o f the Trading State:
Commerce and Conquest in the M o d em World (New York: Basic Books. 1986).
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There are two groups of literatures on the state that speculate about the effect o f
the changing international security environm ent on the nature of the state.''' Authors such
as Michael Mann insist that despite the dramatic changes brought about by the Cold W ar’
end. states will remain essentially unchanged in scope and cohesion."() States need to
facilitate domestic political, econom ic, and social functions such as redistribution tasks or
mobilization for collective action, regardless of the international context.
The other group o f theories, on the other hand, maintains that the changed
security environment challenges the cohesion, and in som e cases the viability, of certain
states. According to this reasoning, threats are crucial in the creation, consolidation and
continued cohesion o f political entities. This argument is based on the assumptions that
threats and wars expand the scope o f states and that w ithout threats som e states would
collapse under the strains o f fractured and polarized societies. For scholars such as
Charles Tilly, it is the competition for pow er between states that provide impetus for
state-building. As Tilly puts it, “war m akes states.” The process o f state formation in
Europe was protracted and violent; it resulted in vastly strengthened state structures.21
Thus, the end of the Cold War would have a dramatic effect on the scope and cohesion of
states, especially weak ones.
This group of theories brings about an important point with relevance to security.
In contrast to neorealism ’s external security orientations, this approach defines security in
' 'For a discussion see Michael C. Desch, “W ar and Strong States, Peace and
W eak States?” International Organization 50, no. 2 (Spring 1996): 237-68.
‘"Michael Mann, “ Nation-States in Europe and O ther Continents: Diversifying,
Developing, not Dying,” Daedalus 122, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 115-40.
2lSee Tilly; See also Charles T illy, “W ar-M aking as O rganized Crim e” in Peter
Evans. Dietrich Rueschemeyer and T heda Skocpol, eds., Bringing the State Back In
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985): 169-91.
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relation to both internal and external threats. M ohammed A yoob observes that the
explanatory pow er of the neorealist concept has been vastly reduced when applied to
Third World states.22 While the long consolidation o f states in the West created strong
institutions and loyal citizenry and eliminated the domestic security dimension, most of
the non-Westem states still face significant internal threats. In fact, in some parts o f the
world, threats to security are almost exclusively domestic in their origin. Third W orld
countries em erged in a state system in which the principle o f territorial inviolability
ensured their survival as international subjects, yet their fractured societies and politics
challenge the survival o f the state as a political unit.2-’ Paradoxically, it is the lack of
challenging external environm ent during state-formation that accounts for the fragile state
structure in most o f the non-W estem world.24 Authors such as Buzan and Holsti advance
even further the connection between national security and state strength by arguing that
in the post-Cold W ar environm ent it is the strong-weak state variable that accounts for
international security. To Buzan, the evolution to “strong states” in conjunction with a
move toward “mature anarchy” would result in greater international security. Holsti sees
the problem o f international security as determined by domestic politics.-3

Mohammed Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament: State Making,
Regional Conflict and the International System (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995).
2,See Krause.
-4See Jeffrey Herbst, “W ar and the State in Africa,” International Securitx 14. no.
4 (Spring 1990): 117-39.
23See Holsti.
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The Literature on East European Security

This study will attempt to make a contribution to a small body o f literature on the
post-Cold War Eastern European security. The size o f the literature notwithstanding, ten
years of a fundamentally altered security environment has yet to translate into a rich body
of empirical and theoretical accumulation. The very few works on the region's security
have not produced a deep understanding of the subject as they confined their analytical
focus on a variety o f real and potential threats and risks, political and m ilitary variables
associated with traditional security considerations, and recommendations and options
related to practical foreign policy objectives. This state o f the field com es as no surprise
given that during the Cold War. at least on the part of American foreign policy, there was
no autonomous policy toward the countries of Eastern Europe; they represented but an
element in the more significant policy toward the Soviet Union. Not surprisingly, much
of the literature dealing with security is devoted to “rediscovering” much of the
countries' cultural, social, political, and economic backgrounds, an exercise which in
itself discerns the unstable, fluid, and dynamic character o f the security environm ent in
the region.
As far as Eastern European security, the literature may be divided into two main
groups, the first of which deals w ith traditional hard-core security issues. The second,
vastly richer one, w hile not directly discussing security, focuses on problem s, including
political change, institution building, market reform, and political culture, which have a
direct effect on it. In other words, previous studies have concentrated on either traditional
politico-military factors of security or the nonmilitary factors of transition in Eastern
Europe. This study will attempt to bring together some o f the findings and concepts o f the
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two bodies o f literature; it will combine some of their them es and subjects, and integrate
them against the backdrop of the current debate over the changing nature o f security and
threat in world politics.
Only a handful o f works systematically analyze the changing security
environment in Eastern Europe. Most of the investigations provide policy studies o f the
states' foreign policy objectives and behavior, and abound in practical recom mendations
to both the West and the East concerning the states’ proclaim ed objective o f “joining the
W est.”26 Policy oriented works focus on the challenges to the region by identifying the
main risks and threats, both within and outside the countries. Frequently, past historical
experience and patterns o f politics are used as a significant indicator of potential future
security problems and conflicts.
Very few studies have ventured to theorize and em pirically explore the security in
the region, within the context of the wider debate on the transformation o f the security
environment. Usually, the problematique o f security in the region is seen as determ ined
by the collapse of the regional hegemon rather than as conditioned by the global
processes, which alter the nature of sovereignty, nation-state, and national and
international security. In one rare attempt, John Lampe and Daniel Nelson provide a
framework for the study o f East European security, taking into consideration the

' 6Adrian Hyde-Price, The International Politics o f East Central Europe
Manchester: M anchester University Press, 1996); Lonnie R. Johnson, C entral Europe:
Enemies, Neighbors, Friends (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); Andrew
Cottey, East-Central Europe after the C old War: Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia
and Hungary in Search o f Security (New York: St. M artin Press, 1995); Stephen F.
Larrabee, East European Security After the Cold War (Santa Monica, CA: Rand
Corporation, 1993); Steven L. Burg, War o r Peace? Nationalism, Democracy, and
American Foreign Policy in Post-Communist Europe (N ew York: New York University
Press, 1996); David G. Haglund, N ATO 's Eastern Dilemmas (Boulder, CO: W estview
Press. 1994).
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changing nature o f threats and security.27 The com plexity and dynamic of the concept of
security in the region stems as much from global, political, social and geopolitical
processes as from the history and recent experience of Eastern Europe. In the book, the
problem o f security is related to dem ocratization, market and political change.
In another attempt, Richard Smoke edited a volume on public and expert
perceptions o f security in Eastern Europe. This work, written from a Eastern European
perspective, lays out som e very interesting—although given the unexplored status of the
subject, still tentative—observations. These observations include the convergence of
security perceptions held by the public and security experts, and the presence of relatively
intense perceptions o f insecurity despite the lack o f clearly identifiable threats. Perhaps
the most significant observations reached by some of the authors is that despite the
existence o f a real security vacuum in the region and the intensity o f perceptions of
insecurity, the situation is not perceived to be critical, as the emergence and enlargement
of European and Atlantic structures (NATO. EU, Partnership for Peace, Council of
Europe) are m inim izing the negative effects o f a security void.28
The literature on political and social transformation in Eastern Europe, while not
directly discussing international security in the region, contains insights about the
countries’ perspective on stable and peaceful development. A rich edited piece by
Beverly Craw ford, though not directly discussing security and institutionalization in
Eastern Europe, contains a few chapters in which the authors are quite skeptical about the
-7John R. Lampe and Daniel N. Nelson in collaboration with Ronald Schonfcld.
eds.. East European Security Reconsidered (W ashington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center
Press and Sudosteuropa-Gesellschaft, 1993).
Richard Smoke, ed., Perceptions o f Security: Public Opinion and Expert
Assessm ent in E urope's New Democracies (M anchester: M anchester University Press,
1996).
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future o f the region’s security and stability.2*’ With the development o f capitalism and
liberal institutions in Western Europe. Eastern Europe became a peripheral region, a
status which created institutional, econom ic and social obstacles to reform. In another
thorough and ambitious study of the m ost troubled region o f Eastern Europe, the Balkans,
Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott provided a systemic and cross-country comparison o f
political change in post-communist states.30 While not directly addressing the problem of
security, the various essays provide a rich catalog of security threats and risks and their
effect on institution building and politics under the conditions of social and political
transformation. This study is so far unrivaled in its systematic approach to the problem of
transition in this part o f Eastern Europe. In another edited volume, both authors, applying
the sam e approach, focus on similar processes in East-Central Europe. ’’

" ’Beverly Crawford, ed.. Markets, States, and Democracy: The Political Economy
o f Post-Communist Transformation (Boulder. CO: Westview. 1995).
30Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, eds.. Politics, Power, and the Struggle fo r
Dem ocracy in South-East Europe (Cam bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
’'Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, eds., The Consolidation o f Democracy in
East-Central Europe (Cambridge: Cam bridge University Press, 1997).
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CHAPTER III
RESEARCH DESIGN

Chapter III describes the theoretical model that will be used in the dissertation.
The first section discusses the dissertation’s hypothesis. The next two sections describe
the two independent variables-dom estic institutionalization and international integration.
The following section discusses the dependent variable—national security. The final
section describes the m ethodology—the three case studies used and the criteria for their
selection.

Hypothesis

This dissertation explores the relationship of the small state’s pow er and its
security. The hypothesis can be sum m ed up as follows. The security o f a small state is
determined by its power. In contrast to the past, however, the power o f a small state is not
determined exclusively by its military power and participation in a m ilitary alliance, but
rather by the strength o f its domestic institutions and the capacities the state can utilize
from international institutions, which possess ample military, political and economic
capacities. In other w ords, the security o f a small state depends on the strength of its
domestic institutions and the capacities derived from international institutions.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

39
Independent Variable I: National Capacity as M easured by Domestic Institutionalization

Robert Jackman proposes a definition and measurement of national political
capacity conceived in terms of institutional capacity and legitimacy.1 Jackm an and
Kenneth Bollen2 argue for separating questions of stability from questions o f democracy
on the grounds that each concept represents a distinctive phenomenon. Stability can be
seen as reflecting the political capacity in a sense that is independent o f regim e type.
Their emphasis on political capacity built upon already existing studies exam ining the
social and political conditions associated with the stability o f democratic societies. The
problem of political capacity was most thoroughly treated by Samuel Huntington, who
argued that institutionalization is the key ingredient to political capacity. ’
After making the distinction between force and power, Jackman defined political
capacity in terms of institutions that are sustained by legitimacy. Institutions reflect the
structures necessary for the exercise of power, which assumes a degree o f continuity and
regularity in the relationship between the participants. But these structures must also be
seen as legitimate: that is, consent must be attained. G iven that legitimization is an
ongoing process, political capacity is never an all-or-nothing phenomenon, but rather a
m atter of degree.
A central feature o f these forms is that they take considerable tim e to develop,
which immediately draws attention to the age of institutions. Jackm an's analysis of
'Robert W. Jackman, Politics a n d Social Equality: A Comparative Analysis (New
York: Wilcy-Interscience, 1975).
2Kenneth A. Bollen, ‘issues in the Comparative Measurement o f Democracy,”
American Sociological Review 45, no. 3 (June 1980): 370-90.
’Huntington, Political Order.
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national political institutions accordingly focuses on their age, conceived in both
chronological and generational term s. With age com es the formalization of routines, and
the goal becomes organizational survival. By increasing the adaptability of institutions,
age increases the probability o f survival. While age increases the odds of survival, it is
hardly a sufficient factor for the success of institutions. Thus it is reasonable to assume
that those with a relatively strong pre-com munist democratic tradition would have an
advantage over states establishing democratic institutions for the first time.
Traditions always seem to be present in any assessment o f democratic transitions’
chances of success. Yet some authors question the invariable effect o f the past on
contemporary transitions. For exam ple, Beverly C raw ford and Arend Lijphart focus on
the possibility o f overcoming the Leninist legacy through what they call “the imperatives
o f liberalism.”4 They argue that “new institutions can be crafted and new international
pressures can be brought to bear that shut out the negative influences o f the past." Indeed
a substantial part o f the democratization literature focuses on the elites' strategic
interactions and choices in crafting institutions and procedures. Newly created
institutions are often the result o f the domestic balance of political forces, expectations
about the future, and compromise rather than long held liberal principles and memories of
a democratic past. Crawford and Lipjhart, trying to reconcile the historical determinism
approach and recent democratization literature, argue that the immediate context of
norm s, institutions, and international pressures shapes the particular way that legacies
influence outcomes. Therefore, it can be contended that while age increases the odds of

4Beverly Crawford and A rend Lijphart, “Explaining Political and Economic
Change in Post-Communist Eastern Europe: O ld Legacies, New Institutions, Hegemonic
Norms, and International Pressures,” Comparative Political Studies 28, no. 2 (July 1995),
187.
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institutional survival, it hardly precludes extinction; issues o f legitimacy therefore need to
be addressed explicitly. Drawing on a distinction between pow er and force, a regime is
legitimate when it can resolve problems by exercising pow er without resorting to force or
provoking a forceful challenge.
Rigid historical determinism is also challenged by sociology’s institutionalism.
Formal bureaucratic structures did not spread as a result o f their functional virtues as
efficient coordinators o f complex relationships but because the wider environment
supports and legitimizes rational bureaucracy as a social good. Organizations exist,
proliferate, and have the form they do not necessarily because they are efficient, but
because they are externally legitimated.5
Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell have a slightly different take on the
capacities of political systems. Instead o f capacities they speak o f capabilities o f political
systems.6 The capability approach attempts to understand the performance o f the political
system in its domestic and international environm ents by introducing the notions of
extractive, regulative, sym bolic, responsive, and international capabilities.
Robert Dahl and Edward Tufte, w hile analyzing the correlation between the size
of the state and dem ocracy, implicitly investigate the relationship of small states' national
capacities and threat abatem ent.7 The authors ask the question: Can a small country

5W. Richard Scott, John W. M eyer and Associates, eds., Institutional
Environment and Organizations: Structural Complexity an d Individualism (Thousand
Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1994). See also, John W. M eyer and Brian Rowan
“ Institutionalized Organizations; Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony," American
Journal o f Sociology 83, no. 2 (September 1977); 340-63.
6Gabriel A. Alm ond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics: A
Development Approach (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966). 190-213.
7Robert A. Dahl and Edward R. Tufte, Size and D em ocracy (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1973).
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maintain its independence as well as a large country? First it must be observed that Dahl
and Tufte do not identify a single dimension of size. Instead, population, area, and
density as well as socio-economic variables are adopted as indicators o f size.
Furthermore, when dealing with the capacities o f political systems the socio-economic
variables are gauged, for, the authors argue, a nation’s capacity for survival and
autonomy depends on the size o f its wealth, skilled workers, etc., rather than on the size
o f its population and territory.
Neorealists, too, include political capacity among the factors, which determ ine the
state’s power. A ccording to Kenneth Waltz, the place o f the state in the international
system depends on how it ranks in term s of size of population and territory, resource
endowment, econom ic capability, military strength, political stability and com petence.8
He goes on further to argue that states are highly ranked not because they excel in one
way or another. O f course, we have to acknowledge that neorealist assumptions and
prescriptions pertain to great powers rather than small states.
For the purpose o f this study, states will be placed on a continuum of strength. As
Kalevi Holsti defines it. “ ... state strength ... is not measured in m ilitary strength. It is.
rather, in the capacity o f the state to command loyalty—the right to rule—to extract
resources necessary to rule and provide services, to maintain that essential element of
sovereignty, a m onopoly over the legitimate use o f force within defined territorial limits,
and to operate within the context o f a consensus-based political com m unity.”<) This
conception of state strength goes beyond the traditional focus on institutionalization,
capabilities for extraction of resources, and autonomy. These are important but
8Waltz, Theory, 131.
'^Holsti, 82-83.
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insufficient variables in determ ining the strength of states. W hat Holsti suggests is that “ It
is in the realm of ideas and sentiments that the fate of the state is primarily determined.” 10
He proposes that in addition to the instrumental capacities o f the state one needs to
analyze legitimacy, both horizontal and vertical, as another measurement o f state’s
strength. Vertical legitimacy deals with authority, consent, and loyalty to the ideas of
state; horizontal legitimacy deals with the definition and political role of com m unity."
In order to operationalize the variable “domestic institutionalization” the study
will investigate five factors that are com m only seen by m ost students of political systems
as the variables determining the degree o f institutionalization. According to the field of
study or personal preferences, these variables are seen as determining the strength,
power, capability, or capacity o f the institutional system. For the purpose of this
dissertation, these five factors are seen as determining the level of domestic
institutionalization which partially accounts for the state’s power.
Two-turnover test. One criterion for measuring institutionalization in transition
states is the two-turnover test. A political system can be viewed as consolidated if the
party takes power in the initial election at the time of transition, loses a subsequent
election and peacefully turns power to those election winners, and if these election
winners then peacefully turn over power to the winners o f a later election.12
O f course, one m ight argue that the two-tum over test is an unclear indicator of
political institutionalization as elections in transition dem ocracies are marked by a high

,0Ibid„ 84.
"Ibid. 108
1'Samuel S. Huntington. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth
Century (Norman; University o f Oklahom a Press, 1991), 266-67.
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level o f electoral volatility.1’ If a great percentage o f voters change their voter
preferences, political leaders m ight com e to believe that they can achieve either total or
overwhelming electoral victory over their opponents. Thus electoral volatility may not be
conducive to moderation and political compromise. O n the other hand, low volatility
should encourage less confrontational politics among the elite. A study by Gabor Toka,
however, persuasively argues that a high electoral volatility in Central Europe in the mid1990s has not prevented the consolidation o f dem ocratic regim es.14
Initial agreem ent among all sectors o f society' on the fundam ental rules o f the
political game. In his discussion of democratic consolidation. Giuseppe Di Palma warns
that “time alone—a number of elections or parliaments, o r other supposedly significant
institutional occurrences—is insufficient to advance consolidation: for example, elections
and parliaments themselves come under attack."13 Instead, his main argument em phasizes
the significance o f “outlying in advance of the rules o f the game—the norms, procedures,
institutions whose operation should affect a fair balance o f winning and losing."16 In this
initial phase of a transition to a pluralistic political system , diverse political players agree
upon clear, workable rules to which contending political players can com mit them selves
and ensure restraint, mutual security, and a nonviolent exit from authoritarian rule. As Di
Palma cautions, however, the negotiations o f these rules must involve all relevant
1’Electoral volatility (or net volatility) is defined as half the sum o f the absolute
value o f the differences between the vote of each party in two consecutive elections.
l4Gabor Toka, “Political Parties in East Central Europe," in Larry Diamond, Marc
F. Plattner, Yun-han Chu, and H ung-m ao Tien, eds.. Consolidating the Third Wave
Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1997): 93-134.
l3Guiseppe Di Palma, To Craft Democracies (Berkeley: University of C alifornia
Press, 1990), 143.
,6lbid„ 44.
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political players, or at least must be drawn with an eye on them, lest in the future the
effectiveness and legitimacy of newly form ed institutions and the rules of their crafting
are challenged. Therefore, agreement on the rules of the game requires more than a
majority. Instead it necessitates a broad, early consensus involving almost all relevant
political players. It must be noted that this initial agreement is not about formal
institutions, constitutions, separation o f pow er, or the nature o f the emerging regime.
Rather, it is about basic rules guiding players’ behavior and ensuring their security in a
fluid political environment where processes have uncertain outcomes.
It seems to follow from these considerations that the consolidation of institutions
in the transition countries of Eastern Europe depended on the speedy adoption of basic
rules according to which political conflicts are carried out. Indeed, the new democracies
became involved in the turbulent process o f rule making in areas such as division of
powers between president and parliament, minority rights, multiparty systems, civilmilitary relations, and market economies. The process o f rule making was carried out
under the conditions o f specific cost-benefit calculations, which made them vulnerable to
challenges when, subsequently, payoffs did not satisfy various groups. This phase of the
transition, also known as extrication, is seen by many authors as a crucial explanatory
variable for the institutional outcomes and future political developm ent.17 Initial
institutional choices are not easily altered and have clear im plications for the fate of the
new polity. In any event, it is expected that after the initial phase o f institution settingbuilding consensus on the ends—the polity would move to political struggle over the
17Some authors offer typologies o f modes of extrication. See Samuel S.
Huntington. “How Countries Democratize,” Political Science Q uarterly 106, no. 4 (Fall
1992): 579-616; Terry Linn Karl and Philippe C. Schmitter. "M odes o f Transition in
Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe,” Journal o f International Affairs 45, no. I
(W inter 1991): 269-84.
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means. In other words, groups m ove from the uncertain and volatile fundamental politics
to the certain (as far as the security o f groups and players) instrum ental politics.
The dom inance o f instrumental rather than fundam ental politics—consensus on
the ends, hut political struggle over the means. A well-institutionalized society is one in
which the constitutional order according to which political conflicts are carried out are
not themselves the object of political struggle. Once the rules o f the game have been
established in the initial transition period, politics lose their confrontational character and
become merely competitive. Jon Elster, Claus Offe, and Ulrih Preuss distinguish between
distributional and constitutional conflicts. Distributional conflicts relate to divisible
goods, thus easily accessible to bargaining within an established framework of bargaining
procedures and ru les.18 Constitutional conflicts are about the basic norms and
fundamental institutions of the political order, including the rules about competing for
and exercising of political power. In other words, constitutional conflicts pertain to
ideological conflicts in which, although actors do not fear for their survival, political
interactions are seen as a zero-sum game. Conflicts between political actors espousing
competing ideologies are not easily reconciled as they see each other as mutually
threatening. Each o f them questions the legitimacy o f its opponent and sees itself as
better off if the opponent were defeated.
The com pletion of transition from fundamental politics to instrumental politics, in
other words, from constitutional to distributional conflicts, m arks the routinization and

18

' Elster and his associates also define another category, categorical conflicts,
which involves conflicts about social belonging and identity. Exam ples o f this category
are ethnic and religious conflicts. Jon Elster, Claus Offe, and Ulrich K. Preuss with Frank
Boenker, Ulrike Goetting, and Friedbert W. Rueb, Institutional Design in PostCommunist Societies: Rebuilding the Ship at Sea (Cambridge: C am bridge University
Press, 1998), 147.
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consolidation of political institutions. Politics becom es the process o f competitive
selection o f sets o f policies rather than about the struggle between various ideologies
espousing different ideas about political and social order.
Writing about post-com m unist political elites, John Higley and Gyorgy Lengyel
make a similar argument by identifying a normative and interactive dimension in elite
c o h e s iv e n e s s.T h e normative dim ension is the extent o f shared beliefs and values
among the elite, as well as informal norms pertaining to political access, competition, and
restrained partisanship. The interactive dimension is the extent o f inclusive channels and
networks through which elite members, political parties and groups obtain access to the
political decision-making processes.
Inclusiveness o f political society—the degree o f participation o f diverse social and
ethnic groups. Political institutionalization is based, am ong other things, on the
fundamental rule that no group in a society is excluded from seeking political power and
participation. In the countries o f Eastern Europe the end of communism led to an
explosion of participation and political mobilization. The emerging institutions had a
difficult time channeling multiple dem ands and expectations from a suddenly em powered
public. In this initial phase of transition, the main challenge to the em erging institutions
was posed by the lack o f clearly defined and constantly shifting functions, authority,
resources, and even legitimacy. O nce established, however, one of the main challenges
comes from particular groups and interests. In the post-com munist societies the initial
phase o f transition witnessed the differentiations and aggregation o f diverse interests and
groups ending the preceding dom inance of the conflict between the extricating elite and

10John Higley and Gyorgy Lengyel, eds., Elites A fter State Socialism (Lanham,
Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000), 2.
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reform elite. The outcome is contingent on the capacity of the institutions to absorb new
groups, and the receptivity o f the groups to the institutions. If the institutions fail by
design or default to incorporate newly mobilized groups, there emerges a serious
challenge to the stability o f the institutions and the functioning o f the institutional
arrangement. It might be hypothesized that what worked in the institutions' favor, in
terms of fending off challenges arising from newly emerging groups, is the relative
weakness o f those groups in term s o f organizational depth, ideological clarity, and
functional skills. Although the disintegration of communist regimes brought about an
explosion o f political m obilization, it also exposed the weakness o f diverse groups to
formulate and channel interests and demands into a political program and action. In other
words, groups needed time to build their identity in order to assert themselves politically.
Among the newly m obilized segments in the transition societies, ethnic groups
already possessed distinct and identifiable interests and demands. Having distinct
identities and interests, often predating the establishment of communist regimes, placed
them into the fore of political conflicts and issues to be addressed in the transition.
Negotiating elites had to reconcile the often conflicting concerns o f building functioning
institutions which ensure the interests and security o f diverse groups, on the one hand,
and the traditional—and often supported by the society at large-exclusion of ethnic
minorities policies, on the other. Ethnically exclusive arrangements in crafting the new
institutions led to the most disruptive consequences in transition societies. The price o f
ethnic exclusion was not sim ply the failure of various institutions but, in its extrem e, the
compromised territorial integrity o f the state.
High public com m itm ent to the fundam ental values and procedurals norms o f the
state's constitutional system. In the post-communist societies o f Eastern Europe one o f
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the most important problem s of institutionalization is the extent and degree o f public
acceptance of, and com m itm ent to, the newly emerging and transforming institutions.
The institutional fram ework o f new regimes can consolidate only if a large majority of
the public supports it.20 At bottom, consolidation of the existing regime can be construed
as the process of achieving broad and sustainable legitimization: the belief am ong
relevant political actors and the mass populace that the current regime is the best one
among various alternatives.21 On the mass level, there m ust be a broad consensus on the
legitimacy of the constitutional regime, regardless of its immediate political, economic,
and social performance. Therefore, disengagement of legitimacy from the short-term
performance of the regim e requires nothing short from a transformation o f political
culture. In this process, the commitment to the constitutional regime, the rules o f the
game, and the procedural norms of the political process becom e routine and political
players and the masses do not question and challenge the established order.22 In other
words, citizens develop loyalty to the regim e by deepening their normative and
behavioral com mitments to the specific rules and norms o f the constitutional system.
Legitimacy is shaped by a wide range of historical, cultural, and perform ance
variables, which affect the normative and behavioral com mitments to the constitutional
order. In the nascent dem ocracies of Eastern Europe the political, social, and especially

"°Larry Diam ond argues that consolidation is indicated when at least two-thirds of
citizens believe that dem ocracy is the best form of government for their country at their
time. Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1999). 68
2lIbid., 65.
Writing about democracy as a form o f political organization. Dankwart Rustow
calls this process o f transformation, “habituation.” Dankwart Rustow, “Transition to
Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model,” Comparative Politics 2, no. 3 (1970): 337-63.
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economic performance o f the regime took on special significance as one o f the immediate
problems the em erging institutions encountered was the entrenched cynicism and distrust
of state and political institutions, a consequence of decades o f communist rule.
Historically, regimes which fail to deliver on citizens’ expectations are unable to gain
legitimacy in the long run. Indeed there is a reciprocal relationship between legitimacy
and regime performance. The regime performance is a crucial intervening variable
affecting the internalization of beliefs, com mitments that sustain legitimacy. At the same
time, if the regim e enjoys a high degree o f legitimacy, its institutions and political actors
can negotiate, design, and implement efficacious policies. Effective policies enhance the
individual political, social, and material benefits provided to the citizenry and thus
strengthen the regime legitimacy.
One, however, should not exaggerate the effect o f regime performance on
legitimacy. As noted above, legitimacy is shaped by a wide variety of factors, and the
more these factors produce legitimacy, the less significant the impact of regime
performance on the consolidation of the em erging institutional framework. Thus,
populations with a political culture, history, and prior experience which generate
commitments to democracy might be wiling to accept a short-term political and economic
“under-performance” o f the regime without seriously questioning the political and
constitutional order.
It follows from these considerations that one would expect to find in Eastern
Europe a co-variation o f public perceptions o f the regime’s political and econom ic
performance, while the legitimacy of dem ocracy as a political form varies somewhat
independently. In other words, satisfaction and dissatisfaction with the performance of
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the political system reflect partisanship and attitudes towards governments, while the
legitimacy of dem ocracy is autonom ous.2"

Independent variable II: Level o f International Institutionalization

In the last decades the grow ing proliferation of transnational interactions and
increasing dominance o f economic as opposed to military concerns, along with the
growth of highly integrated international institutions, have made synergistic strategies
more prevalent and essential to national and international governance. Certainly, the
significance of international variables that affect national institutions and national
developments, and the linkage betw een national and international systems, has long been
recognized.24 Later, am ple literature explored the interaction between dom estic, foreign
policy, and international negotiations. Putnam, for example, argues that the politics of
many international negotiations can be treated as two level gam es.'3
In his overview o f the crisis o f authoritarianism, Lucian Pye saw the sovereignty
o f the regime as being critically underm ined by the increasing flow of international
finance, trade, communications and technologies.J ' Similarly, it is now widely accepted
among students o f dem ocratization th at external factors played a decisive role in the
~3For a comprehensive study see Richard Rose, William Mishler, and Christian
Haerpfcr, Democracy a n d its A lternatives: Understanding Post-Communist Societies
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998).
' 4James N. Rosenau. Linkage Politics: Essays in the Convergence o f National and
International Systems (New York: T h e Free Press, 1969).
' 3See Putnam.
“6Lucian W. Pye, “Political Science and the Crisis o f Authoritarianism .”
American Political Science Review 84, no. 1 (March 1990): 3-19.
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regime change in Eastern Europe.27 W hile Western Europe had a substantial contribution
to democratization in Southern Europe, particularly in the consolidation phase, in no
other part of the w orld as in Eastern Europe did one witness the almost complete
withdrawal of one superpower and the radical reorientation of states in term s of
ideological principles, institutional objectives and social and economic transactions with
the rest of the world. External factors seem to be one o f the decisive sets o f reasons for
the East European change, causing the initial impetus for regime transform ation and
conditioning the subsequent democratic consolidation.28 The reason for the initial
"opening" of the regim es was external, due to the reluctance of the Soviet Union to keep
its em pire intact at any cost. The ideas underpinning the emerging regim es were derived
from the Western tradition. Additionally, the massive support in creating the democratic
institutional framework and alleviating the shock of economic transition cam e from the
West. Not unlike the South European experience, along with the process of
democratization Eastern Europe em barked on the process o f joining various European
and Atlantic institutions, which provided W est Europe with even further influence in the
region. In fact, even before the outset o f democratization. East European countries were
what Jam es Rosenau refers to as “a penetrated system ... in which non-mem bers of a
*7Archie Brown, "Transnational Influences in the Transition from Communism."
paper presented at the 3 P ‘ National Convention of the American Association for the
Advancement of Slavic Studies, St. Louis. Missouri, on 18-21 November 1999.
" 'X

“ Jeoffrey Pridham, Eric Herring, George Sandford, Building Democracy? The
International Dimension o f the Democratization in Eastern Europe (New York: St.
M artin's Press, 1994); Laurence W hitehead, "Democracy and Decolonization: EastCentral Europe," in Laurence Whitehead, ed., The International Dimension o f
Democratization: Europe and the A m ericas (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1996):
356-91: Karen Dawisha and Michael Turner, ‘T h e Interaction Between Internal and
External Agency in Post-Communist Transitions," in Karen Dawisha, ed.. The
International Dimension o f Post-Communist Transitions in Russia and the New States o f
Eurasia (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. 1997), 407.
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national society participate directly and authoritatively, through actions taken jointly with
the society’s members, in either the allocation o f its values o r the mobilization o f support
on behalf o f its goals.” involving a certain “ fusion of national and international systems
in certain kinds of issues-areas.”29
The international environment, along with providing the incentive for regime
transformation, posed numerous novel challenges to the security of post-communist
states. Therefore, East European states were faced with the task o f accessing threats and
designing policies to guarantee their ability to ensure their basic security needs. This
requirement also represents a major challenge to security studies to provide understating
of the region's security in a systematic way. Neorealism w ould point us in the direction
of measuring the state's capacity to influence and control the shaping of events within a
specific international context. However, the application o f this statement to the analysis
of East European states' security is obviously problematic. As stated above, neorealism
applies to great powers and its assumptions and prescriptions for small states give little as
a basis for investigation. In addition, most o f the realist research on the behavior o f small
states, which the East European countries certainly are, was done in the context o f the
Cold War and thus provides insights into their behavior under conditions of bipolarity.
During the Cold War, small states tended to confirm neorealist notions that systemic
constraints accounted for small states’ com pliance with the will of the respective bloc's
leader.
In multipolarity, however, the validity of this hypothesis must be called into
question. Small states find themselves free to choose among multiple policy options,
"9Jam es N. Rosenau, “ Pre-theories and Theories o f Foreign Policy” in R. Barry
Farell, ed.. Approaches to Comparative and International Politics (Evanston. IL:
Northwestern University Press. 1966), 65.
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being restrained by much more benign structural limitations. Newly acquired autonomy
in the multipolar international system raises the question o f what determines the security
o f small states. Since most of the East European states are by definition small states, it is
tempting to analyze the regional setting in search of the subsystem distribution of power.
That, in turn, would provide insights into the extent o f security enjoyed by various states.
Indeed, the end o f bipolarity enhanced the ability of regional powers to claim leadership
and superior status in various subsystems. The lack o f great power confrontation that led
to the extension o f their rivalry far beyond their boundaries provides regional great
powers the opportunity to advance their interests into previously off-limit states. Yet
regional subsystems are not insulated from the larger international structure. Regional
states stand in em pirically identifiable relations not only to one another but to great
powers as well. This leads to the reasonable assertion that the behavior of small states is
influenced by the com bined effect o f the international system and the regional sub
system.
Of course, there emerge questions about the relative impact of the international
system on the regional system, the extent o f regional politics on state behavior as
opposed to the effect o f great pow er interactions, etc. In o rder to preserve the neorealist
notion of structure one must account for the capabilities o f regional actors and the
distribution of capabilities among them, while incorporating the real impact of the larger
international system on both subsystem and regional states. In short one ought to account
for both actors' attributes and distribution o f capabilities.
To this end, this dissertation introduces the organizing concept of core-periphery
interaction, that is the pattern of interactions between small peripheral states and the
industrialized, dem ocratic system o f states in the context o f the regional subsystem. Just
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as neorealism distinguishes between capabilities as actor's attributes and the distribution
of capabilities as a structural component, this project defines a set of core-periphery
interactions as an attribute and the distribution of core-periphery interaction in the
subsystem as its structural component.
East European states, in addition to being small states, are located in the periphery
of the industrialized w orld. The core-periphery dichotomy pertains not so much to
geographical location as to the extent o f modernization, democratization, and political
stability. Similarly, external and internal constraints on foreign policy are stronger in the
periphery than in the core. Peripheral states are more exposed to external pressures and
are frequently internally w eak and fragile. This results in frequent instability and disorder
in the periphery. ’0 Peripheral states are frequently dissatisfied with the territorial and
demographic status quo and had often sought radical revisions. ’1 It was notably so in
Central and Eastern Europe for the better part of the last two centuries. However. Vital
also notes that these states tend to claim membership in regional system, organization,
alliance, association, or league—a distinct phenomenon of our times. In any event, what
need to be em phasized is that crucial to the difference between core and peripheral states
in their respective patterns o f international behavior are factors that are internal to the
societies in question.
In a contribution to the study o f European security. Ole Waever argues that the
continent has witnessed the transformation o f the pattern o f politics from the traditional
’°James M. G oldgeier and Michael McFaul, “A Tale o f Two Worlds: Core and
Periphery in the Post-Cold W ar Era,” International Organization 46. no. 2 (Spring 1992):
467-91.
’’David Vital. “M inor Power/Major Power Relations and the Contem porary
Nation-State,” in Efrain Inbar and Gabriel Sheffer, eds.. The National Security o f Small
States in a Changing W orld (Portland, OR: Frank Cass. 1997), 203.
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model of competing nations to a core-periphery model.32 W hile traditionally the basic
pattern in Europe had been a number o f centers competing with each other, in the last
decade this has been replaced by a pattern o f concentric circles around the EU/NATO
center. ’3 Indeed, since the end of com m unism a large num ber o f European issues have
translated into issues of “center-periphery, distance, questions o f getting in to achieve
influence versus keeping distance for the sake of independence.” Similarly, the
international and domestic politics of the states of Eastern Europe are no exception to this
pattern; political controversies range from the East European states’ quest to join EuroAtlantic organizations, to policies intended to increase the inflow of W estern investments
to the transforming market economies, to policies seeking to engage Euro-A tlantic
institutions in maintaining the stability and territorial integrity o f weak East European
states, to domestic debates about the dim inishing national independence in the process of
joining institutions with supranational functions. In this model some of the states are
closer to the center—not necessarily geographically-w hile others are more distant.
It is important to stress that in the so delineated model o f European politics, the
European Union, although not a formal security institution, has a crucial security role.
According to Waever, the EU keeps the core intact, provides stability to the near
periphery, and, if needed, directly intervenes in conflicts in the distant periphery. ’4 In

,2Ole Waever, “Insecurity, Security, and Asecurity in the West European NonWar Community,” in Emanuel Adler and Michael Bamett, eds.. Security C om m unities
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998): 69-118.
,3Ibid, 99-100. W aever argues that the EU/NATO represents an instance o f the
historically-tried method o f peace-empire. Empires constitute political centers whose
powers and influence extend radially with fading force, as a number of quasi-independent
political units operate around the center with increasing independence as the distance
from the center increases.
34lbid, 99.
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other words, the EU is an institution, which not only performs integrative functions in the
core but also attracts states from the more distant centric circles through the diffusion of
institutions, principles, norms and practices as well as direct intervention.
Another crucial element in the core-periphery model of European politics, as
delineated by Waever, is the issue of security. Waever observes that in 1970 West
European states moved toward a state of “asecurity," w here the very question o f security
am ongst the states lost its traditional meaning. ° Western Europe went through a process
o f “desecuritization” after which the possibility of change without the consent of the
m ajor states became very unlikely; it produced a “non-expectation o f w ar." '6 In other
words. West European states ceased to define their relationships in security terms. ’7 After
the end o f the rigid division of the Cold W ar, however, there is a new sense of insecurity
as new elements were added to the security discourse including ethnic conflict,
environm ental issues, migration, and organized crime, am ong others. Although the
em erging insecurity is more complex and hard to define as a pattern, it replaced the state
of "asecurity" as new concentric circles were added to the core of Europe; a new process
o f “securitization” ensued as new risks and threats proliferated.
Security problems and controversies appeared in a variety of forms after 1989.
Significantly, the traditional o n e -a state or group of states posing a credible threat to the
territorial integrity and sovereignty of other states--was the least likely security threat.
But not all security threats are posed by states that have the capability and intentions to
35Ibid. 88.
36Ibid. 84-7.
,7It must be stressed that the state o f “asecurity” em erged only in the context of
interstate politics among West European states, while the communist states still
constituted the overwhelming, and external to West Europe, security threat.
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circumscribe the security o f others. Security may be threatened by a state, which is
politically unstable and therefore unable to keep its territorial integrity as it comes under
pressure by discontent ethnic groups. A state may be a source o f mass migration,
therefore threatening the social and political peace in neighboring countries. A state may
be the source o f organized crime with international operations in human trafficking,
drugs, and weapons o f mass destruction. The proliferation o f security threats requires the
creation o f novel security strategies to address them. Therefore, it comes as no surprise
that a variety o f institutions, in terms of their forms and functions, are necessary to cope
with these security threats. Thus, while NATO provides the protection against military
threats, the European Union addresses the multitude of risks and threats arising from the
expanding interaction between the core and periphery. Accordingly, this study includes in
its analysis not only East European states’ relationship with organizations which address
security threats through traditional means—including deterrence and defense—but also
institutions that address threats through nontraditional means, such as values, norms and
principles that suppress threats and risks.

Operationalization o f Core-Periphery Variables

There have been several attempts to investigate and conceptualize the relationship
of core-periphery and post-communist transitions.lS Analyzing East European

8Jacques Rupnik, “The Postcommunist Divide,” Journal o f Democracy 10, no. I
(January 1999): 57-62; Laurence Whitehead, “Geography and Democratic Destiny,"
Journal o f D emocracy 10, no. 1 (January 1999): 74-79; Jeffrey Sachs, “Eastern Europe
Reforms: Why the O utcom es Differ so Sharply,” Boston G lobe (19 September. 1997): 7;
Jeffrey S. Kopstein and David A. Reilly. “Geographic Diffusion and the Transformation
of the Postcomm unist W orld,” World Politics 53, no. 1 (January 2000): 1-37;
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transformations, several authors point out that the farther aw ay a country is from the
West, the less likely it is to be democratic. In other words, geographic proximity to the
West exercises a positive influence on the transformation o f post-com m unist states, while
isolation in the East arrests this transformation. In a com pelling study, Jeffrey Kopstein
and David Reilly go beyond the analysis of spatial context as m ere distance from the
W est—pointing out that distance sim ply tells one that factors m oving over space have
discemable effects on East European transformations—and instead propose a model in
which successful transformations are determined by spatial diffusion o f resources, values,
and institutions. Furthermore. Kopstein and Reilly go as far as to insist that although long
neglected as a variable in the models o f post-communist transform ations, geography itself
influences factors determ ining the pace and direction of transform ations including
communist legacies, historical context, culture, and other factors constituting the core of
the so-called path-dependent explanations. Indeed, the authors conclude that the
geographic pattern o f success and failure of post-communist transform ations is
significant even when controlling for cultural legacies and institutional choices.
Spatial diffusion is a "complex process that involves inform ation flows, networks
of communications, hierarchies o f influences, and receptivity o f c h a n g e . A t the core of
the spatial diffusion model is a relationship of stocks and flows, on the one hand, and
transformation outcom es, on the other. The stock of the country represents the external
environment while flow s represent the movement of inform ation and resources between
the countries. Stocks may be the physical, political, economic, cultural and other
structural and environm ental conditions. Flows, on the other hand, may be represented by
analyzing both the actual flow of resources and information and the country’s potential
wKopstein and Reilly. 12.
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for these flows. The diffusion process is in large part a function of how open and
interactive states are.40 It is im portant to stress that, as the authors point out. while the
stock o f the state represent the structural conditions and environmental context within
which the state operates, flows indicate the willingness and capacity o f the state and its
society to behave in certain way. Indeed, as Andrew Cortell and James Davis argue, a
state’s formal subscription to an international norm or principle is not a sufficient
predictor o f the nation’s com m itm ent to this international norm.41 Instead, the norm ’s
‘‘salience” requires a durable set o f elite and public attitudes toward its legitimacy in the
national arena.42
In a similar vein. Emannuel Adler and Michael Bamett posit that security
com m unities rely for their governance structure not only on a common understanding o f
their m em bers’ international behavior but also on a common reading o f their domestic
behavior and institutions.43 In other words, the assurance that states participating in a
security community will not settle their differences through war is based on the members'
shared international and dom estic practices and commitments. Therefore, for the purpose
o f this study, the extent of state integration into an international institution will be
measured not only by the state's formal membership in it but also by the extent of public
and elite commitment to the institution’s norms and principles. The objective is to create
4(>For a description o f the form al model see. Kopstein and Reilly, 7-24.
41Andrew P. Cortell and Jam es W. Davis, Jr., “Understanding the Domestic
Impact o f International Norms: A Research Agenda,” International Studies Review 2, no.
I (Spring 2000): 65-87.
42Ibid, 68.
43Emanuel Adler and M ichael Bam ett. “ A Framework for the Study o f Security
Com m unities,” in Emanuel A dler and M ichael Bamett, eds.. Security Communities (New
York: Cam bridge University Press, 1998): 29-66.
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a measure that reflects the receptivity to the new norms and principles o f both the elites
and the public.
For the purpose of this study, states will be placed on a continuum of integration
with the European core. The more integrated the country in the main European
institutions, the closer the country to the core. Conversely, the less integrated the country
is in European institutions, the more distant the country from the core. The degree of
integration is determined by both the country's stock and flows. In order to operationalize
a country’s flow the study will investigate the following factors:
Membership in core institutions including NATO. EU. OECD. As already
discussed above, international organizations have important security functions. NATO is
the institution that provides traditional security through deterrence and defense to its
members. The Alliance also moderates the behavior of the allies.44 Even when military'
threats disappear other security problems may remain. Therefore, alliances may transform
their functions to cope with more diffuse risks and challenges. As Celeste W allander and
Robert Keohane point out. after the Cold War, NATO was being transformed into a
security management institution.43 Indeed, although many o f the East European countries
do not face a clear threat to their territorial integrity and sovereignty, they still seek
NATO membership as a means of, among other goals, addressing more diffuse security
risks and challenges. Similarly, EU membership is seen as another way to increase the
44 See, Christopher Gelpi, “ Alliances ad Instruments o f Intra-Allied Control.” in
Helga Haftendom, Robert O. Keohane, and Celeste W allander. eds.. Imperfect Unions
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1999): 107-39.
43Institutions whose functions, along with the defense and deterrence, include the
management o f security risks have rules, norms, and procedures to enable members to
exchange information and avoid generating security dilemm as. For more on alliances'
management o f security risks see, Celeste A. Wallander and Robert O. Keohane, “Risks,
Treats, and Security Institutions,” in Helga Haftendom, Robert O. Keohane, and Celeste
W allander, eds., Imperfect Unions (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999): 21-47.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

62

security of post-communist states. The European Union is an institution holding the core
states together, an area where the likelihood of political change through war is non
excitant so long as the organization performs its integrative functions.
Percentage o f international trade with the EU. Trade is also seen as diffusing
institutions and ideas.46 One o f the most significant econom ic changes in Eastern Europe
after the end of com munism w as the dramatic increase o f trade with the European Union.
Usually, the more advanced post-com m unist economies were more successful in
reorienting their trade patterns from the East to the W est without experiencing dramatic
economic difficulties.
The level o f direct fo reig n investments in the national economy. The inflow o f
direct foreign investments has been identified as an important agent o f diffusion of
institutions, norms and rules. Foreign direct investments also increase the state's
economic capacities and power. O f course it must be stressed that foreign direct
investments are a result of, not a cause of. successful econom ic reform. Countries striving
to attract investments must first significantly marketize their economies and fulfill the
requirements o f international financial institutions. Only then can states expect to attract
foreign investments. In any event, what is significant for this study is the degree to which
foreign investments incorporate the national economy into the core market and further
how foreign investments increase econom ic, political, and social capacities.47 The study

4r,Jonathon Eaton and Sam uel S. Kortum, "International Technology Diffusion:
Theory and M easurement,” International Economic Review 40, no. 3 (August 1999):
537-70.
47Foreign direct investments have been identified as an important agent o f ideas.
See, Ray Barrell and Nigel Pain, “Foreign Direct Investment. Technological Change, and
Economic Growth within Europe,” Economic Journal 107, no. 445 (November 1997):
1770-86.
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includes the foreign direct investments in both absolute terms and per capita. The per
capita levels address discrepancies in the sizes o f case studies' econom ies, but does not
measure the stakes the core has in the econom ies of the three countries. The total amount
o f foreign direct investments, therefore, provides a good measure not only o f the levels of
the core’s penetration o f the country but also the extent o f stake the core has in the
country’s well-being and security.
Public acceptance o f integration in the core. Integration in the core is a function
o f both the elite’s commitment and the public’s mobilization. A country’s flow can best
be measured by devising a measure that reflects the receptivity to the integration of both
the elite and the public. Whereas the stock represents the structural conditions within
which the state operates, the flow’s com ponent represents the society’s willingness to
integrate in the core. Indeed, although a state may enjoy good stock—short distance to the
core and neighbors bent on integration in the West—the elite and society, for various
reasons may choose to erect barriers to integration.
For the purpose o f this study I posit a country’s stock to be w ho its immediate
neighbors are. The stock o f a country represented by the structural and environmental
conditions within which the state operates shape the options available to the state. In
order to analyze a country's stock this study looks at its neighbors' position on the coreperiphery continuum. The more integrated the country's neighbors are in the core, the
better the stock of the country. A post-com munist country has a better chance of
integrating itself in the core if its neighbors are already part of the core or are also
striving to achieve integration in it. This measurement takes into consideration not only
the geographic position o f the state in relation to the core but also the decision taken by
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its neighbors in relation to integration in the core and their place in the core-periphery
continuum.

48

A state with a high level of interaction with the core enjoys membership in
various organizations and institutions associated with being a part o f the core state
system —the EU, NATO, and the Council o f Europe, among others; a high level of
econom ic interaction including trade, financial penetration by core states’ businesses, and
synchronization o f economic practices; and human and elite exchange. The core develops
a stake in the stability and security of a peripheral slate with which it enjoys a high
degree of interaction. The peripheral state, on its part, in addition to its own capacities
can "borrow” capabilities from the core in confronting the challenges in its security
environment and meeting the demands of transition to a market econom y and democracy.
O f course, one can easily identify the correlation between the attributes derived
from internal capacities and attributes gained from the pattern o f interaction with the
core. Transition states that have achieved a high level of institutionalization of the market
econom y and democratic institutions have also achieved a relatively high degree of
interaction with the core. Politically and econom ically stable and prosperous East
European states have attained associate agreements with the European Union and are on
their way to negotiating membership in the institution. Stable national politics have also
qualified them for membership in NATO and increased the penetration of foreign capital

48

Although not investigating the international integration o f post-communist
states, Kopstein and Reilly make some conclusions relevant to this study. Using
regression analysis, the authors conclude that neighbors are strong determinants of
political and economic behavior. See Kopstein and Reilly, 18. O ne can hypothesize, then,
that neighbors are strong determinant of international behavior, including a willingness to
integrate.
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from the core states, thus increasing their chances o f sustaining the political and
economic stability so vital to strengthening o f national institutions.

Dependent Variable: National Security

It is this dissertation’s contention that the security of a transition state depends on
its power. The power o f the state, on its part, can be analyzed by investigating the state's
capabilities and the distribution o f capabilities in the subsystem o f which the state is a
member. There are two sources o f state capabilities—the strength o f national institutions
and the capabilities the state can derive from the core state system. The system-wide
component in the model is the distribution of patterns of core-periphery interactions in
the subsystem in which the state is located.
One of the major problem s with the dependent variable “security” is its definition
as a concept. As David Baldwin observes, security has not been an important analytical
concept for most security studies scholars.49 During the Cold War. if the military was
relevant to an issue, it was considered a security issue, reflecting the dominance o f the
field by scholars of military statecraft. Conversely, if the military was not relevant, the
issue was consigned to the area o f low politics. Accordingly, security was defined as the
absence of threat to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the nation-state.
Specifically, the West defined security as the absence of military threat from the Soviet
bloc and Moscow defined security as the absence o f military threat from NATO.
The last decade has w itnessed the proliferation of attempts to redefine security by
giving high priority to previously ignored issues such as human rights, the environment,
49See Baldwin, ‘T h e C oncept o f Security.”
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drug trafficking, organized crim e, human smuggling, and social issues. According to
David Baldwin, however, surprisingly little attention has been devoted to defining the
meaning o f security. In other words, there have been only limited attem pts to explicate
the conceptual issues o f security. Instead, most o f the exploration o f security intertwines
conceptual analysis with empirical observations. Authors construct propositions, theories,
and analytical frameworks as a substitute for the concept o f security. C oncepts, however,
are not theories or propositions; they are constructs, ideas o f general or abstract nature,
which are used in the construction o f theories. Therefore, Baldwin argues that
“understanding the concept o f security is a fundamentally different kind o f intellectual
exercise from specifying the conditions under which security may be attained.”30
In defining the working definition o f security in this study, the point o f departure
is Baldwin’s characterization of security as “the low probability o f dam age to acquired
values."31 As the author points out, traditional definitions of security usually emphasize
the absence o f threats. This formulation, however, does not include threats, which are
beyond any human control such as natural disasters. There is, however, another reason to
choose Baldwin’s definition. Small states such as the ones in Eastern Europe have little
independent control over their international environment. In response to external threats,
including a powerful antagonistic neighbor or civil war on their borders, states develop
deterrence policies. These policies are intended to provide security by low ering the
likelihood that an attack or military spillover will occur. Yet by virtue o f th eir relatively
small power, these states cannot determine the presence or absence o f the threats. The
best the states can hope for is to preserve acquired values ranging from preserving
50lbid„ 8.
5'ibid.. 13.
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territorial integrity to maintaining the well-being o f their society in the face of existing
threats beyond the control of any individual state. In other words, East European states’
security policies do not eliminate threats but lower the probability o f losing
independence, reversing the democratic process, economic collapse or anything else that
is defined as the states' values.
Furthermore, the concept o f security must also include two specifications:
Security for whom? And security for which values? For the purpose of this study the
referent object will be the state and the society. As for the values, the security o f the
states has traditionally included territorial integrity and political independence, and more
recently other values such as open seas, uninterrupted flow o f resources, etc. Therefore,
this study will include in national security the values as defined by the individual states.
Those values are usually included in the national security concepts and other
governmental papers created after the states found themselves free to pursue autonomous
policies in a rapidly changing and increasingly complex international environment. In
keeping up with the changing approach to security, these states, along with the traditional
value of state security, included in their security conceptions abundant references to
societal well-being and defined it as a referent object of security.32 The study identifies
the values o f state and societal security as defined by the national security concepts and
other official papers prepared by the security experts in each country.
The w orking definition o f security includes the subjective and objective
dimensions o f the concept. The purpose is to allow for the possibility that states and
societies may either overestimate or underestimate the actual probability of dam age to
32Following the logic o f distinguishing between conceptual analysis and empirical
observations, state security and societal security are different forms of security, not
fundamentally different concepts.
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acquired values. Therefore, “absence o f fear” is designated as one o f the values.
Operationally, the study investigates the public and experts’ perceptions o f the existing
threats to the state and society’s values which are defined as part of national security. On
the other hand, the immediate regional environment is investigated to determine the
objective state o f threats to the state’s acquired values. Attention is devoted to the
presence of states, conflicts and developm ents that present threats to security. They may
include neighboring states that challenge the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the
case-study state, the presence of local conflicts, which hold the likelihood o f spillover
into the state, or adverse economic developments likely to affect the well-being of the
society, among others.
In order to operationalize the dependent variable the study identifies what the
individual states identified as the referent o f security or, in other words, w hat values must
be protected. Then the study measures the level of objective security the transition states
enjoyed in the decade of post-communist transition. It proceeds with identifying the
official perceptions o f the level o f security enjoyed by the state. Finally, it gauges the
sense o f security or threats exhibited by the populations o f the stales. The study also
provides a comparison o f the level o f security each state enjoyed.

Case Selection

The selection o f the three case studies is based on three criteria. The first criterion
for the selection o f the three countries is a variance in the dependent variable, national
security. The three countries achieved different levels o f security. While the Czech
Republic enjoyed a relatively high level o f security, Bulgaria and Lithuania faced
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security challenges o f high intensity. Similarly, the populations exhibited varying security
perceptions. The second criterion pertains to similarities among the states in terms of
power positions in the international system and types o f political regimes at the beginning
of the transition process.
Third, the countries have similar size and by all definitions qualify as small states.
There is no widely accepted definition o f small states. The problem boils down to
determ ining the dim ension o f size. Some definitions use area as the criteria o f size, others
use population, GNP per capita, or military expenditures. Some authors prefer to speak of
small powers rather than small states by mixing physical with psychological factors.5'’ In
any event, by all definitions, the three countries are small states.

5;iRobert Rothstein defines small pow er as one which cannot obtain security
primarily by use of its ow n capabilities. Rothstein, 296.
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CHAPTER IV
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE DOM ESTIC INSTITUTIONALIZATION

Chapter IV evaluates the level o f domestic institutionalization in the three case
studies. Separate sections are devoted to the m easurem ent o f each co untry’s strength of
domestic institutions using the five factors constituting the first independent variable. The
final section compares the countries’ levels of institutionalization.

Bulgaria

Tw o-tunw ver test. Formally. Bulgaria meets the tw o-tum over test. The former
communist party, now nam ed the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), won the first
multiparty elections in 1990 and formed the first p o st-1989 government backed by a 53
percent majority in the Parliament. In the next elections in 1991, the opposition coalition,
the Union o f Democratic Forces (UDF) won 34 percent o f the vote and formed the first
non-communist governm ent headed by Filip Dimitrov. The minority government was
backed by the votes o f the only other non-communist party in the parliam ent, the
M ovement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), a predom inately ethnic Turkish party. In the
next parliamentary elections in 1994, after gathering 43 percent o f the votes, the BSP
again formed a governm ent led by Zhan Videnov, backed by a 52 percent socialist
majority in the Parliament. In fact, no party or group has so far succeeded in winning two
consecutive elections, as confirmed by the convincing win o f UDF in the 1997
parliamentary election.
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It seems only logical to conclude that Bulgaria w ent even beyond the twoturnover test as the opposition parties or groups have formed governments after winning
elections four tim es in the last ten years. Bulgaria's experience, however, must be
qualified in one im portant way. Following Huntington's prescription, it is expected that
the two-turnover test demonstrates that the losers o f parliamentary elections, operating
within the democratic system, are w illing to peacefully turn over power to the winners. A
peaceful transition is a reflection o f the willingness o f at least two groups in the political
elite to commit to the rules and principles o f democracy. In Bulgaria, however, no w inner
in a parliamentary election has been able to complete a full mandate in power. Each
government was forced to resign under public pressure, organized opposition, or both.
The first Socialist governm ent of Andrei Lukanov. after the economy and standard of
living went into a free fall, came under attack from a rapidly accelerating strike wave and
had to resign. B ulgaria’s president, Zheliu Zhelev, asked the politically unaffiliated
Dimiter Popov to form a coalition government which governed until the 1991 election.
Similarly, the m inority government o f Filip Dimitrov, formed after the UDF won the
second multiparty election, lost the support of the MRF in the Parliament and had to
resign after less than a year in power. The resignation cam e amid growing criticism o f the
government's policies by the president, unions, and the press. Once again. President
Zhelev had to appoint a non-party governm ent led by Liuben Berov, and supported in the
Parliament by the BSP, the MRF. and a group of UDF dissident deputies. After nineteen
months in power, the Berov government in turn fell out of favor with the odd coalition
and had to be replaced by another nonparty government, led by Reneta Indzhova, until
the December 1994 parliamentary election. The Socialists, winners in the election.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

72
formed a government led by Zhan Videnov, and relied on a disciplined 52 percent
majority in the National Assembly.
The last transition o f power, from the Videnov government to the U D F in 1997. is
perhaps the clearest exam ple o f why a formal application o f the two-turnover test alone
may fail to account for the degree of institutionalization. Am id dismal econom ic
performance, growing international isolation, and uncompromising political selfrighteousness, the Socialist government came under severe criticism from the public, the
president, nearly all political parties, and the press. After forty days of strikes, mass
demonstrations, student boycotts, and even barricades blocking streets and roads,
bringing the country to a standstill, the society came to the brink of mass political and
social violence. The Socialist Party, seeing the leaders of the opposition gradually
mastering the wave of social discontent. Finally agreed in early 1997 to relinquish power
and hold early parliamentary elections.
In Huntington's treatm ent of the two-turnover test there is an explicit reference to
the choice of the voters in determining the rulers. Indeed, in Bulgaria, as in w hat would
be an institutionalized electoral system, the “voters regularly ousted the ins and the ins
always yielded office to the new choices of the voters."1 It is important to note, however,
that in 1990 and again in 1997, the voters had their say only after the “street” had its say
and effectively forced both the Lukanov and Videnov governments to relinquish power.
It is only expected in well institutionalized political systems that governments, under
pressure of unfulfilled public expectations, would resign after exhausting certain legally
prescribed venues for change, e.g., seeking a coalition government, changes in the
executive team, or a new government agenda. In Bulgaria, however, the decision to step
'Huntington, The Third Wave, 268.
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aside was taken as a response to the escalation o f political and social violence. In other
words, the mode of turnover did not occur in the framework of formally prescribed rules.
In 1991 and 1997 the ballot boxes simply ratified what had been decided on the streets by
the naked pow er clash between ruling party and opposition.
Initial agreement among all sectors o f society on the fundamental n d e s o f the
political game. One of the most significant evidence o f failed institutionalization is
violence, ranging from civil war to ordinary crime. Civil strife, social unrest, and mass
protests, as a form of violence in the initial phase of institutionalization in Bulgaria,
signified the absence of legitimizing rules to which actors can refer.
Beginning in January 1990, the ruling Com m unist Party, its satellite, the
Bulgarian Agrarian National Union (BANU). and UDF initiated a series of roundtable
talks intended to set up the initial rules of the gam e.2 In the next two months the
roundtable functioned as a parliament as the com m unist-held National Assembly could
pass no law without its formal approval. The negotiations produced a series o f
agreements on political and institutional reforms including electoral law, basic
depolitization o f state institutions, granting citizens basic political and civil rights, and
support to newly emerging political parties. One very significant stipulation called for the
election o f a Grand National Assembly to sit for eighteen months to prepare the new
constitution and function as a regular parliament by passing new basic legislation. During

2For a discussion o f the roundtable talks see, Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan,
Problems o f Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America,
and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 333-43;
John D. Bell, “Democratization and Political Participation in “ Postcommunist” Bulgaria,”
in Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, eds., Politics, Power, and the Struggle f o r
Democracy in South-East Europe (Cambridge: Cam bridge University Press, 1997): 353403; Rumyana Kolarova and Dimiter Dimitrov. “The Roundtable Talks in B ulgaria,” in
Jon Elster, ed.. The Roundtable Talks and the Breakdown o f Communism (Chicago:
Chicago University Press, 1996): 178-212.
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the negotiations, the UDF found itself outm aneuvered and yielded on most points o f
contention. For exam ple, the UDF agreed to an early timing of the elections, thus giving
the ruling party—already having a disproportionately large base and resources—an
additional advantage. The BSP also retained Petar M ladenov as the head of state, and the
ruling party successfully resisted attempts to bring to the talks any additional, potentially
significant political players. In fact, Andrei Lukanov. a member o f the Communist Party
and later to become the prime m inister of the first p o st-1989 government, held firm
control over the negotiations and set their agenda.
This early phase of transition from totalitarian rule was initiated and heavily
dominated by the old regime. The ruling elite was able to constitute a roundtable forum to
set up the basic rules o f the gam e to ensure the security o f the participants and their
interests. Yet. the rules of the game and institutions crafted in the initial phase quickly
came under attack from newly emerging political actors. It must be noted that at the time
of its formation, the UDF was dominated by center-left intellectuals, most of whom were
former members of the Communist Party. In contrast to other Central European
communist countries, Bulgaria did not develop an organized opposition to the regime
until just before the beginning o f transition. ’ At the macro level, the initial changes found
the political system in what Linz and Stepan call "early-post totalitarian stage.”4 which
goes a long way in explaining why the still unreform ed communists were able to control
the transition. W hat is significant, as far as the initial phase of institutionalization,
however, is the failure o f the roundtable talks to include all significant players in the
process of crafting rules of the gam e, security, and new institutions. There simply lacked
"’For com parative analysis o f post-communist transitions see Linz and Stepan.
4Ibid.. 293-343.
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the process o f defining multiple opposition interests, players, and groups—a process
which in other post-communist countries took years, even decades. The process of
opposition formation and its differentiation into diverse political groups representing
various interests in the society began only after the regime initiated the transition. Even
then, the Com m unist Party faced a w eak opponent, internally divided, leftist in outlook,
and lacking in leadership and confidence.
The initial deal between the Com m unist Party and the opposition, which
obviously favored the old elite, proved unable to provide a stable transition to building
new institutions. After the elections o f 1990, the Communist Party, renam ed the
Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) in M arch o f the same year, found itself the controlling
majority in the Grand National A ssem bly, holding the presidency and controlling all
other still unreformed institutions. A fter achieving legitimization through roundtable
talks, free elections, and careful distancing from the personality o f the last dictator Todor
Zhivkov, the Socialist Party quickly lost interest in further substantial o r symbolic
reforms. Unwillingness to reform and dwindling standards of living gave impetus to the
explosion of strong opposition in the civil society. This time the opposition was led by
the emerging right-of-center elem ents in the UDF. These leaders, who cam e to be known
as the “dark blues,” were in fundamental opposition not only to the BSP but also to the
whole nature o f the transition, including the agreements of the roundtable negotiations,
the results of the first free elections and the right of the BSP to be a legitimate player in
the political system. The “dark blues” challenged leftist elements, known as the “light
blues,” in the UDF and accused them o f collaboration with the com m unists throughout
the transition process. In fact, their allegations of collaboration only seem ed real after a
number of key leaders in the UDF w ere revealed to have been “police informers" before
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1989. In the Grand National Assem bly, as the debate on the new constitution progressed,
the ‘"dark blues" refused to participate in designing the basic law in a parliament
dominated by the Socialist Party. They were joined by the MRF, which argued that the
draft failed to protect the right o f ethnic minorities in calling for the elections o f a new
parliament that would be more representative o f the rapidly increasing political dem ands
in society. In fact, the most intense opposition in the civil society em erged after the first
multiparty elections in 1990; this time they were led by the “dark blues.” The “ light
blues," on the other hand, were becom ing increasingly marginalized both in the
Parliament and in the UDF.
When the draft constitution was presented in the Parliament, the “dark blues"
walked out and began a hunger strike. The position o f the strikers was supported by most
MFR deputies and the increasingly radicalized UDF led by Filip Dimitrov. The majority
o f the UDF deputies, however, supported by the new president and former UDF leader
Zheliu Zhelev, fulfilled their com m itm ent to the roundtable agreements and in July 1991
joined the BSP in endorsing the new constitutions.
After the G rand National Assembly fulfilled its task of crafting the new
constitution, the Parliament set the new elections for October 1991 and dissolved itself.
Prior to the elections, the UDF com pleted the purge o f “light blues" and proclaimed itself
as the true anticommunist force in the country. Ekaterina Nikova observes that this initial
period of transition was marked by revolutionary rhetoric, preoccupation with the past
and what she calls “prepolitics and antipolitics.'0 Indeed, the victory o f the UDF at the
1991 elections did not subdue their uncompromisingly anticomm unist stance despite their
3Ekaterina Nikova, “The Bulgarian Transition: A Difficult Beginning." in Joan M.
Nelson, ed., A Precarious Balance: Democracy and Economic Reform s in Eastern
Europe (San Francisco: ICS Press, 1994): 125-162.
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lack o f majority in the parliament and the need to seek support for reform legislation. The
Dimitrov government’s most im portant policy imperative was the com plete
“decommunization o f the country." While the majority o f the proposed legislation was in
line with the attempts to create a m odem political, economic, and social system, many of
the laws were clearly aimed at denying the BSP a role in the society. The Assembly voted
to deny pensions to former m em bers o f the Communist Party above a certain post or the
security services. The so-called “Panev Law” barred former com m unists from
administrative positions in academic institutions for five years. The UDF also introduced
legislation that would have led to a broad purge of the civil adm inistration. In one of its
most controversial moves, the Prosecutor-General indicted Andrei Lukanov. former
prime minster and a sitting m em ber o f the parliament, for diverting resources to friendly
Third World regimes. Most significantly, in February 1992 a num ber o f “dark blues"
accused the BSP of planning a coup and threatened to ban the party. In a comparative
study of transitions from totalitarian regimes. Linz and Stepan argue that the "dark blues
were only semiloyal democrats in opposition in 1990-91."6 In interviews with UDF
leaders, Stepan finds them to be m ore concerned with moral imperatives o f justice rather
than formal constitutional procedures.7
Questions about the dem ocratic credentials of the political players aside, from an
institutional point o f view, the events of the 1989-91 demonstrated a lack of consensus
among the major political players on the essential rules o f the game and the nature of the
em erging institutions and political system. While in early 1990, during the roundtable
negotiations, there seemed to be a tentative agreement between the ruling regime and the
6Linz and Stepan, 341.
7Ibid.
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soft-liners in the opposition, the failure of the “dark blues” (either because their interests
were not transformed into political representation or because o f their outright exclusion
by the Comm unist Party) to endorse the em erging mles o f the game very soon put into
question the viability o f the consensus. Indeed, the failure o f the roundtable talks to
formulate workable rules o f the game was signified by the fact that, only nine months
after the series of agreem ents was signed and six months after the first post-1989 general
elections, the accelerating political and economic crisis forced the main political players
to sign a new agreem ent in January 1991. Even this agreement, however, did not
establish stable m les o f the game.
This initial failure, of course, should not have spelled doom for the prospects of
political institutionalization. De Palma argues that “a dem ocracy is not entirely doomed
by a difficult birth."8 Players can adjust agreements and institutions or even leam to live
with imperfect ones. Yet in Bulgaria the Socialist Party, gaining legitimacy after the
roundtable negotiations and victory in the first free elections, lost incentives to implement
further political, econom ic, and social reforms and isolated the opposition from further
institutional crafting. Although the decision by the Communist Party in late 1989 to
democratize was expeditious and relatively uncontroversial within its elite, the almost
complete regime dom inance over the initial transition precluded consensual institution
building. The roundtable talks, although providing an orderly venue for transition,
excluded, for various reasons, relevant players from the process. The constitution was
drafted and adopted by a coalition of hard-liners in the regime and moderates (light blues)
in the opposition to the resistance of the more radical opposition (dark blues).
Furthermore, the refusal o f the Socialist Party, once it assumed power, to reform both
xDi Palma, 108.
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itself and the political system did not provide the radical opposition with stakes in the
current process and emerging system. Riding on the wave o f popular discontent, the dark
blues defined radical “decommunization” as the overriding im perative o f its present
political activity and future governance, thus automatically excluding compromise with
the Socialist Party, seen as the bearer of the past communist tradition.
The dom inance o f instrumental rather than fundam ental politics—consensus on
the ends, hut political struggle over the means. The UDF’s refusal to regard the BSP as a
legitimate political player is but one example of an important characteristic of Bulgarian
politics. A well-institutionalized social order is one in which the m les according to which
political conflicts are carried out do not become themselves the object o f such conflict. In
other words, there is a dominance o f instrumental rather than fundamental politics.
Political players can disagree over what particular policies governm ents should pursue,
and yet broadly agree over the center of authority and the m eans by which decisions are
made. Political parties and groups in the society struggle over distribution of scarce
resources, econom ic and social legislation, foreign policies, and extent o f governmental
regulations. On the other hand, in well-institutionalized societies the players do not
contest such core areas as the separation of powers; the fundamental principles of justice
that underline the state; guarantees o f civil rights and liberties, including ethnic
minorities; legitimation of government through periodic elections; limits of government
authority and coercion; and, the right of diverse interests to representation and power.
Even when such areas are contested, the groups must be com m itted to seeking decisions
that satisfy more than a simple majority of political interests. F or example, amendments
to the constitution, contain those “higher order” rules requiring in most well-
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institutionalized societies two-thirds o f the votes in the legislative bodies and even the
positive vote of other institutions.
Bulgaria's party system is characterized by bipolarity with the U DF at one pole
and the BSP at the other. O f course, a bipolar model itself is not conducive to political
confrontation. In the case o f Bulgaria, however, the two blocks embody tw o significantly
divergent ideological programs, socio-economic policies, and ideas about the country and
its future.9 The great ideological distance between the two poles translated into
differences on the ends o f politics: the tw o parties differ to various degrees on almost all
fundamental issues, including division o f powers, minority rights, property rights, market
economy, and matters o f social justice. Not surprisingly, changes of ruling parties amount
to changes o f ideological directions rather than pragmatic alterations o f policies.
W hat is significant in the case o f Bulgaria is that the party system remains
structured on the base of the roundtable division between ruling elite and opposition.
W hile in the rest of Eastern Europe, the end of the roundtable negotiations and the first
free elections marked the end of the rigid separation of the party system into opposition
and communists, in Bulgaria there failed to emerge a significant political center capable
o f bridging the gap between the two ideological poles. In the elections o f 1991 and 1994
respectively 25 and 16 percent of the active voters were not represented in the parliament
and thus failed to create a centrist formation. Instead the BSP and the UDF dominated the
political scene and seldom allowed sm aller, centrist parties to emerge as consequential

9On Bulgarian parties’ ideologies and policies see Ivan Krastev. ' Party Structure
and Party Perspectives in Bulgaria,” Journal o f Communist Studies and Transition
Politics 13, no. 1 (March 1997): 91-106; Venelin I. Ganev, “ Bulgaria's Symphony of
Hope.” Journal o f Democracy 8, no. 4 (O ctober 1997): 125-39.
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players and affect their policies.10 Not unlike in the rest of Eastern Europe, the end o f the
initial phase of transition led to fragmentation in the opposition coalition, but unlike their
counterparts in the region the UDF purged the dissenting groups and individuals from the
organization rather than splitting into numerous w eaker parties. The process of
organizational restructuring in the UDF was com pleted in 1997-98 when it turned into a
single party rather than a coalition o f numerous and still rather diverse parties and groups.
The BSP. too. despite the existence o f numerous fractions within the party, maintained
relatively high coherence and until late 1996 w itnessed little threat o f splitting apart. In
addition, the presidential elections in 1992 and 1996 candidates with no affiliation with
the tw o parties did not come even close to gaining any substantial vote, thus m axim izing
the political dominance o f the bipolar model.
The dominance o f the tw o ideologically polarized blocs ensured the lurking
existence of fundamental politics along with instrum ental politics in the polity. The
separation of powers, parliamentarism, civil-military relations, market economy, and
human rights often became contentious issues and the object of polarized and bitter
political confrontation. From the point o f view o f institutionalization, what made these
confrontations significant is their persistence after the initial phase o f transition. In spite
of the relatively uncontroversial acceptance of the separation of pow ers in the
constitution of 1991, its practice has been rather dism al. There has been a protracted
struggle over the independence o f the judiciary. W hile in power, the BSP, perceiving the
Constitutional Court as anticomm unist, repeatedly tried to curtail its powers and
autonomy. Along with frequently accusing the C ourt o f being the political tool o f the
l0This model fits what Giovanni Sartori defines as polarized pluralism. See
Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party System: A Fram ework fo r Analysis (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1976), 131-45.
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UDF. the BSP has tried to adopt laws and policies that undermine judiciary independence
including openly defying the Court’s decisions.11 cutting the salaries and abolishing the
pensions of the judges and trying to remove them from their building.12 The other
institutions of the judiciary also came under attack; after wining the elections of 1994, the
BSP tried to limit the powers of the Supreme Judiciary Council (the self-government o f
the judiciary) and enacted a law, later struck down by the Constitutional Court, requiring
current judges, prosecutors, and law professors to have had five years o f previous
experience, thus ensuring that only individuals who had served under the communist
regime would have their current positions.1’ The judiciary system cam e under extreme
political pressure and arbitrariness when the Socialist majority in the Parliament
abolished the Parliam entary Legislative Committee and entrusted the drafting of
legislation to a C ouncil o f Experts—law professors affiliated with the Socialists.14
The UDF, too, has tried to influence, although not as zealously as the BSP. the
judiciary. After assum ing power in 1997 the Kostov government pushed through
amendments to the Law on Judiciary Power, which in the view o f President Stoyanov.

" ’’Bulgaria U pdate,” East European Constitutional Review 3. no. 3 and 4
(Summer/Fall 1994), 6.
''See Transition 1 (8 September, 1995), 29; For a com parative study of East
Europe's constitutional courts see Herman Schwartz, “Eastern E urope's Constitutional
Courts.” Journal o f D emocracy 9, no. 4 (Fall 1998): 100-14.
i;,See “Bulgaria Update.” East European Constitutional Review 4. no. 2 (Spring
1995), 6; For the B S P ’s treatment o f the judiciary also see Venelin I. Ganev, “Prisoners'
Rights, Public Services, and Institutional Collapse in Bulgaria,” East European
Constitutional Review 4, no. 4 (Fall 1995): 76-83; Albert P. Melone, “The Struggle for
Judicial Independence and the Transition Toward Democracy in Bulgaria,” Communist
and Post-Communist Studies 29, no. 2 (June 1996): 231-43.
l4See “ Bulgaria Update,” East European Constitutional Review 4, no. 2 (Spring
1995): 5-7.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

83
elected on the UDF’s ticket and sympathetic to its program , gave the government too
much power over the judiciary.13 Even more controversial, a provision of the law
mandated the replacem ent o f the current Supreme Judiciary Council, a body instrumental
in the appointment o f magistrates, with a newly elected one before the end o f its term. In
fact, as Sergio Bartole observes in this case, the C onstitution invites political meddling
into the judicial system by giving priority to political appointm ents rather than to
professional qualifications.16 Furthermore, the government did not abandon the
Socialists’ habit of blam ing the judiciary for runaway crim e rates. Under these
conditions, it is rem arkable that the Constitutional Court in spite of its still unclear and
limited role has m aintained its independence, often going against the ruling majority in
highly controversial cases. The independent track record o f the rest of the judiciary
institutions, however, is highly dubious.
The notion o f parliamentarism, as the notion o f separation of powers, is often
misunderstood. During the crucial time of constitution crafting the dark blues boycotted
the work of the parliament, a tactic later embraced by consecutive oppositions in the
parliament, including the BSP. Even after ten years of transition, parliamentarian groups
still resort to threats o f boycotts, a measure with greater im pact and consequences for the
work of democratic system s than the mainly symbolic walkouts.
Economic policy is perhaps the rule o f the game over which the two contending
blocs had the most significant ideological split. Despite the UDF’s opposition to the BSP

l5Stoyanov later vetoed the law. See “ Bulgaria U pdate,” East European
Constitutional Review 7, no. 4 (Fall 1998): 7-8.
l6Sergio Bartole, “Organizing the Judiciary in C entral and Eastern Europe,” East
European Constitutional Review 7, no. 1 (W inter 1998). Available from
http://www.law.nyu.edu/eecr: INTERNET.
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dominated process o f institution building and constitution crafting, while in pow er in
1991-92 and again from 1997 on. the dark blues did not make concerted efforts to alter
the constitution and the form o f government. In the economic sphere, on the other hand,
upon assuming power the UDF embarked, w ith qualified success, upon marketization and
privatization in stark contrast to the policies implemented by preceding socialist
governments. It must be noted that one w ould not find the great ideological differences
on economic issues in the election programs o f the two parties, as the socialists formally
adopted the fundamentals o f the free market, although at a slower pace and with a social
orientation.
The BSP did not m ake any attempts to reform the economy before the elections of
1990. fearing backlash against marketization policies which would have inevitably
deteriorated the living standards. Indeed, the government of Prime Minister Lukanov
spent the last of Bulgaria’s foreign currency reserves to pay salaries and pensions.17 After
the elections, the governm ent found itself unable to continue this policy and the economy
went into free fall. It was the non-party governm ent of Dimiter Popov appointed after
Lukanov’s resignation which implemented, how ever modestly, the first reform policies.
Although the BSP avoided association with the painful consequences of policies intended
to bring the creation o f a free market, it also displayed lack of intra-party consensus on
the free market as a mode o f economic development.
After the 1991 election the minority government of Filip Dimitrov initiated the
most radical economic reform s to date, including further price and trade liberalization,
privatization, restitution, return o f farm land to the previous owners, and repairing
relations with international financial institutions (severely damaged after the governm ent
l7See Bell, 370-72.
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of Lukanov suspended the repayment on the foreign debt). The success o f the economic
reforms, however, w as severely handicapped by systemic and political problems.
Politically, the governm ent was restrained by its lack o f majority in the Parliament, often
sore relations with its informal partner in the Parliament, the MRF, and inability to forge
informal alliances w ith various groups in the society, particularly the trade-unions. More
importantly, the governm ent prioritized the privatization o f small enterprise and the
restitution of properties confiscated by the communist regime, thus neglecting far more
important (from a macroeconomic point o f view) decisions on the future o f large scale
enterprise, the creation of a functional banking sector, and creating the institutional
structure of market econom y.
After the resignation of the D im itrov government, the government led by Lyuben
Berov relied on the support of an odd coalition of the BSP. MRF. and U DF dissidents in
the Parliament. Lacking the popular and political mandate to lead the country, this weak
government stalled the reforms and instead turned a blind eye to the hidden privatization
of much of the econom y by former com m unist nomenclature. With the ascendance of the
socialist government led by Zhan V idenov to power in 1994. the reverse o f the process of
economic reforms took an even more op en character. Plans to implement cash
privatization were rescinded and instead m ass privatization was chosen as the option that
would keep “national w ealth" out of foreign reach. Resources were poured into heavily
indebted state enterprises and deals and credits from state banks were offered to those
close to government "shady" businesses. The restitution o f farmland was halted and an
attempt was made to reinstate collective farming. The Parliament reversed many of the
laws intended to create a market econom y and involved itself in the endless passing of
legal amendments. R elations with the International Monetary Fund and the W orld Bank
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were frozen. By the end o f 1996 the econom y collapsed: inflation reached 300 percent,
the G N P shrank by 9 percent, the corrupt banking system witnessed the bankruptcy of
several banks, and the average monthly salary shrank tenfold. Facing growing public
protest and political violence the government resigned.
After the April 1997 elections, the UDF governm ent led by Ivan Kostov enacted
radical policies to stabilize the economy, build some o f the foundations of a free market,
and repair relations with international financial institutions. The Parliament approved the
institution of a currency board, an IM F-supported mechanism which virtually strips
authority from national institutions in monetary matters. The government also initiated a
broad process of privatization, which this time included large enterprises and industries
considered by the Socialists as having national security im portance (e.g. National
Telecommunication Company, the largest state banks, and petrochemical and
metallurgical industries). In addition the decision was taken to gradually close heavily
indebted and losing enterprises should there be no buyers.
On civil-military relations, too, the two blocs have significant differences of
political programs which led to frequent clashes and tensions. The Socialists opposed
almost all reforms in defense matters beginning with their opposition to ending the
presence of the Com m unist Party cells in the armed forces during the roundtable
negotiations. The old elite also objected to any restructuring of the military to adjust to
the altered conditions in the post-Cold W ar world. In many cases the BSP's resistance to
any military reform took the form o f public confrontation between civil and military
authorities. In 1994, the joint-chief o f staff General Lyuben Petrov openly defied a
decision by the M inistry o f Defense to retire a group o f high-ranking officers as part of a
government program to streamline the army.
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The reasons for the significant differences between the UDF and the BSP on civilmilitary relations are not only ideological but also influenced by their respective visions
of Bulgaria’s place in Europe. For the first ten years o f post-com m unist transition, the
Socialists’ foreign policy objectives included the country’s membership in the European
Union but opposed membership in NATO, unless the organization included Russia and
became an all-European security institution.18 In May 2000 at its congress the BSP finally
endorsed Bulgaria’s bid to join N A T O .19 The UDF, on the other hand, from early on
declared NATO m em bership to be am ong the highest foreign policy priorities and sought
military reforms that w ould lead to m eeting the membership criteria.20 It is significant
that Bulgaria-although one may argue Slovakia as w ell~is the only country among the
EU 's associated members that in the ten years of post-com m unist transition has failed to
achieve consensus am ong the main political actors on the main foreign policy orientation
of the country. Although the BSP seem ed recently to have joined the other political
parties in their support of NATO membership, there still remain substantial divisions
about its priorities, preceding military and political reforms, and the policies and foreign
policy behavior membership would entail.21

18

‘ Zhan Videnov. “ Lektcija na M inistar-Predsedatelja na Republika Bylgarija
Gospodin Zhan Videnov Pred Atlantitcheskija Klub v Bylgarija, Iznesena na 4 April
1995.” [Lecture of the Prime Minister o f Republic of Bulgaria, Zhan Videnov Before the
Atlantic Club of Bulgaria. 4 April 1995]. Available from the Atlantic Club, Sofia.
1’“Socialists Break With Past, Back NATO," Reuters (7 May. 2000).
20After wining majority in the parliament, the U D F proposed and passed in the
National Assembly the Declaration o f National Consent which expressed, am ong others,
the consensual parliamentary support o f Bulgaria’s m em bership in NATO. See Bulgarian
Telegraph Agency (8 May, 1997).
2,“Socialist Party Insists on Referendum for N ATO M embership,” Bulgarian
Telegraph Agency (21 June, 2000).
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Inclusiveness o f political society—degree o f participation o f diverse social and
ethnic groups. Given the history o f ethnic relations in Bulgaria, and specifically the
decade preceding the beginning of transition, the potential for excluding the ethnic Turks-the largest, 9 percent strong ethnic m inority-from adequate political participation and
power represented one o f the most significant challenges to institution building.22 With
the forced mass migration of approximately 300,000 ethnic Turks to Turkey—in response
to a repressive cam paign of ethnic assimilation and waged by the com munist regime in
the 80’s~being a fresh memory, the interests o f the Turkish minority at the onset o f
transition had more to do with acquiring fundamental assurances for identity survival and
preservation than with conscientious demands for liberalization and democratization. A
remarkable expression o f the differences of perceptions and experience between the two
titular nation and the Turkish minority was the fact that while ethnic Bulgarians during
the regular Decem ber 1989 picketing o f the National Assembly dem anded political
changes and dem ocratization, the Turkish participants in separate demonstrations before
the building dem anded the return of their ethnic names, the right to worship, and the use
of Turkish language in public.
Ethnic relations and tensions were among the most delicate issues discussed at the
roundtable negotiations. The MRF was publicly invited to participate as a representative

220 n ethnic relations in Bulgaria sec John Georgeoff, "Ethnic Minorities in the
People’s Republic o f Bulgaria,” in G eorge Klein and Milan J. Reban, eds.. The Politics o f
Ethnicity in Eastern Europe (New York: Columbia University Press. 1981): 49-85:
Martin V. Pundeff, “ Bulgarian Nationalism ,” in Peter Sugar and Ivo J. Lederer, eds..
Nationalism in Eastern Europe (Seattle: University o f Washington Press, 1969): 93-166;
Maria Todorova, ‘T h e Course and Discourse of Bulgarian Nationalism ,” in Peter Sugar,
ed., Eastern European Nationalism in the Twentieth Century (W ashington, DC:
American University Press, 1995): 55-103; Blagovest Tashev, "Politics o f Ethnicity and
Security in Bulgaria,” occasional paper no. 9803 (Saint Louis: C enter for International
Studies of the University of Missouri-St. Louis, 1998).
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o f the Turkish minority, but for yet unknown reasons it declined to join the discussions.23
Years of ethnic oppression under communist regim e and gradual liberalization at the end
o f 1989 led to exploding political mobilization among Turks and the formulation o f a set
o f demands for improvement o f the human and civil rights o f ethnic minorities. Ethnic
Turks began picketing the National Assembly, soon to be countered by Bulgarian
nationalists in a mass protest. Both the UDF and the communists felt apprehensive and
uncertain about the simmering ethnic tensions in the country and the political role to be
played by the Turkish minority. Although the roundtable negotiations took place with full
public openness, discussions on ethnic issues were held behind closed doors. An
agreement was reached to ban parties based on ethnic or religious base, a provision which
later made its way into the Constitution (Article 11, Section 4). Indeed, the Constitution,
crafted in a Parliament dom inated by the Socialists, included no liberal provisions on the
way minorities organize politically and on basic human and civil rights. Elster, Offe, and
Preuss, in a comparative study o f post-communist institutions, observe that the Bulgarian
constitution contains no guarantees of group rights for m inorities.24 There is a
constitutional tendency toward ethnic hom ogeneity as reflected in the ban on ethnic and
religious parties, the declaration o f the Bulgarian language as the official language o f the
Republic, and the duty to use and study Bulgarian language—which is slightly mitigated
by the right o f citizens whose m other tongue is not Bulgarian to study and use their own
language under the terms of the law.
Although it appears that the ban on ethnic parties was aim ed at the MRF there
emerged a tacit agreement, at least among som e institutions, to tolerate its existence.
23Kolarova and Dimitrov, 191.
24Elster, Offe, and Preuss, 80-93.
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Early in the 1990 election cam paign, the Central Electoral Commission, a committee
charged with the overall im plem entation and administration of the elections, registered
candidates nominated by the MRF although a court had refused to register it as a party.
The UDF, although not always on good term s with the leadership o f the party, also never
questioned its legitimacy. The BSP. on the other hand, although it often found itself
cooperating with the MRF, repeatedly challenged the constitutionality o f the party, both
in its political rhetoric23 and, most importantly, through judicial means. It was only due to
international pressure that the Constitutional Court, against the letter o f the basic law,
allowed the MFR to participate in the elections of 1990, and subsequently reaffirmed the
constitutionality o f the party in 1992.26
Apart from their precarious and uncertain constitutional status, the MFR was
politically isolated in the first years o f post-communist transition. Although it controlled
the swing vote in the parliament from 1991 to 1994, neither the UDF nor the BSP
ventured to create formalized alliances with the party. The leadership o f the ethnic Turks
could not jeopardize its credentials by forming an alliance with the Socialists who were

' 3For manifestations of the S ocialists’ anti-Turkish rhetoric see the Socialist daily
Duma. Stayko Trifonov. “Why the Bulgarians in Kurdzhali Region Seek Protection in
Greece” (text). Sofia Duma in Bulgarian (26 November 1990). Translated by the Foreign
Broadcast Information Service. FBIS D aily Report-East Europe. 3 Decem ber 1990 (PrEx
7.10: FBIS-EEU-90-232; p. 15-16): For a more recent exam ple sec Radka Petrova.
“Ankara se Gotvi za Privatizatcijata ni.” [Ankara is Preparing for O ur Privatization
Process) in Duma (4 December, 1995). 1.
■°“Bulgaria Update,” East European Constitutional Review 1, no. 3 (Summer
1992): 11-12; It must be noted that in the eve o f the 1991 elections first the Regional
Court and subsequently the Supreme Court refused the register the party under the name
of Party for Rights and Freedoms. The Central Election Commission then re-registered
the organization under its previous nam e, the MRF. Therefore, the registration o f the
MRF was based on precedent and rem ains an exception as no other ethnically based party
has registered. See “Bulgaria Update,” East European Constitutional Review 3, no. 3
(Summer 1994): 52-53.
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associated with the anti-Turkish policies of the old regime. T he UDF. on the other hand,
could not bring the M RF into a coalition government lest it alienate a large portion o f its
voters.
The 1994 electoral victory o f the Socialists and two subsequent years of almost
total BSP political dominance which rendered the opposition impotent, naturally brought
the MFR and the UDF together thus ending the political isolation of the Turkish
community. In early 1996 UDF, MRF, and the People’s Union (a center-right coalition)
signed an agreement which agreed upon the selection of a jo in t candidate for the
presidential elections to be held in November. The newly created coalition, called United
Democratic Forces (UdDF), did not have much effect on the workings o f the Parliament.
However, its candidate, Petar Stojanov, went on to win the presidential elections in the
run-off. gathering 60 percent o f the vote as opposed to 40 percent for the Socialist
candidate. Once the BSP’s power and cohesion was destroyed, the incentives for
cooperation between the UdDF and the MFR w ere lost and they parted ways before the
1997 parliamentary elections. The MFR was once again able to avoid political isolation
by forging another coalition with several sm aller centrist parties.
High public commitment to the fundam ental values a n d procedural norms o f the
states constitutional system. Compared to most East European countries, the Bulgarian
population has exhibited a persistent criticism o f the implementation o f reforms along
with a deep distrust o f democratic institutions and officials. Political parties, parliament,
courts, and presidency, the core institutions o f every democratic society, score low on the
scale o f public trust (See Table 1). In fact, a majority of the public finds that the behavior
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of politicians and officials is even worse than in the com munist era.27 These attitudes
existed along with a dissatisfaction with the way democracy is developing in the country.
In Eastern Europe, satisfaction with democracy is strongly influenced by personal
political and economic assessments; the greater the political and economic optim ism , the
greater the satisfaction with the way dem ocracy is working. The impact o f satisfaction
with the way democracy performs is significant, for studies indicate that it is a
substantive factor that m ediates the effect o f other variables on regime legitim acy.28 In
Bulgaria dissatisfaction with the way democracy performs (See Table 2) does not appear
to negatively affect support for democratic regime and even the legitimacy o f the current
regime, however inefficient its performance has been (See Tables 3, 4 and 5).29 Indeed,
support for building a m arket economy and acceptance o f the present and future
democratic system o f rule simply confirms earlier studies asserting that legitim acy of
democracy is a relatively autonomous variable. However, in Bulgaria public attitudes
indicating the legitimacy o f democracy have not existed along with a strong rejection of
authoritarian alternatives (See Tables 6, 7, and 8), an essential component in every set of
public attitudes and norms that support democracy.
The Bulgarian public exhibited a relatively high degree of approval o f the past
com munist regime, and a significant minority has always supported the establishm ent of
a strong rule including a m ilitary one. Therefore, it may be speculated that despite the
' 7Ase Grodeland, Tatyana Koshechkina and William L. Miller. "In Theory
Correct. But in Practice ...” Public Attitudes to Really Existing Democracy in Ukraine,
Bulgaria, Slovakia and the Czech Republic,” Journal o f Communist Studies and
Transition Politics 14, no. 3 (September 1998): 1-23.
28Diamond, 77-93.
‘ Performance is construed to broadly include the political outputs and character
of the regime, as well as the material conditions it generates. Diamond, 77.
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high public support for democracy and its practice, until the late 1990s the Bulgarian
public remained ambiguous in its acceptance o f the existing political system and
institutions. Frequent political crises and a general lack of econom ic prosperity as a result
o f long-delayed market reforms have maintained a relatively high degree of
dissatisfaction with the way the political system performs, including belief that human
rights are not respected, disapproval o f the direction o f the country, dissatisfaction with
the development of democracy, and a low trust in institutions. Dissatisfaction with the
developm ent of democracy in the country and disapproval of the direction of country
were especially high during the majority rule o f the former com m unists between 1994
and 1996 (See Table 2). The ascent o f the UDF in 1997 brought about a greater public
approval o f the direction o f the country (from negative 63 to positive 21). while
satisfaction with the development o f democracy improved only slightly from negative 81
to negative 54.
It was noted in the theoretical discussion o f this study that legitimacy is shaped by
a wide array of variables. It appears that in the case of Bulgaria until the late 1990s,
performance variables, and one might argue historical variables, have not positively
affected the development and internalization of mass beliefs and com m itm ents that
sustain the regime’s legitimacy.

Czech Republic

Two-turnover test. Formally, the Czech Republic meets the two-tum over test. At
the First post-communist elections on June 8-9, 1990, the Civic Forum , a broad and
am orphous coalition of anti-communist parties and groups, won o v er 53 percent of the
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Czech votes for the H ouse o f the People. 50 percent of the votes for the House of the
Nations, and almost 50 percent for the National Council. At the federal level, the Civic
Forum formed a coalition government with its Slovak counterpart. Public Against
Violence, and the Slovak Christian Democratic Movement. As in most of the other
countries in the region the initial elections in the Czech lands o f Czechoslovakia were
dominated by broad-based movements and groups. The 1992 elections, however, were
dominated by political parties. In the National Council the right-of-center political parties
had a majority of seats and formed a coalition government o f the Civic Democratic Party
(CDP)'°, the Civic D em ocratic Alliance (CDA). and the Czech People's Party-Christian
Democratic Union (C PP-C D U ), which was led by Prime M inister Vaclav Klaus. After
serving its entire four-year term, the governing coalition returned to power in the 1996
elections (which were also the First elections in the newly independent Czech Republic),
although it fell one seat short of an absolute majority. Remarkably, it was the first post
communist coalition in Eastern Europe to win re-election. However, amid economic
stagnation and political crisis, the coalition government disintegrated and an early
election in 1998 brought to power the previously in opposition Social Democrats (CSD).
What distinguishes the Czech governmental turnover from the case of Bulgaria is
the lack o f political and social violence accompanying the change of ruling elites. Indeed
following the collapse o f the totalitarian regime, marked by the inability of the
communist elite to m obilize a violent rcsponsejl to rising opposition demands for change,

3(VThe CDP entered into an electoral alliance with the Christian Democratic Party
(ChDP).
’'Linz and Stepan observe that the members o f coercive institutions in
Czechoslovakia such as the police and arm y simply did not believe in the legitimacy of
the orders to use violence against the opposition in November 1989. See Linz and Stepan,
323-5.
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the parliaments, both on the federal and Czech level, becam e the principle framework in
which political interests clashed, bargained, and sought political ends. O nce the
communist elite was removed as the sole holder of pow er and voters in 1990 elected
relatively heterogenous groups and parties to the parliament, the potential for violence
significantly decreased. The w eakness of the Communist party after the first elections
had two important consequences for the likelihood of political violence. First, the very
low percent of votes the com m unists gathered in the elections (13.5 percent of the Czech
votes for the House o f People in the 1990 election) and the way the party simply
collapsed under society's pressure deprived the still unreformed party o f the capacity to
stir a radical confrontation and reverse the process of democratization. On the other hand,
the relatively low presence of com m unist deputies, along with the presence of a wide
range of anti-communist groups, legitimized the parliament as truly representative of
diverse political interests and thus decreased the incentives for radical and extreme
political actions. Thus, while the radical anticommunist opposition in Bulgaria found
itself institutionally marginalized and therefore willing to exploit its growing political
power on the street, the Czech opposition to the old elite quickly came to dominate the
process of institution crafting and clearly established the parliament and elections as the
ultimate arbiter in political conflict. Furthermore, the parliament in the Czech Republic
became the only institutional forum within which new political actors could interact as
the party system developed through splits of parliamentary-based parties and coalitions.
Of course, the conspicuous lack of direct public action and political violence does
not imply an absence o f public im pact on the political process, but sim ply the
significance of institutionalized form s of political action. Furthermore, Czech
governments did not base their legitim acy only on the outcomes of electoral votes but
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also on the support of public opinion between elections. Indeed, while direct action such
as protests, demonstrations and strikes have been few and confined to the non-political,
mainly economic sphere, changes in pubic preferences and attitudes have had significant
impact on government and party fortunes. W riting on the Czech elections o f 1998, Radin
Marada observes that the political crisis in the governing coalition which, ultimately
leading to the fall of the Klaus government and the holding o f early elections, was
preceded by a significant swing of pubic opinion. President and trade unions against the
government and its policies. ’2 Conversely, a public approval o f the Bulgarian government
reaching single digits, and universal hostility o f trade unions and the President against the
policies of the socialists failed to force the resignation o f the government o f Zhan
Videnov. Only when the prospects of widespread political and social violence threatened
the very foundations of the political system did the government agreed to resign and hold
early elections.
Initial agreement among all sectors o f society on the fundamental rules o f the
political game. Not unlike Bulgaria, the opposition in Czechoslovakia was surprised at
the sudden appearance o f a window of opportunity for democratization. No negotiating
team was ready to begin talks with the regime. It w as two days after the November 19
brutal suppression of the student demonstration that the opposition in the Czech part of
the state set up formal structure, the Civic Forum .” Unlike Bulgaria, however, the lack of

2Radim Marada, “T h e 1998 Czech Elections,” East European Constitutional
Review 7, no. 4 (Fall 1998): 51-8.
’3For a discussion o f the roundtable negotiations in Czechoslovakia see Bernard
Wheaton and Zdenek Kavan, The Velvet Revolution: Czechoslovakia: 1988-91 (Boulder,
CO: Wetview Press: 1992); Milos Calda, “The Roundtable Talks in Czechoslovakia,” in
Jon Elster, Claus Offe, and Ulrich K. Preuss with Frank Boenkcr, Ulrike Goetting, and
Friedbert W. Rueb, Institutional Design in Post-Com m unist Societies: Rebuilding the
Ship at Sea (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998): 135-77.
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previous formal organization and experience did not prevent the opposition from
dominating the talks and imposing the new rules o f the game. Indeed, the talks cannot be
characterized as bargaining over outcomes but rather as managing the peaceful transition
of power from the collapsing regime to the opposition. Vaclav Havel, the leader o f the
anticommunist Civic Forum, and his close advisers simply presented the regime with the
terms of abdication and transition. By the tim e the first round o f talks was held on
November 26, 1989, it was clear to almost all participants that the power had slipped
from the hands of the com munists. In the span o f two months, the roundtable decided on
the election o f Havel as president, the formation o f a coalition government with members
both from the communist party and the opposition, and the recall o f deputies from the
Federal Assembly and their replacement with m em bers from the Civic Forum and its
Slovak counterpart. Public Against Violence. On the Czech level, the Czech National
Council was reconstructed like the Federal A ssem bly. The reconstructed parliament, on
its part, encouraged the formation of a roundtable on regional, district, and local levels.
Unlike in Bulgaria, the First C zechoslovakia elections in 1990 and 1992 produced
stable governments that lasted their full terms. Indeed, until 1997 the Czech Republic
seemed to be the most politically stable country in Eastern Europe. The political system
went through the complex process of creating new political institutions without the
emergence of significant players that challenged the nature and direction of institution
building. The main norms, procedures, and institutions were accepted by all significant
contending parties and players. The political form ation and conflicts outside of
parliaments that marked the institution-crafting in the rest of Eastern Europe was lacking
in the Czech Republic; the parliament (first the federal and later the national) became the
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venue for addressing political conflicts and defining the institutional content of the
political system.
The lack o f a single party with a parliamentary majority to rule alone contributed
to the emergence o f a condition wherein plurality parties had to seek the support of both
ideologically close and opposition parties in order to establish stable governments. This
practice of sharing power and negotiating agreements of support provided diverse
political players with stakes in the emerging system and ensured their security. After the
1992 elections, the strongest political party, the Civic Democratic Party (CDP) led by
Vaclav Klaus, formed a coalition government with the Christian Democratic U nionmade of the Czechoslovakia’s People's Party and the Civic D em ocratic Alliance. After
the 1996 elections, the governing coalition lost its majority in the parliament. Klaus,
however, negotiated an agreement with the largest single opposition party in the
parliament, the Social Democratic Party (CSDP), to support the continuation of the old
government as a minority government. In exchange, the Social D em ocrats, led by Milos
Zeman, were aw arded seats in the parliament’s leadership including the Speakership and
several committee chair positions.
The year 1997 marked the end of relative political stability in the Czech Republic.
A deteriorating econom ic situation, rising unemployment, reports about corruption and
nepotism, and general Western unhappiness with the pace and direction of reforms, led to
the disintegration o f the governing coalition and early parliam entary elections in 1998.
After the elections, the Social Democrats emerged as the largest party in the parliament
but did not have enough seats to form a majority government. A fter numerous
negotiations failed to produce either center-left or center-right governing coalitions,
Klaus agreed to allow a minority Social Democratic government by not supporting any
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future non-confidence votes. In return, the Social Democrats agreed to give the CDP
major parliamentary posts and to consult with them on important decisions. ’4
However, growing discontent in 1999 over political and econom ic stagnation
marked the limitations o f informal agreements between the two largest parties in
parliament. After nine years of peaceful transition in which the very few mass public
protests were mostly confined to econom ic and social demands, the public once again felt
compelled to mobilize mass demonstrations dem anding political change. By the end of
1999. tens of thousands of Czechs demanded a new government and early elections in the
largest movement since the end of com m unism /5 Disillusioned with the political elite,
protests called not only for the resignation of Milos Zem an but also for the ouster of
C D P 's leader Vaclav Klaus. Klaus and Zeman dism issed the movement as irrelevant, but
nevertheless, responding to growing public and political demands for change, the CDP
felt compelled to rescind the informal agreement with Zeman and to consider ways to
replace the minority Social Democrat government—an unlikely option given the fractured
political makeup of the Czech parliament. ’0 Indeed, by early 2000 the tw o parties once
again reached agreement on a plan, which would keep the minority Social Democratic
government in power. ’7

340 n the negotiations between the parties following the 1996 and 1998 elections
see Steven Saxonberg, “A New Phase in Czech Politics.” Journal o f D emocracy 10, no. 1
(W inter 1999): 96-111.
^ “Thousands o f Czechs Rally to Demand New Leadership,” Reuters (3
December, 1999).
30Reuters (17 December, 1999).
37,‘Czech Opposition Party Backs Deal to Save Government,” Reuters (25
January, 2000).
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Coalition governments and informal agreem ents provided a framework of
political arrangements that ensured the stability o f the transition process in the years
following the V elvet R evolution.,s These political arrangements, however, worked as
long as the reform was delivering and the institutions were performing. Although the
Social Democrats and Civic Democrats were w illing to maintain inform al agreements to
support each oth er’s minority governments, the inability o f Klaus' and Zem an’s
governments to press with reform and deliver on promises and expectations ultimately
delegitimized the deals between the two largest political parties. In the final account, the
inter-party informal agreements have been a m ixed blessing for the institutionalization of
the Czech political system. On the one hand, inform al deals mark parties’ acceptance o f
the need to provide other players with stakes in the system and indicate their ability to
work in an environm ent of diffused power. N evertheless, the informal deals in Czech
politics after 1996 proved no substitute for effective politics. Although the agreement
between Zeman and Klaus provided workable conditions for minority governments, the
success of each government was ultimately contingent on the substance and success o f its
policies. In other words, in the context of a pluralistic political system not dominated at
any time by single political, party agreements proved a necessary but not sufficient factor
for a stable transition.
The willingness of Czech political parties to negotiate, com prom ise, and conclude
functional agreem ents was facilitated by institutional conditions, which did not exist in
Bulgaria. From the very beginning o f the transition in Czechoslovakia, dominant groups
and individuals held strong “anti-politics” views. Conflicts were seen as “politics” and
38The provisional governm ent set after the collapse of the com m unist regime and
the government formed after the first post-com m unist elections in 1990 were broadly
based as well and relied on the support of diverse groups and parties.
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thus to be avoided. Milos C alda observes that as early in the transition as the roundtable
talks, the anti-communist opposition was concerned more with the issue of parity in
transitional institutions-betw een Czechs and Slovaks, communists and anticommunists,
those with party affiliation and those without—rather than with elim inating the
communists as a political force/'1’ Indeed, in a stage o f the roundtable talks when the
opposition had to choose an electoral system, Havel rejected a majoritarian model fearing
that the dom inant position o f his Civic Forum w ould enable it to win almost all the seats
in parliament.40 Before the collapse of communism, Czech dissidents never voiced
interests in control o f government. Instead C harter 77 and the Czech dissident movement
developed into an alternative framework of social life, a “second polis” which existed
separate but parallel to the state.41 Following the end o f the com m unist rule, the form er
dissidents did not initially seek to institute a new political power structure.42 which would
establish control over state, econom y, and society. Therefore, leaders and groups in
Czechoslovakia tended to easily accept and accom m odate newly em erging groups and
leaders.

v,See Calda.
40Elster, et al. Institutional Design, 115.
4lOn Havel and Klaus’ ideas see Vaclav Havel. The Art o f the Impossible: Politics
as Morality in Practice (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997) and Vaclav Klaus.
Renaissance: The Rebirth o f Liberty in the Heart o f Europe (W ashington, DC: Cato
Institute, 1997); See also David M. Olson, “Democratization and Political Participation:
The Experience o f the Czech Republic,” in Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, eds., The
Consolidation o f Democracy in East-Central Europe (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1997). Linz and Stepan, 316-22.
42Linz and Stepan observe that Havel and his closest associates' style was not
only anti-political but also anti-institutional as little attention was paid to formal
institutional matters in the transition period. See Linz and Stepan. 331.
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In addition, the constitutional context in Czechoslovakia in the transition period
further enabled the em erging Czech political parties to adopt non-confrontational
behavior and rules o f the game. At the federal level following the first free elections.
Civic Forum, Public A gainst Violence, and the Slovak Christian Democratic Movement
formed a coalition government. To enact constitutional amendments and other major
legislation required a three-fifths majority both in the C ham ber of the People and in the
Cham ber o f the Nations. Under Slovak political pressure, one of the first tasks of the
Federal parliament was to define the divisions of powers between the federation and the
two constituent republics.43 Accordingly, talks between the federal governm ent and the
governments of the two republics took place from August to December 1990,
culminating in the adoption by the Federal Assembly o f a constitutional amendment on
power sharing. Although Czech parties failed to redefine the federation, which ultimately
determ ined its demise, the experience o f dealing with Slovak counterparts socialized
them in the politics of accommodating multiple interests.44
The dominance o f instrumental rather than fundam ental politics—consensus on
the ends, but political struggle over the means. Czech politics emerged as much more
pragmatic than Bulgaria’s. Despite the presence o f ideological rhetoric, parties tend to be
pragmatic in a polity in which even anti-system parties are gradually socialized in the
rules o f the game.43 Like in Bulgaria, the Czech party system was form ed along a left-

43Elster, et al. Institutional D esign, 71.
'‘‘‘O f course, this relatively non-confrontational mode of political behavior did not
prevent the federation from splitting apart at the end of 1992.
4:>On Czech political parties see W endy Hollis. Democratic Consolidation in
Eastern Europe: The Influence o f the Communist Legacy in Hungary>, the Czech
Republic, and Romania (New York: Colum bia University Press, 1999), 221-90.
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right axis. Yet, public and elite preferences never gravitated tow ard the extreme ends of
the axis. Data presented by Michal Klima indicates that the early transformation o f the
Czech political system was dominated by a centrist orientation.46 Later, with the advent
of market and political reforms, and the disintegration of the C ivic Forum, both the public
and the political elite moved in a markedly right direction, a development manifested in
the election to the Parliament o f right-of-center political parties in 1992.47 Klima
observes that even after the consolidation o f the Czech political system and the return of
centrist tendencies, overwhelm ing public preferences for the right-of-center orientations
remained a stable phenomenon. Recent public opinion polls seem to suggest that these
preferences remain stable.

48

Most contemporary political parties in the Czech Republic seem to gravitate to the
center o f the right-left axis.47 Most are to the right on economics and liberal on libertyauthority issues. O f course, one should not overstate the sim ilarities between political
parties. The two major Christian parties, while committed to a free market, defend the
role of the Church and religious values in social and political life and favor property
restitution questions. The Social Democrats, in contrast to the center-right parties, while
tending toward the market, favor more state involvement. The differences among the
majority of mainstream parties, however, do not lead to intense political confrontations of
46Michal Klima, “Consolidation and Stabilization of the Party System in the
Czech Republic,” Political Studies 46, no 3 (Special issue, 1998): 495-510.
470 n ly approximately 20 percent o f deputies identified themselves with the left
while the rest placed themselves in the center and on the right along the left-right axis.
See Klima, 498.
48“Right and Center Orientation Prevailing Among C zechs.” Czech News Aeencv
(12 April. 2000).
4<,Olson, 183.
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the type that stalled the form ation o f a stable institution in Bulgaria and postponed
economic reform.
There are several factors th at may go a long way in explaining the relative lack of
confrontation between political parties in the C zech Republic and their gravitation toward
the center o f the right-left axis. G eoffrey Evans and Stephen W hitefield hypothesize that
in countries as the Czech Republic, characterized by relatively advanced econom ic
development, high ethnic hom ogeneity, and stable borders, attitudes toward the market
are likely to be the most significant dimension in the structure o f political cleavages.30
Where socio-economic issues dom inate the basis o f partisanship, the potential for
consensus at mass and elite levels is more likely than in societies where ethnic divisions
and questions of borders and national identity are central to the structuring of political
cleavages. Indeed, political parties in the Czech Republic, from early on in the transition,
focused their discourse and partisanship mainly on economic issues.31 The main issues of
contention were related to econom ic reform, privatization and the associated corruption,
and the general role of the state in the market.
Even over economic issues Czech political parties adopted a much more
pragmatic approach than their political discourse might suggest. In the first eight years of
economic reforms, despite Vaclav K laus’ neoliberal rhetoric, the government
implemented policies that seem ed to satisfy all politically significant interests and
ensured that none o f them w'ould undermine reform s and newly established institutions.

30Geoffrey Evans and Stephen W hitefield, “The Structuring o f Political Cleavages
in Post-Communist Societies: T he C ase of the Czech Republic and Slovakia,” Political
Studies 46, no. 1 (March 1998): 115-39.
31Jan Obrman, ‘T h e Czechoslovak Elections: A Guide to the Parties,” RFE/RL
Research Report 1 no. 22 (29 M ay, 1992): 1-16; Olson.
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In contrast to Bulgaria, the political elite who designed the transformation policies in the
Czech Republic was newly formed and liberal, and was not connected with the old
com m unist elite and the associated managerial class that presided over the economy. In
fact, the communist party failed to transform into a significant political player with any
real impact on the political and economic transformation. Indeed, in this respect the
Czech Republic is unique in Eastern Europe, as it produced the only genuine socialdem ocratic party, the CSSD, which has no roots in the old communist party.
The new political elite embarked on quick privatization aimed at precipitating the
formation o f powerful interests that might have prevented it. The lack o f presentation of
the old political and economic class in the new leadership, however, made a conflict
between reformers and managerial class inevitable. Recognition of the significance of the
hurdle the old economic elite might pose to the reform convinced the reform ers to
provide the managerial class with stakes in the market.32 Indeed, the old econom ic elite
acquired control over almost half of the enterprises and m aintained their managerial jobs.
The privatization of big businesses was accompanied by the restitution o f old assets
confiscated after the communist takeover in 1948 and the auctioning of sm all enterprises.
Despite Vaclav Klaus’ neoliberal rhetoric, the first Czech governments attempted
to satisfy various interests in their pursuit of com prehensive reforms. From the beginning
o f the transition, the government embarked on policies designed to build a market
econom y while implementing social democratic policies to maintain basic living
standards and alleviate the negative consequences o f transition. Indeed, as M aark Tomass
observes, although the neoliberal ideology takes credit for the success o f the Czech

32M aark Tomass, “A Decade of Conflicts in Czech Economic Transform ation,”
Journal o f Economic Issues 33, no 2 (June 1999): 315-24
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transition, much o f the economy was controlled by the government.3'' It must be noted, of
course, that state control is not in itself instrumental for a successful economic and social
transformation as the Bulgarian case only too conspicuously illustrates. The Czech
reformers, however, used the pow er of the state to stir the reform and ensure that all
concerns of diverse social and political interests in the society are addressed by
governmental policies. Hence, the transition to a m arket economy was not challenged by
old elites-how ever weak the political elite might have been -an d the society as a whole.
In the economic sphere the trade unions did not have reason to protest, and in the political
sphere until 1998. the society did not see reasons to dem and dramatic changes in the
mode o f transition.
Foreign and defense policies are even less contentions areas o f political discourse.
Daniel Nelson and Thom as Szayna observe that security and defense issues have a low
priority and marked indifference among the electorate. Similarly, the political elite,
missing the incentive for political gains, rarely engages in debates on security and the
military.34 The uninterrupted rule o f the Civic Democrats, their allies, and President
Havel ensured a high degree of continuity in foreign and defense policy. As early as April
1993, the Parliament received and noted principle guidelines for foreign policy including
progressive engagement and membership in the European Union. NATO, and the
W EU .33 On security policies in particular, the Czech political elite sees NATO as the

53Ibid., 322.
34Daniel N. Nelson and Thom as Szanyna, N A T O 's Membership am i Central
European Politics: Effects o f Alliance Transformation (Santa Monica, CA: RAND.
1997), 19-27.
33Miloslav Had and V ladim ir Handl, "The C zech Republic," in Richard Smoke,
ed., Perceptions o f Security’: Public Opinion and Expert Assessments in Europe's New
Democracies (M anchester, UK: M anchester University Press, 1996): 129-43.
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only institution capable o f ensuring the state’s security. Had and Handl identify som e
differences among the elite on the tim ing and methods o f achieving NATO
membership.30 These differences, however, did not dilute the existing unanimity that
NATO remained the Czech Republic’s main security goal. When the state was invited to
join the Alliance in 1997, no political controversies and divisions were generated by
either the public or the political elite. Consequently, the ascent to pow er of the Social
Democrats did not in any substantial way change the state's foreign and security
policies.37
Inclusiveness o f political society—decree o f participation o f diverse social and
ethnic groups. The disintegration o f the communist regime in Czechoslovakia brought
about an explosion o f political and social mobilization and participation. The em erging
institutions, however, were able to channel a growing number of diverse interests and
demands. Newly evolving groups were gradually socialized in the rules of the game and
accommodated institutionally. After peacefully solving its political, institutional, and
national conflict with the Slovak part o f the federation by way of peaceful separation, it
seemed that unlike m ost other East European countries, the Czech political system would
avoid the potentially divisive problem o f accommodating ethnic and national minority
interests. Most authors point to the high ethnic homogeneity of the Czech Republic as a
positive factor in the country’s transition and institutional consolidation. The absence of
restive minorities in the country or Czech diaspora in neighboring states is seen as
56Ibid, 139-40.
3?During the K osovo crises in 1999, the Czech Republic irritated the Alliance by
publicly proposing to mediate in the conflict and it appeared that the national foreign
policy elite did not speak with one voice on the conflict. This lack o f consistency tow ard
the crisis, however, did not in any way signify departure from the state’s foreign and
security priorities and policies.
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eliminating the potential for intense political confrontation fed by interests defined by
distinct ethnic or national identities. The stable institutionalization o f the political system
was assured by the ability of institutions to absorb new groups and by the receptivity of
the groups to these institutions. Minority ethnic groups are seen by most authors as hard
to accommodate by political and social systems traditionally unresponsive to their
distinct demands and interests.
The capacity o f Czech institutions to absorb new groups has been challenged by
late 1990s in the emergence o f the Roma problem. After the collapse of the com munist
regime, the Rom anies—a m inority traditionally discrim inated against and just over 2
percent of the population-did not manage to achieve any politically meaningful
organization that would have enabled them to seek political power and participation.
Although 32 Roma political parties existed none o f them gathered enough votes to send
deputies to the Parliament.38 T he lack of political representation only compounded the
social, economic, and legal problem s the Romanies encounter in the Czech Republic. The
disintegration of the communist regim e and the subsequent transition toward dem ocracy
and a market econom y destroyed previously the existing pattern o f relationship between
the society and the Roma m inority. Romanies have been the hardest hit by the ensuing
political, social, and economic transformations. Although the unemployment rate has
been remarkably low for a country in profound econom ic transition, almost two-thirds of
the Roma are unemployed due to a lack of essential skills, minimal education, and
professional motivation. Socially, Romanies suffer from overt public discrimination and

38Jirina Siklova and M arta Miklusakova, “Law as an Instrument of
Discrimination: Denying C itizenship to the Czech Roma,” East European Constitutional
Review 7, no. 2 (Spring 1998). Available from http://www.law.nyu.edu; INTERNET.
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are often victims o f racially motivated attack s.^ Even more significantly, from an
institutional point of view, the new Czech citizenship law is intentionally designed to
exclude the Roma who were previously citizens o f the federation until 1993.60
One o f the most dramatic consequences o f dem ocratization in Eastern Europe was
the emergence o f ethnic identities as an instrumental factor in political mobilization.
Ethnic groups, already holding distinct identities and interests, organized for political
action and placed demands for inclusion in the new ly em erging institutional framework.
Often the failure of bargaining elites to include and accommodate these groups resulted
in the most disruptive consequences in transition processes. The Romany minority,
however, did not organize along a distinct group identity because, as Siklova and
M iklusakova point out, “they lack a com mon, consciously shared identity.” The
overwhelming majority in the group does not claim Roma nationality and identity
although that option has been available since 1991. The lack of a common language and
the dominance o f family ties in the framework o f social and economic interactions have
further prevented Romanies from achieving any form o f organized political and social
action. Not surprisingly, the minority had no unified concept of its identity and proper
cultural, social, and political roles under the conditions o f democracy. Neither the
government nor various Roma organizations have clear visions about the policies needed
to address the problem of accommodation. What is im portant from the institutionalization
point o f view, however, is that at least until 1997, the Roma minority did not present a

59United States Department o f State, The Czech Republic Country Report on
Human Rights Practices fo r 1997 (W ashington, DC: US Department of State. 1998),
section 5.
°°See Jiri Pehe. “Law on Romanies Causes U proar in Czech Republic," RFE/RL
Research Report 2, no. 1(12 February, 1993): 18-22.
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significant predicament in the process o f incorporating newly mobilized groups into the
institutional framework.
It was only in 1997 that the Czech Republic witnessed the emergence o f the Roma
minority as a separate dimension in the transition. As thousands of Romanies tried to
immigrate to the West and there appeared more frequent reports of racist practices, the
government came under intense international scrutiny. The Canadian government,
responding to an influx o f Czech Romanies, imposed visa requirements for all Czech
citizens; some Western European governm ents threatened to follow suit, and the
European Union criticized the state for failing to address the legal, social, and economic
status of the minority. The debate reached em barrassing proportions when the city
council o f Usti nad Labem erected a wall to separate Roma council apartments from
private apartments. Only after the governm ent and international community intervened
did the local council agree to demolish the wall. The incident marked the evolution o f the
status of Romanies into a more prominent dim ension o f institution building in the slate.
President Havel called for a wider social debate on the issue and the European Union
defined the treatment o f Romanies as a key problem in the Czech quest for membership
in the Union.61 It appears that after seven years o f relatively unproblematic institutional
accommodation of newly mobilized groups, the problem o f the Romany Czechs gained
the potential o f creating disruptive new cleavages in the pattern of party competition at
the elite level. Furthermore, a future division at the elite level will be mirrored in a
similar base o f partisanship among the public. Indeed, as the analysis of Evans and
W hitefiled indicates, along with the issue o f social values, attitudes toward Romanies
“constitute the main aspect of a still w eaker but still significant second dimension" of
6l“Czech City Destroys Wall Separating G ypsies,” Reuters (24 November. 1999).
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partisanship.62 It remains to be seen whether the Roma issue will em erge as a significant
problem in the process o f institutionalization. It can be hypothesized that the failure of
the Romany com munity to mobilize for political and social action can only be offset by
sustained and robust intervention by international actors, the European Union in
particular.
High public com m itm ent to the fundamental values a n d procedural norms o f the
state 's constitutional system. Com pared to public attitudes in Bulgaria, people in the
Czech Republic were much more positive about politicians and officials in the transition
period. An overwhelming majority declared that politicians and officials’ behavior has
improved since the com munist era.6'1 Support for the principles o f dem ocracy and its
practice, a market economy, privatization, and multi-party system was near universal.
The public exhibited a high approval of the current and future regim e (Tables 4 and 5), a
common trend in most East European countries.
The performance o f the regim e seemed to have no significant impact on the
legitimacy of democracy in the country. Indeed, when the political system and society
began to experience economic dow nturn, political stalemate, and lack o f political
accountability on the part of the political elite, the public grew' dissatisfied with the
performance o f the regime and the direction of the country (See Tables 2 and 9). On the
other hand, these negative attitudes did not undermine the stability o f dem ocracy's
legitimacy.
What accounts for the relatively high level o f legitimacy is the high level of
public trust in democratic institutions, despite the presence o f dissatisfaction with their
62Evans and W hitefield. 126.
f” Grodeland.
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performance. Indeed, in the Czech Republic democratic institutions enjoyed significantly
higher levels of public trust compared to Bulgaria (See Table I). Richard Rose and his
associates observe that trust in dem ocratic institutions is associated with support for the
new regimes in Eastern Europe.64 Trust is also associated with the rejection of
authoritarian forms o f political organization. In the Czech Republic relatively high levels
of pubic trust in political and civil institutions seems to boost the regim e’s legitimacy.
Another factor that accounts for the legitimacy of the regim e is the Czech Republic’s
historical experience, unique among East European countries. In the inter-war period, the
country was a constituent part of Czechoslovakia, a country with a lively democratic
system and participatory political tradition.
It must be noted, however, that the Czech Republic experienced a significantly
lower level of political, social, and econom ic instability com pared to Bulgaria and
Lithuania, and thus public attitudes have not been tested by unsatisfactory regime
performance. It remains to be seen w hat would be the effect of the late 1990s political
and economic crisis on dem ocracy's legitimacy. For the most part of the transition, the
country achieved a high level of accommodation of diverse interests seeking participation
and satisfaction. The Czech Republic was the East European country with the lowest
level of political and social confrontation. The economic and political crisis of the late
1990s, however, exposed the fragility o f the achieved consensus and challenged the
regime capacity to easily address the interests of all social and political groups.

64Rose, et al.. Democracy and its Alternatives, 155.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Lithuania

Two-tum over test. Formally, Lithuania meets the two-turnover test. Since its
independence in 1991, Lithuania has held three parliamentary elections in 1992, 1996 and
2000 in which different political parties gained majority in the parliament and formed
governments. However, it can be argued that even before seceding from the Soviet
Union, the republic achieved a relatively high degree of political pluralism. The 1989
elections to the USSR Congress of People’s D eputies and the 1990 elections to the
Lithuanian Supreme Soviet witnessed com petition between various political formations,
including the Lithuanian Comm unist Party, the nationalist Sajudis movement, and other
nascent political parties. In fact, Sajudis, a m ass nationalist movement seeking
Lithuania’s independence, em erged as the dom inant group in 1989 by winning 36 o f the
42 seats to the Congress. A year later, in the first pluralistic national elections to the
Lithuanian Supreme Soviet in February 1990, Sajudis-backed candidates won 80 percent
o f the seats. The former com m unist party (renam ed Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party
[LDLP] in December 1990) gained only 25 seats against 99 for Sajudis.63
These initial com petitive elections were dominated by the question o f Lithuania’s
independence from the Soviet Union. The com m unist party, led by Algirdas Brazauskas.
favored a slow approach to achieving independence as the most realistic policy to ensure
peaceful secession. Conversely, Sajudis, led by Vytautas Landsbergis, centered its
campaign on the promise o f speedy and unconditional independence. Accordingly, on the

foOn the 1989 and 1990 elections see Richard J. Krickus, “ Democratization in
Lithuania,” in Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, eds.. The Consolidation o f Democracy
in East-Central Europe (Cambridge: Cam bridge University Press, 1997), 297.
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eve of the overw helm ing Sajudis electoral victory, the new Parliament voted on March
11. 1990 to restore the sovereignty of Lithuania/16
After the abortive August 1991 coup in the Soviet Union, both Moscow and the
international com m unity recognized Lithuanian independence. O nce the issue o f political
sovereignty and secession was finally settled the electorate turned their attention to the
pressing issues o f economic and institutional reform and at the sam e time increased their
expectations about the ability of state and political institutions to deliver the econom ic
and social dividends o f the newly acquired independence. Not surprisingly, the inability
o f the ruling Sajudis to stabilize the disintegrating economy, continued political stalemate
in parliament, and the inability of governmental institutions to implement even basic
reforms brought about changes in public perceptions and voters brought the former
communists back to power. In the 1992 elections the LDLP won a landslide victory in the
new 141-seat Sejm a by capturing 77 seats com pared to only 13 for Sajudis.67
Notwithstanding, this remarkable, in the context o f East European transition politics,
return of ex-com m unists to power, the 1992 parliamentary elections marked the advent of
fully competitive electoral politics.

w’On Lithuania’s transition to democracy, see Anatol Lieven. The Baltic
Revolution: Estonia, Lat\'ia, Lithuania and the Path to Independence ((New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1993), 214-373; Alfred Erich Senn, G orbachev's Failure in Lithuania
(New York: St. M artin’s Press, 1995); Krickus. “Democratization in Lithuania,” 290-330;
Richard J. Krickus, Showdown: The Lithuanian Rebellion and the Breakup o f the Soviet
Empire (W ashington, DC: Brassey’s, 1997); V. Stanley Vardys and Judith B. Sedaitis,
Lithuania: the R ebel Nation (Boulder, CO: W estview Press. 1997); Graham Smith, ed..
The Baltic States: The National Self-Determination o f Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania
(New York: St. M artin’s Press, 1994); Ole Norgaard, Dan Hindsgaul, Lars Johansen and
Helle Willumsen, The Baltic States A fter Independence (Brookfiled, VT: Edward Elgar
Publishing Com pany, 1996).
67For the results of the 1992 and 1996 elections see Velio Pettai and Marcus
Kreuzer, “Party Politics in the Baltic States: Social Bases and Institutional Context,” East
European Politics a n d Societies 13, no. 1 (W inter 1999). 157-8.
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The LDLP went on to govern alone but faced formidable challenges in trying to
build a market economy and meet citizens’ economic and social expectations. Although
the LDLP succeeded in bringing a measure of econom ic stability, the nationalist forces
(now reorganized as the Homeland Union-Lithuanian conservatives, o r the HU-LC) led
by Landsbergis won the 1996 parliamentary elections by capturing 51.1 percent o f the
seats and forming a government in coalition with the Christian Democratic Party (CDP)
who won 14 seats, the second largest number. The LDLP came forth winning only 11, or
8.8 percent of the seats.
Lithuania's parliamentary elections in October 2000 marked the ascent to power
of a new political coalition including the center-right Liberal Union which won 34 seats,
the center-left Liberal Union of Social Liberals with 29 parliamentary seats and several
smaller parties. The left-leaning Social Democratic C oalition led by Algirdas Brazauskas
and including the LDDP, Social Democratic Party, New Democratic Party and Russian
Union o f Lithuania won 51 seats. The Home Union of Landsbergis suffered the biggest
slip in support and gained only 9 seats.08
In addition to the three post-independence parliam entary elections, Lithuania held
regular and free presidential and local elections which further institutionalized the
electoral process as an essential com ponent of the political process. These elections were
seen by ail political players as legitimate and their results were not challenged.
Consequently, in the initial phase o f transition, the parliament became the crucial
instrument of system transformation. Indeed, political parties played marginal role until

68For complete results see Terry D. Clark and N erijus Prekevicus, “ First We Take
Vilnius, Then We Take Palm Beach,” Central Europe Review 2, no. 41 (27 November,
2000). Available from http://www.ce-review.org; INTERNET.
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after the 1992 parliamentary elections, which fostered the creation o f a more consolidated
party system.
Initial agreem ent among a ll sectors o f society on the fundam ental rules o f the
political game. Lithuania's model o f institutional transformation is sim ilar to the process
o f democratization in the rest of Eastern Europe. The institutional structure was built
through negotiations between the extricating communist elite and the newly em erging
opposition. The initial phase of transition to independence and dem ocracy was short and
consensual. The em erging organized opposition, led by the mass m ovem ent Sajudis, and
the reform com m unists, led by Brazauskas, quickly reached an agreem ent on the need to
achieve Lithuania's independence and build a new political system. Indeed, when Sajudis
emerged in 1988 it represented a coalition between reform com m unists and non
communists formed as support for Soviet leader Michael G orbachev’s policies of
glasnost and perestroika. Sajudis was formed in the Lithuanian A cadem y of Science by
intellectuals pressing for changes in the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic constitution
needed to accommodate G orbachev's reforms.69 Consequently. Sajudis grew and became
a mass organization, holding public meetings and establishing relations with all informal
organizations in the republic.
As in the case o f Czechoslovakia, but unlike in Bulgaria, the new ly organized
opposition in Lithuania built upon a long tradition of widespread dissident movement.70
Military resistance against Soviet occupation in the 1940s, a mass nationalist movement
including not only the elite but also lower social echelons, religious dissident activities,
lively underground literature, and sometimes massive dem onstrations and protests
69See Vardys and Sedaitis, 100-5.
70On the dissident movement see Vardis and Sedaitis. 80-100.
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defined Lithuania as one the most anti-Soviet and anti-comm unist nations in Eastern
Europe. Not surprisingly G orbachev’s policies of enlightened socialism presented
Lithuania with a window o f opportunity for political change; both Sajudis and the LCP
began to push for constitutional and institutional changes that would accommodate
glasnost and perestroika. Very soon, however, these dem ands were swept aw ay by much
more radical demands for political independence and democratization. In 1988 and 1989
Sajudis sponsored mass demonstrations and began to mobilize millions of Lithuanians
into a national resistance movement. The Lithuanian com m unists had to choose between
trying to moderate the emerging nationalist agenda and risk becoming politically
irrelevant in the process, or joining the growing movement. By choosing to stay
politically relevant and reformist, Brazauskas’ party maintained the ability to negotiate
and reach consensus with Sajudis. By joining the nationalist movement, the LCP also
ensured that no significant national political force would resist the process of institutional
transformation and significantly limited the likelihood of violent challenges to reforms
emanating from local political forces.
The LCP and Sajudis' control over the nationalist and reformist movement in the
initial phase of transition was by no means certain at the beginning. In late 1989 and early
1990 numerous political parties and movements appeared, some o f which claim ed to be a
continuation o f inter-war political formations, including the Democratic, the Christian
Democratic, and the Social Democratic parties.71 One of these parties, the Lithuanian
League, represented a formidable challenge to Sajudis in the process of capturing the
loyalties o f a newly mobilized population and formulating the agenda of the opposition.
71On Lithuania’s party system see Algis Krupavicius, “The Post-communist
Transition and Institutionalization of Lithuania’s Parties,” Political Studies 46, no. 3
(Special issue, 1998): 465-491.
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The League—consisting o f long-time political dissidents. anti-Soviet partisans, deportees,
and political prisoners—em erged in 1987 and adopted a radical program of Lithuanian
independence and anti-communism.72 W hile Sajudis was careful to present its program as
part o f G orbachev's policies o f glasnost and perestroika, and refused (at the insistence of
Brazauskas) to include in the official resolution o f its October 1988 founding congress
any reference to secession from the Soviet Union, the League dem anded immediate
independence claiming that Moscow was illegally occupying the country. In addition the
League rejected Sajudis’ cooperation with the LCP and called for a boycott of Soviet
elections and politics. Although by 1990 the League of Lithuania had lost its popularity,
its short-term impact was to radicalize Sajudis and shift the political debate and agenda to
achieving national independence.
The radicalization of Sajudis marked the beginning of a process of polarization
between the movement and the LCP. Initially the communist party kept up with the
rapidly m obilizing populace by promoting reform within the party and in the society.
Algirdas Brazauskas, a com m unist reformer, was elected the leader o f the LCP in the fall
of 1988 to replace Rigaidas Songaila, who represented the wing o f the party which
opposed reform s in the Soviet Union. Consequently, the party em braced many o f Sajudis'
goals and dem ands. Following the shock o f the 1989 elections, the LCP and Sajudis
reached a consensus to make major changes to the national constitution, including
making Lithuanian the official language, increasing national authority over the econom y,
allowing the Catholic Church to operate openly, and abrogating the communist p arty 's
monopoly o f power. However, these popular acts by the communist-controlled Suprem e
Soviet did not significantly increase the party’s popularity among the public as it also had
72V ardys and Sedaitis, 111-13.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

119

to accommodate M oscow 's dem ands for restraint on the rapidly radicalizing Lithuanian
politics. Brazauskas' party was in the uncomfortable position of balancing M oscow ’s
threats to intervene and the need to establish itself as a legitim ate party representing the
aspirations of the nation. For exam ple, under M oscow's pressure Brazauskas agreed not
to declare the national law supreme, while assuring the public that radical constitutional
changes might take place in the future. Sajudis saw the L C P ’s policy as going against the
tide o f public aspiration; consequently, the relations between the movement and the
communists became strained.
The LCP defeat at the elections to the All-Union Congress of People's Deputies
in 1989 and the prospects of losing the elections to the national Supreme Soviet exerted
additional pressure on its leadership to em brace an even m ore radical reform agenda. To
co-opt the masses Brazauskas began to press Moscow for greater autonomy o f the
republic and the LCP. By then, how ever, Gorbachev and the reformers, openly
challenged by hardline com m unists’ backlash against the policies of perestroika, were in
no position to accommodate the Soviet republics' calls for further liberalization. In
December 1989 Brazauskas and 80 percent o f the party's membership broke with the
Communist Party o f the Soviet Union and established an independent Lithuanian
Comm unist Party. The remaining pro-M oscow com m unists formed a separate communist
party, the so-called “night party.”73 Although Brazauskas successfully elim inated the proSoviet hard-liners from the party and decisively defined the LCP as pro-independence, in
the 1990 elections to the Supreme Soviet Sajudis won 80 percent of the seats, sending 99
deputies to the Parliam ent compared to 25 for the reform communists.

73Krickus, “Democratization in Lithuania," 297.
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One of the most significant outcom es of the 1990 elections was that Sajudis and
the LCP emerged as the two dominant political players able to determ ine the process o f
institutional transition, eliminating radical forces on the right as well as pro-Moscow
formations on the left in the struggle to define the national agenda. The elections did not
signify the end o f cooperation between the two blocs. Sajudis and the LCP supported the
declaration restoring Lithuania's independence and both advocated basic laws laying the
foundations of a pluralistic political system . In addition, Sajudis shared the executive
power by appointing reform com munists to governmental positions, including Kazimiera
Prunskiene as Prim e Minister, while Landsbergis was elected Chair o f the Supreme
Soviet. What accounts for this relatively high degree of consensual politics was the
question of independence, for even after the declaration o f independence was accepted by
the new parliament, neither Moscow nor the international community recognized
Lithuanian sovereignty.
The Parliament cam e under enorm ous pressure to rescind the declaration of
independence lest the Soviet Union im pose sanctions. After Lithuania's refusal to
reconsider, in April Moscow imposed econom ic sanctions. Dramatic deterioration of
economic conditions due to the sanctions, intense international pressure, and the
com m unists’ support for a compromise with the Soviet Union convinced the parliament
to freeze the declaration and to begin negotiations with Moscow. From the very
beginning, however, Landsbergis aimed to stall the process and the talks did not go
anywhere as both sides could not agree even upon the ground rules. A lthough Sajudis and
the LCP continued to agree on independence as the ultimate goal, the ensuing
confrontation with M oscow created the first significant split between the tw o parties.
Dealing with M oscow and addressing the growing socio-economic problem s caused by
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the sanctions and the early transition to market relations, strained the ability of the
political elite to maintain the consensual character o f Lithuanian politics. Indeed, there
emerged great differences not only between Sajudis and the LCP but also significant
divisions within Sajudis. As early as the second half of 1990 the movement split into
right-wing and left-wing. Sajudis Common Union and Sajudis Center, respectively.74
Many of the Sajudis deputies resented what was seen as the authoritarian leadership of
Landsbergis, and began to form separate factions which threatened the movement’s
majority in parliament. While at its inception Sajudis included individuals who supported
the general goals o f perestroika as well as radical nationalists and anti-communists
demanding independence, the confrontation with Moscow in 1990 radicalized the public
opinion and helped radicals, especially forces associated with deputies from the city of
Kaunas, to gain the upper hand in Sajudis. At the same time the LCP, while still
unconditionally pro-independence, advocated a step-by-step approach to dealing with
Moscow. This support was supported by Prime M inister Prunskiene who saw talks with
Moscow as the only way out o f the blockade and settling the question o f independence.
In January 1991 the pro-M oscow organization Edinstvo and the “night party,”
organized demonstration in support o f Gorbachev’s declaration of his direct presidential
role of the republic. Soviet paratroopers with the support of the KGB and the military
tried to seize power but their attempt, met with the unified resistance o f the public and
political parties, failed. On February 9, 1991, Lithuanians voted in a referendum in
support of Lithuania's independence. After the August coup in M oscow failed, Yeltsin
recognized the republic's independence.73

74Norgaard, Hindsgaul, et al, 93.
7:>For an excellent eyewitness account of the events sec Krickus, Showdown.
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The 1990-91 confrontation with M oscow exposed the fragility and inefficiency of
Lithuania's institutional framework. While Sajudis and the reform communists agreed
not to reintroduce the pre-w ar constitution there emerged no accord on the nature of the
future basic law. Negotiations on the new constitution took place in the context of
confrontation with M oscow and stalemate in parliament and government. The provisional
constitution adopted after the March declaration o f independence developed into
paralyzing stalemates between government and parliament as both the chairman of the
legislature and the prime m inister had wide and untested authorities and powers and
competed for supremacy in the conduct of relations with M oscow and in defining social
and economic policies. However, the attempts o f the right and Landsbergis to exert
control over government and institution building were extremely weakened by the
continuing fractioning o f the Sajudis and its declining number o f deputies. As a result, in
1991 the nationalist right gained control o f the movement.
Attempts by the left and the right to develop functioning and effective policies
inevitably led to political actions that tried to get around the inherent deficiencies of the
interim constitution. As a result both sides accused each other o f breaking the rule of
law.76 The polarization o f Lithuanian politics undermined any chances of finding a
solution to the political impasse. Parliamentary walkouts became a common occurrence
favored even by the nom inally ruling Sajudis as its dwindling numbers in the Supreme
Soviet hampered its ability to formulate policies and govern. At the same time the
polarization was not offset by the appearance o f any moderate center. There appeared to

76For exam ples o f both sides’ cavalier treatment of the constitution see Vardys
and Sedaitis. 192-93.
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be no political formation capable o f creating a political base for any o f the governing
political institutions.
The only factor that m oderated the confrontation between the left and right was
the Soviet pressure on the republic. For all its volatile divisions, the two sides were
briefly united during the January 1991 Soviet attem pt to seize power in Lithuania and
during the August coup o f the sam e year. O nce the question of independence was settled,
however, the polarization and confrontation reached crisis proportions. In November
1991 Brazauskas’ party declared its formal opposition to the government.
Sajudis and the reform com munists developed conflicting visions o f how to
overcome the political and institutional impasse. W hile Landsbergis and the right came to
see early parliamentary elections and the creation o f a strong, executive presidency
independent from legislature as a way out o f the stalemate, the left, both am ong the
former communists and the opponents of Landsbergis. advocated the establishment of a
strong parliament to balance w hat they came to see as Landsbergis' authoritarian
tendencies. The attempt to reach a compromise in the fractured parliament was greatly
complicated as Sajudis continued in the spring o f 1992 to split into new factions and the
movement was reduced to a m inority. Instead o f trying to forge an alliance am ong the
multiplying political groups in the parliament and negotiate the basic rules o f the game.
Sajudis took its chances with the voters by calling for a referendum on the future
constitution. The referendum , conducted in the spring of 1992, calling for a constitution
with a strong presidency dealt a serious blow to Landsbergis and his supporters as less
than 51 percent of all eligible voters supported the right’s proposal. The defeat at the
referendum motivated Sajudis to compromise on the constitutional design, and just in
time for the early elections called by Landsbergis, the parliament produced a document
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assigning significantly less constitutional powers and authority to the future presidency
than Sajudis hoped for. The draft document produced rather hurriedly—it was laden with
references o f statutes yet to be adopted, and provisions to be amended after approved by
the electorate-represented a compromise between the pro-Landsbergis and antiLandsbergis forces rather than a true social contract.77 The draft constitution was
approved by the voters at a referendum on the day of the parliam entary elections in
October 1992. The elections dealt another serious blow to Sajudis as the electorate
soundly rejected the m ovem ent’s policies sending only 14 o f its deputies to the 141-seat
Seimas com pared to 77 for the Democratic Labor Party. The electoral swing from support
for the nationalist right to support for the former com munists was further represented by
Brazauskas' election as the first post-Soviet era president in February 1993.
The adoption of a new constitution and the renewed mandate of the parliament
after the 1992 elections did not change the pattern of political confrontation and abuse of
the basic rules o f the game. The left majority in the parliament frequently disregarded
constitutional provisions and altered laws for short-term political gains. Sajudis.
extremely weakened by the 1992 election results, once again resorted to walkouts and
dilatory tactics. The strong rift between the LDLP and the right was reflected in the
refusal of the left to include opposition deputies in the Seimas" elected offices.7S
Sim ilar to the Czech Republic, but unlike developments in Bulgaria, the
Lithuanian parliament em erged as the foci o f institutional and political change in the
transition period. Political parties played only a marginal role in the process as the society
77“Lithuania Update.” East European Constitutional Review 1. no. 3 (Fall 1992):
7.
78
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"‘Lithuania Update,” East European Constitutional Review 2, no. 3 (Summer
1993): 12.
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lacked many o f the requisites for a functioning party system. Another important feature
o f the party system in the transition phase is the em ergence of a bipolar model, with the
LDLP at one pole and Sajudis—later H U -L C -at the other. In fact, until the late 1990s the
party system remained structured on the base of the initial divisions between the reform
communists and the nationalist opposition. The 1992 and 1996 parliamentary elections
failed to produce an effective centrist party. Instead, the LDLP and the conservatives
dominated the political process and hardly allowed any political formation to moderate
the existing political confrontation in the parliament. The lack of significant center parties
in parliament precluded the em ergence o f cross-party alliances and cooperation that
would have tempered the polarized stance and policies o f the two dominant blocks.
Although Sajudis after the 1990 elections and the LD LP after the 1992 elections went
through a process o f factionalization. the emerging new political formations failed to
create a political alternative to the disappearing right and left governing majorities.
Instead, the fractioning of the ruling parties became a recipe for parliamentary stalem ate
and political confrontation. The parliament elected in the 1996 elections did not seem to
escape this pattern either. The fragmentation of the ruling conservatives has led to
frequent government changes and confrontation between the Presidency. Seimas, and its
Chairman.
The 1992 parliamentary elections also marked a starting point in the
transformation and consolidation o f the party system in Lithuania. It signaled the end o f
Sajudis as a mass national movement and its transformation into a political party. The
refusal o f Sajudis to participate in the elections as a political party signified the low
degree o f institutionalization of the party system in Lithuania. While in the Czech
Republic the first free elections marked the end o f the Civic Forum as a means of
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political participation, the Lithuanian nationalist movement continued to rely on a mass,
amorphous movement as an institution for aggregating interests and for political
participation. Despite the constant process o f fragmentation and factionalization of
Sajudis in the 1990 parliament, the movement refused to consider its transformation into
a political party built around a specific political program and a national structure. Not
surprisingly, the movement had very little to show in terms of a comprehensive social,
economic, and political agenda, and instead had to once again rely on anti-communist
rhetoric to mobilize electoral support. In contrast to the 1990 elections, however, the
voters were more interested in policies that would reverse the dramatic econom ic slump,
and in any event doubted the ability of Sajudis to govern more effectively than during its
previous term as a governing party.7'*
Meanwhile the LDLP, after losing the 1990 election, was able to transform itself
into a modem and legitimate social-democratic party utilizing its existing Soviet
experience and infrastructure. W hat accounts for the success of the reform communists in
Lithuania is the com m unist party's high degree o f legitimacy. In 1989-1990 the LCP was
able to transform itself into a reform party and even support the emerging opposition in
its demands for Lithuania's independence and democratization. In fact, the opposition
contained many com munists, including those in its elite. In addition, the com munist party
was able early on to eliminate hard-liners from its ranks by denying them material
capacities and organizational support. A crucial advantage of the Lithuanian communist
party compared with other republics’ parties was the high percentage of Lithuanians in its
ranks. Thus while in other Soviet republics the local communist party structures were

7,On the state o f the Lithuanian econom y see Sulius Gimius. “The Lithuanian
Economy in 1992,” RFE/RL Research Report 2 (1 6 April, 1993): 28-32.
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seen as imposed by the occupying Russians, in Lithuania it was seen as a national
organization.

SO

During the rule o f the LDLP, Lithuanian politics witnessed the gradual subsiding
of polarized confrontation between the left and right in the parliament. Contrary to the
fears o f many in the W est that the form er communists would reverse the country’s drive
towards a market econom y and dem ocracy, the LDLP implemented, albeit at a slower
pace, further policies that consolidated institutions and instituted fiscal and monetary
stability and austerity. The inability o f the central bank to hold the inflation at b a y caused to a great degree by constant political meddling and a split governing party—was
addressed by the introduction of a currency board in March 1994. The currency board, an
institution separate from the Central Bank, was com m itted to converting the national
currency offered to the reserve currency, the US dollar, at a fixed rate. The currency
board gradually brought about a great measure of stability to the market, significantly
improved Lithuania's relations with the International Monetary Board and the World
Bank, and most importantly, greatly limited the ability o f political forces to meddle in
fiscal and monetary polities. Thus the new institution not only brought some economic
benefits but also elim inated an area o f great political confrontation between left and right.
Another reason for the abating confrontation between the left and right in
Lithuanian politics was the wide social and political consensus on the country’s quest for
European Union membership. The seven main political parties drafted and voted a
statement emphasizing that integration into the EU was a top priority for the country and
pledged to work toward achieving a membership. On June 12, 1995, Lithuania and the
European Union signed an Associated Agreement, a first step in a process by which the
X0See Krupavicius, 472.
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country would eventually become a m em ber of the Union.81 The agreement envisaged the
gradual harmonization until 1999 o f the national legislation with EU law. The
negotiations and ensuing commitments brought a new urgency to the governing LDLP’s
pursuit o f compromise with the opposition in parliament. In light of the Associated
Agreement and the overwhelming public support for an EU membership, the opposition
declared its readiness to participate in the negotiations and preparation o f laws that would
facilitate Lithuania’s accession, including a constitutional amendment to allow foreigners
to purchase land in the country.82 O nly two small parties, the rightist Nationalist Union
and the left-wing Peasant Party, refused to embrace such an amendment.
The process o f subsiding political confrontation was further accelerated by the
emergence in the late 1990s of a significant political center which further moderated the
bipolar model. In the 1997 presidential elections the long-run hold on pow er by the
LDLP and the HU(LC) was broken by the election o f Valdas Adamkus. a U.S. emigree
and former American environmental official. While LDLP and the HU(LC) supported
former Prosecutor General Arturas Paulaskas and Speaker of Parliament Landsbergis
respectively, Adamkus. backed by several smaller parties, refused to be a candidate of
one party and sought w ider support. Adamkus was elected as Lithuanian president
defeating Paulaskas by less then one percent margin.8j The new President, while
generally supportive o f the HU(LC) policies, proved to be a moderating force
81
»
*
See “Lithuania Update,” East European Constitutional Review 4. no. 3
(Summer 1995), 14.
jp

•
*
' “Lithuania Update,” East European Constitutional Review 4, no. 2 (Spring
1995). Available from http://www.nyu.edu/eecr; INTERNET.
83

After Landsbergis was eliminated at the first round, the HU(LC) m ade sure the
LDLP candidate would not be elected president by throw ing its support behind Adamkus
at the second round.
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constraining the excesses o f the governing majority, not even hesitating to ask for the
prime minister and ministers’ resignations when he saw it fit.
Party realignment at the end of the 1990s further eroded the bipolar model of
party politics and thus the level of confrontation. From the emergence o f the party system
in 1990 to 1999, politics were dominated by the struggle between the LDLP and Sajudis
(later the HU(LC). Three sm aller parties, the Christian Democratic Party, the C enter
Union and the Social Democratic Party, were able to gain a significant share of
parliamentary seats in the three post-independence elections, but were never able to
challenge the two dominant parties. Continuing economic stagnation attributed to the
Russian crisis of 1998 and m ajor splits and realignments among well established parties
created the conditions for the emergence o f significant party alternatives to the previously
dominant HU(LC) and the LD LP.S4 The big winners of the Spring 1999 local elections
were the relatively new Social Liberals and the revived coalition o f the Peasants' Party
and the Christian Democratic Union, while the HU(LC) came with the third largest
number of deputies. The electoral success of the two parties indicated the voters'
disillusionment with traditional parties and politics and the final coming of age o f
alternative the party system.
The dominance o f instrum ental rather then fundam ental politics—consensus on
the ends, hut political struggle over the means. At least until 1999. Lithuania's party
system was characterized by bipolarity with the LDLP on the left and Sajudis, later the
HU(LC), on the right. Like in Bulgaria, the party system is rooted in the division between
ruling elite and opposition at the initial phase of transition to independence and
84

Nerijus Prekevicius and Terry D Clark, “Shifting Party Sands Forecasting
Lithuania's Political Future,” Central Europe Review 2. no. 27 (10 July, 2000). Available
from http://www.ce-review.org; INTERNET.
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democracy. Accordingly, the resulting political left-right cleavages do not neatly
correspond to concrete ideological platforms, but derive from the parties’ post
communist and anti-communist images. The left-right dichotomy has little meaning in
national politics as the lines of divisions are not along the classical difference between
collectivist and liberal policies. Indeed, ideological rhetoric aside, the left and right in
Lithuanian politics share similarities in agenda and policies that assured a relatively high
degree o f continuity in the transition to a market econom y and dem ocracy.
As it was argued above, the question of secession from the Soviet Union brought
Sajudis and the reform ed communist party, the tw o dominant political players, close
together as it was the most crucial aspect of L ithuanian's transition. Both parties’
immediate agendas included independence, political, social and econom ic reform as
common goals and objectives. The differences in programs pertained to the pace of
change rather than to its desirability. For example, the former com m unists cautioned
against Sajudis’ uncompromising manner of dealing with Moscow and demanded slower
implementation o f m arket reforms and more social protection of the affected masses.
Once the question of independence was settled in 1991, the electorate turned its
attention to the im m ediate problems o f the political, economic, and social transition, thus
giving political parties a chance to distinguish each other by identifying and delineating
political cleavages. Despite the increase in ideological rhetoric, the political left and right
maintained a relatively high degree o f program and policy similarities. Most parties,
including the two dom inant ones, displayed a cautious approach to m arket reforms,
extensive provisions for welfare protection and social security, and very often they
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formulated populist policies that ran against economic prudence and austerity.83
Consecutive changes in ruling parties did not lead to a rupture in the pace and direction of
institutional reforms and the implementation of marketization. Even m ore importantly,
there emerged a wide-ranging consensus on the main rules according to which political
conflicts are carried out. In other words, political players may disagree over particular
policies governments should pursue, yet most parties agreed on the broad institutional
structure and the ways authoritative decisions are form ulated and implemented. Yet it
must be noted that although the main political parties recognized the legitimacy of their
opponents, the ruling majorities did not resist the tem ptation to exclude opposition parties
from decision-making processes or to frequently change laws for the benefit of narrow
party interests.86
The primary cleavages in Lithuanian politics have not significantly threatened the
consolidation of the institutional structures. Instead, they have been centered on
differences in the pace and extent o f market reforms; anti-communist and post
communists images; views of the past and relations with the Soviet Union and later
Russia; church-state relations; and internationalism versus nationalism.87 While these
cleavages sometimes bred virulent rhetoric and political gridlock, they did not question
the legitimacy o f the constitutional order and rules o f the game. Even more, weakly
83For an example of econom ic populism both in the right and left see Krickus,
“Democratization in Lithuania, 309; Peter Rutland, “A Year of Progress,” in Peter
Rutland, ed.. The Challenge o f Integration (Armonk, NY; M. E. Sharpe, 1998), 123.
86Before the October 2000 parliamentary elections the conservatives changed the
electoral law expecting to pick up m ore seats in the Seim as. See Mel Huang, “Changing
the Rules at the Half,” Central Europe Review 2, No 27 (10 July, 2000). Available from
http://www.ce-review.org; INTERNET.
87

See Pettai and Kreuzer, 166; Krickus, “Democratization in Lithuania,” 309;
Norgaard, Hindsgal, et al, 103; Rutland, 120.
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institutionalized parties did not align political and social interests into cohesive cleavage
structures and did not formulate consistent party programs or public policies.88 Therefore,
political parties have som etim es been deeply split on many o f the cleavage issues. The
conservatives, for exam ple, have long been divided on Lithuania’s future and place in
Europe with one faction insisting on the country’s speedy modernization and
incorporation in Euro-Atlantic structures. The other, more nationalist, faction demanded
that Lithuanian should adopt the pre-war pastoral society and oppose Eastern as well as
Western influences and entanglements.
Inclusiveness o f political society—degree o f participation o f diverse social and
ethnic groups. From very early on in its transition. Lithuania has dem onstrated a liberal
attitude toward political participation on the part of all ethnic groups. The status o f the
country's minorities, including 350,000 ethnic Russians and 300,000 ethnic Poles (out of
the republic’s 3.7 m illion residents), proved to be a non-confrontational issue as the
Lithuanian parliament as early as November 1989 adopted a resolution granting all
minorities, including post-W orld War II immigrants and their descendants, Lithuanian
citizenship based on a sim ple application procedure.80 In addition, the Suprem e Soviet
passed a law on m inorities guaranteeing the right to develop their culture, the use of
minority languages in public areas and its use alongside Lithuanian, and the right of
association.00 Later, in 1991, in an attempt to assure ethnic minorities, the parliament
KK
Although the process o f party system institutionalization and stabilization of
party elite accelerated discem ibly in the period after the 1993 presidential elections the
party system remained weak
The requirements to gain citizenship were further simplified through
amendments o f the law in 1993 and 1996. See Lithuanian Parliament, Lithuanian Law on
Citizenship (May 2001). Available from http://www.lrs.lt; INTERNET.
<)0Vardys and Sedaitis, 212.
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amended the law and guaranteed the right to schooling in one’s native language and its
use in dealing with the government in areas with concentration o f m inorities. What
accounts for the liberal attitude of the emerging elite and the masses to the integration o f
ethnic minorities is the relatively homogeneous ethnic character o f the country. While in
the Soviet Union. Lithuanians maintained their share o f the republic’s population at
around 80 percent, thus avoiding the fate of most other Soviet republics which witnessed
massive influxes o f Russian immigrants. Furthermore, after independence, Lithuanians
accounted for almost 80 percent of the natural growth of population, securing the
preservation o f the existing ethnic balance.01
Ironically, it was the Poles, not the Russians, who had the m ore tense relationship
with ethnic Lithuanians. A long history o f uneasy and sometimes violent co-existence,
which included both alliance and anim osity between the two ethnic groups, created
suspicion and apprehensions on the part o f the Polish minority at the time o f transition to
independence. In the late 1980s, Sajudis failed to attract representatives o f ethnic
minorities as the presence of radical nationalists am ong its ranks assured the absence o f
appeal to Poles and Russians. The advent o f Sajudis and its agenda w as seen as
encroaching on the rights and security o f minority groups. Both m inorities were generally
opposed to the early reform attempts, including the establishment of Lithuanian as the
official language and more economic independence from the Soviet Union. The Polish
minority in particular came with dem ands of its own including adm inistrative and cultural
autonomy within Soviet Lithuania, more Polish education, and closer relations with
Poland. To m obilize the minority, its leaders created in May 1989 a separate association
o f Lithuania’s Poles. The peak of the confrontation between the m inority and the
0|Norgaard, Hindsgal, et al, The Baltic States, 171.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

134

independent movement came when the local Polish elite, joined by ethnic Russian
bureaucrats in minority dom inated districts, supported the January and August coups of
1991 and demanded the creation o f an autonomous Polish republic in Lithuania.
Authorities in Vilnus immediately suspended local government soviets during the August
coup and established direct rule, further antagonizing minorities.92 Indeed, during the
struggle for independence the only allies the Soviet leadership found in the republic were
the leaders of the Polish minority, the Russian Yedinstvo, and a minority o f hardline
communists.
Since the emergence o f a pluralist party system , the Polish minority has generally
remained more active politically while the Russians chose to assert their rights and
interests through social and cultural associations. A Russian party em erged in 1996
targeting the nine-percent strong minority but it gained only 1.63 percent of the vote. The
Polish political parties, on the other hand, successfully mobilized their constituents and
consistently won parliamentary seats in all elections.9 ’ Krickus suggests that what
accounts for the relatively lower political mobilization o f the Russian minority com pared
with ethnic Poles is economic status. Employment and incomes figures comparing
Russians and Lithuanians have indicated no difference in social status.94 Accordingly,
ethnic Russians participate in the political process through established parties. Ethnic
Poles, on the other hand, are disproportionately em ployed in industries hard hit by the

92Saulius Gim ius, "Lithuanian Conflict with Poles," RFE/RL Resereach Report
(16 September, 1991).
93Union o f Poles won 2 percent in the 1992 elections and 2.9 percent in 1996
entitling it to 2.8 percent and .7 percent of parliamentary seats, respectively. See Pettai
and Kreuzer, 157-58.
94Krickus. “Democratization in Lithuania,” 319.
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transition to a m arket econom y and thus greatly vulnerable to social and economic
change. This, along with the interest to preserve ethnic identity, provides a powerful base
for political mobilization and autonomous participation.
With ethnic Poles’ political participation and further attem pts by the state to
guarantee ethnic rights and freedoms addressed, a greater num ber Poles began to accept
Lithuania's independence. A similar trend took place among ethnic Russians, although in
the mid-1990s still only a minority o f them accepted independence.
There were also other political developments which went a long way towards
assuring the ethnic m inorities in Lithuania and increasing their support for the
independent state. As noted above, during the transition to independence. Sajudis failed
to attract ethnic m inorities among its ranks and files.93 Although Sajudis advocated
guaranteeing the rights and freedoms o f ethnic minorities, and once in pow er continued to
promote legislation to that effect, its emotional nationalism and uncom prom ising attitude,
especially on the part o f Landsbergis, during the negotiations with M oscow and Warsaw,
contributed to the feeling o f insecurity am ong ethnic Russians and Poles. The elections o f
the LDLP as a governing party and especially of Brazauskas96 as the President
contributed to the relaxation o f inter-ethnic relations. Brazauskas and his party were able
to successfully negotiate the withdrawal o f Russian troops from the country and
important treaties w ith M oscow and Warsaw which further addressed the uncertain
feelings of minorities which were still coping with their new status in a new state.

b 97 percent o f the delegates to Sajudis’ founding congress were ethnic
Lithuanians.
%Ever since Lithuania sought independence, Brazauskas has advocated a
conciliatory approach tow ard Moscow, seen as too powerful and im portant economically
to afford a tense relationship.
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High public commitment to the fundam ental values a n d procedurals norm s o f the
state's constitutional system. Lithuanian public attitudes displayed many similarities with
the ones in the rest of Eastern Europe. Dissatisfaction with the way democracy performs
(See Table 2) does not appear to negatively affect support for the democratic regime and
even the legitimacy of the current regime, how ever unsatisfactory its performance has
been (See Tables 3 ,4 and 5). Accordingly, there seemed to be an approval of the future
democratic regime (See Table 5) which is associated with a better performing system,
while the public felt unsatisfied with the developm ent o f dem ocracy (See Table 2).
It must be noted that while the Lithuanian public seem ed less satisfied with the
development of democracy than the C zech's, it expressed a significantly lesser
dissatisfaction then the public in Bulgaria. On the other hand, the Lithuanian public
displayed the least satisfaction with the direction of the country and with the respect of
human rights (See Tables 9 and 10). This dissatisfaction, how ever, did not translate into a
disapproval o f democracy. As in the other tw o cases, the legitim acy o f democracy is an
autonomous variable; the public supported a market econom y and accepted the present
and future democratic system regardless o f the performance o f the current regime.
Furthermore, strong support for democracy—like in the Czech Republic, but unlike in
Bulgaria—existed along a low approval of either a military rule or restoration of the
communist regime (See Tables 7 and 8). Yet, like Bulgaria, the Lithuanian public also
displayed a high approval o f the former com m unist regime and an acceptance o f a strong
leader ruling without parliament, thus exhibiting the instability o f the public’s
commitment to democracy (See Tables 6 and 11). The public also displayed the familiar
almost everywhere in Eastern Europe low degree of confidence in the political
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institutions, while political leaders and symbolic institutions, including the church and the
presidency, enjoyed greater confidence.

Conclusion

In spite o f having similar com munist experiences and going through com parable
phases of post-communist institution building, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and
Lithuania attained political systems o f varying institutionalization (See Appendix 1).
M easured by the two-turnover test, Bulgaria and Lithuania witnessed regular and free and
fear elections in which no political party or coalition won consecutive elections. The
Czech republic, on the other hand, did not meet the test, as only two parties, the C D P and
Social Democrats in coalitions that included various sm aller parties, formed governments
after the 1992 parliamentary elections. Yet, this did not translate into authoritarian
policies and the governments were almost always checked by effective opposition in the
parliament as no governing coalition had com fortable majorities. Since 1996 all
governing coalitions had no parliamentary m ajorities and had to conclude power-sharing
agreements with opposition parties in order to form stable governments. Conversely,
Bulgaria, although meeting the two-turnover test, w itnessed successive weak
governments; only the last UDF government, elected in 1997, stayed in office for the full
term. In fact, a study o f democracy in 17 East European states found that in the ten years
since the first free elections, the average term o f office o f post-communist governments
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in Bulgaria is 9 m onths, while reaching 23 m onths for the Czech Republic and 15 months
for Lithuania.07
The differences between the three states are more significant in term s of the
agreement among all sectors o f society on the fundamental rules o f the political game and
the dominance of instrum ental rather than fundamental politics. W hile the Czech
Republic and Lithuania scored high on both scales. Bulgaria scored the lowest. The
Czech political elite had the advantage o f creating the fundamental rules o f the political
game, facing virtually no opposition from the communist elite as the com m unist party
collapsed in late 1989 and had no meaningful political participation in the roundtable
which created the new political regime. No organized political party dom inated the
process o f early transition and only after the first elections did political interests begin to
form political organizations. Thus political actors from early on reached a consensus on
the rule o f the political game and consequently no significant political interests
questioned the established political order. Furthermore, in the latter part o f the transition
process and throughout the 1990s the dom inant political actors did not d iffer significantly
even on questions o f instrumental politics. Therefore, the country did not experience
dramatic changes in both in its domestic and international policies.
Similarly, the early transition phase in Lithuania witnessed a high degree of
collaboration between the local communist party and the already powerful Sajudis
opposition movement. Both parties were not only well organized and thus capable of
negotiating as equals but they were forced to reach a quick consensus on the
fundamentals of the new political regime as both of them saw M oscow as the significant
97Sten Berglund, Frank Aarebrot, Henri Vogt and Georgi Karasim eonov.
Challenges to Democracy: Eastern Europe Ten Years A fter the Collapse o f Communism
(Northampton, MA: Edw ard Elgar Publishing, Inc., 2001), 24.
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political challenge rather each other. As in the Czech Republic, both the LDLP and
Sajudis emerged as legitimate political players seeking consensus on the fundamental
political rules. In the latter part o f the transition process and through the 1990s, however,
the dominant political actors often sharply differed on the instrumental politics and the
country witnessed both economic and political instability as reflected by the frequent
change of government.
Bulgaria, in contrast, w itnessed the most serious challenges to the emerging
political order. The former com m unist party dominated the transition period and
established rules o f the political gam e that were later frequently challenged by political
actors who had little say in their creation. Thus Bulgarian politics in the 1990s went
through periods o f political, social and economic instability as the m ajor political actors
often struggled over not only instrum ental but also fundamental rules o f the political
game.
Instability in Bulgaria was also fed by the public which exhibited low approval of
the developments in the country and was, more significantly, highly distrustful of the
institutions of democracy. Similar sentiments were observed in Lithuania, although, it
must be noted that negative public perceptions did not translate into open defiance on the
streets as happened in early 1997 in Bulgaria. In both countries, the legitim acy of
democratic institutions was relatively low and the approval of authoritarian alternatives
relatively high. Conversely, the Czech Republic enjoyed relatively high public approval
o f democratic institutions, regardless o f their performance. Even w hen in the rare cases
the public was dissatisfied with political actors, the resulting protests w ere challenged
into civic actions consistent with the established political rules.
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Appendix I
Figure 1 represents an attempt to provide a rough comparison of domestic institutionalization on an ordinal scale from
total domestic institutionalization to total lack o f it. The figure measures the position of each country on the already
discussed domestic variables. The three countries are ranked by summing the live variables by assigning values of 3 to
the highest ranking on each variable. 2 to the next and I to the lowest ranking. In case two or more states share the
same ranking, the states receive the same value on the 1-3 scale. The assigned values represent the countries' ranking
for the period 1990-2000.
Instuiionali/uiion is estimated by using a 1-3 scale and assigning the value o f three to the country , which meets the two
turnover test, has the highest degree of agreement on the rules of the game, has a political system in which instrumental
rather fundamental politics are the norm, has a highest degree of inclusivcncss of the political society, and its public has
the greatest commitment to the constitutional system. The value of one is assigned to the country w hich scores lowest
on each o f the same variables.
Figure 1.
Variable Domestic Institutionalization
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Total

Average

Bulgaria

3

1

1

1

1

7

1.4

Czech R.

1

3

3

3

3

13

2.6

Lithuania

3

3

->

2

1

11

2.2

Note: Column headings are as follows: ( I ) Two turnover test: (2) Agreement on the rules o f the game: (3 1 Instrumental
rather than fundamental politics: (4) Inclusiveness o f political society; (5) Public commitment to constitutional system
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Tabic 1.
Trust in Civil and Political Institutions

Bulgaria

Czech R.

Government

2.7

4.6

Parliament

22

36

President

4.0

5.1

Courts

2.8

4.0

Parties

2.5

3.7

Army

4.6

4.1

Media

3.7

4.2

Unions

2.5

3.4

Private
enterprise

2.5

4.2

Source: William Mishlcr and Richard Rose. "Trust. Distrust and Skepticism: Popular Evaluations o f Civil and Political
Institutions in Post-Communist Societies." The Journal o f Politics 59 no. 2 (May 1997). 422.
Table 2
Satisfaction with Development o f Democracy
1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

Bulgaria

-23

-6

-17

-49

-87

-67

-81

-54

Czech R.

-16

-25

-19

0

-9

-4

-21

23

5

-20

-31

-40

-31

Lithuania

-13

Source: European Union. Central and Eastern Eurobarometer no. 8 (May 2000). Available from http://curopa.eu.int:
INTERNET.
Table 3
Approval of the Creation o f Market Economy
(approval minus disapproval responses)
1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

Bulgaria

22

45

36

18

.1

6

12

23

Czech R.

54

39

24

15

II

6

1

55

44

3?

9

16

5

Lithuania

23

Source: Ibid.
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Table 4.
Approval of Current Regime
(percentage of public)______
1991

1992

1993

Bulgaria

64

55

59

Czech R.

71

71

1994

78

Lithuania

1995

1998

66

58

77

56

34

2000

45

Note: Data for Lithuania in 2000. ethnic Lithuanians only.
Source: Ibid. Richard Rose and Christian Haerpfer. Trends in Democracies and Markets: Mew Democracies Barometer
1991-98 (Glasgow: University o f Strathclyde. 1998). 29: Richard Rose. New Baltics Barom eter II: A Survey Study
(Glasgow: University o f Strathclyde. 1995). 23-24: Richard Rose. N ew Baltic Barometer IV: A Surrey Study (Glasgow:
University o f Strathclyde. 2000): 50-59; Krickus. "Democratization in Lithuania." 310; Vitosha Research. Accountable
Government: S e lf and P ublic Perception (June 2000). Available from http://www.online.bg. INTERNET: "Poll Shows
Institutions. Politicians A pproval Rate Drops" (text). Prague CTK in English (28 March 2000). FBIS Daily Report-Fast
Europe. 28 March 2000 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-EEU-2000-0328). Available from World News Connection: INTERNET;
"Survey: Czechs Do Not W ant the Return of Comm unism " (text). Prague Lidove Noviny in Czech (9 November 2000).
Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-East Europe. 9 November 2000 (PrEx
7.10: FBIS-EEU-2000-1109). Available from World News Connection: INTERNET.
Table 5.
Approval o f Future Regime
i percentage of public)_____
1991

1992

1993

Bulgaria

77

72

70

Czech R.

89

88

1994

SS

1995

1998

83

78

88

72

69

Lithuania

2000

61

Note: Data for Lithuania in 2000. ethnic Lithuanians only
Source: Rose and Haerpfer. 3 I : Rose. New Baltic Barometer II. 24: Rose. New Baltic Barom eter IV. 52; Vitosha
Research.
Table 6.
Approval o f Former C om m unist Regime
i percentage of public)_________________
1991

1992

1993

Bulgaria

30

42

51

Czech R.

23

29

Lithuania

1994

1995

1998

58

43

23

24

31

27

47

2000

56

Note: Data for Lithuania in 2000. ethnic Lithuanians only.
Source: Rose and Haerpfer. 27: Rose. New Baltic Barometer II. 23: Rose. New Baltic Barom eter IV. 50: Vitosha
Research.
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Table 7.
Approval of Restoring Communist Regime
I percentage of public)___________________
1993
Bulgaria

1994

1995

1998

29

24

9

16

25
7

C/ech R.

7

Lithuania

2000

19
9

Note: Data for Lithuania in 2000. ethnic Lithuanians only.
Source: Rose and Haerpfer. 33; Rose. New Baltic Barom eter II. 32; Rose. New Baltic Barometer IV. 52; Vitosha
Research.
Table S.
Approval of Military Rule
(percentage o f public)
1993
Bulgaria

1994

1995

1998

2000

15

12

9

3

3

15
2

C/ech R
Lithuania

7

4

Note: Data for Lithuania in 2000. ethnic Lithuanians only.
Source: Rose and Haerpfer. 35: Rose. New Baltic Barom eter IE 32: Rose. N ew Baltic Barometer IV. 56: Alfa Research.
Table 9.
Approval o f the Direction o f Country
1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

Bulgaria

4

38

->

-37

-39

-8

-63

21

C/ech R.

37

17

24

2S

25

24

9

34

28

-39

-47

-49

-52

-25

Lithuania

Source: European Union. Central and Eastern Enrubaromcter.
Table 10
Respect for Human Rights in the Country
(respect minus disrespect responses)
1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

Bulgaria

41

30

1

-10

_2

-13

5

C/ech R.

34

19

12

7

-I

-7

8

Lithuania

-6

-13

-54

-52

-59

-58

-50

Source: Ibid.
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Tabic 11.
Approval of a Strong Leader. Ruling W ithout Parliament
(percentage of public)_______________________________
1991

1992

1993

Bulgaria

66

45

22

C /ech R.

24

16

Lithuania

1994

12

1995

2000

29

53

13
62

58

Note: Data for Lithuania in 2000. ethnic Lithuanians only.
Source: Rose and Haerpfer. 37: Rose. New B altic Barometer II, 32-33: Rose. New Baltic Barometer IV. 56: Vitosha
Research.
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CHAPTER V
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATION

Chapter V evaluates the degree o f international integration with the core for each
o f the three case studies. The first tw o sections describe the decision o f the EU and
NATO to integrate East European countries and the process to achieve these goals. The
chapter evaluates each country’s relations to the core in terms of integration in the EU.
NATO, and economic interaction with core states, including trade and investments.
A nother section evaluates the stock o f each country in terms of its neighbors’ integration
in the core.

The European Union

The changes in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s coincided with a very crucial
phase in the European Community’s history as the m em ber states were striving to
com plete the single European market and finalizing plans for a monetary and political
union. These processes marked the grow ing confidence o f the member states in the EC’s
ability to be the cornerstone of a new European architecture. The Com m unity with its
history o f addressing problems of security and stability through integration, economic
and social development, and democracy, certainly possessed the right institution to
include Eastern Europe in the process. Even before the collapse of com m unism , the
Com m unity agreed on a common approach to East European states; the approach was
based on the belief that the promotion o f democracy and reform would increase security
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on the continent.1 On 9 June 1988 in Moscow the EC and the Council of Mutual
Economic Assistance (CM EA)--an organization integrating the communist econom ies—
initiated a declaration com m itting both sides to cooperation. Consequently, bilateral
agreements were signed, encouraging economic cooperation in areas such industry,
agriculture, energy, transportation and environmental protection.2 Until 1988, the opening
of relations between the Com m unity and CMEA countries was not conditional on
political reform in the com m unist countries. The beginning of change in some o f the
countries, however, led the Com m unity to apply, for the first time, conditionality as a
way to encourage reform in individual countries. In February 1990, the European
Commission proposed to the European Council that potential aid to post-communist
countries must fulfill several conditions, including commitment to the rule of law, respect
for human rights, the establishment o f a multiparty system, holding o f free elections, and
economic liberalization. In order to assist transformation in the states o f Eastern Europe,
the Community established the PHARE program and began to coordinate multilateral aid
flowing to the countries.
Already by late 1989, it became apparent the East European countries dem anded
more intensive relations with the EC and most im portantly, a membership in the
Community. Accordingly, the established policies for dealing with the post-com munist
states-PH A R E, aid programs and trade cooperation agreements—appeared insufficient to
either address the new foreign policy objectives o f the states in Eastern Europe or
promote the Com m unity’s vision o f a new Europe. The new demands from the East,
'On the European Union’s policy toward Eastern Europe see Karen E. Smith. The
Making o f EU Foreign Policy: The Case o f Eastern Europe (New York: St. M artin’s
Press, 1999).
2Ibid. 54.
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however, caused a short but dramatic debate on the C om m unity's policy priorities. The
dilemma was between an enlargement o f the Community to include the countries of
Eastern Europe or a process o f further integration among the current members. This
debate was resolved by proceeding with a deepening o f the Comm unity by creating a
monetary union, further political integration, and designs for institutional reform to
address the challenges facing the organization. To accommodate states o f Eastern
Europe, the Comm unity proposed concluding associated agreements with individual
countries without the prom ise of a membership. The associate agreements were called
Europe Agreements and required that prospective associates meet basic econom ic and
political conditions including democratization and transition to market econom y. ’ The
Agreements provided the associated countries with trade concessions and other benefits
that are normally associated with EU membership. Between 1991 and 1995, the European
Union signed Europe Agreements with all ten East European countries.
Each Europe Agreem ent, adjusted for each country, established an institutional
framework for political dialogue. It also provided for the establishment o f a free trade
area between the C om m unity and the associated states as well as for financial support,
and econom ic and cultural relations. The Europe Agreements, however, did not end the
post-communist states’ dem ands for Community membership. Finally, in June 1993, the
European Council in Copenhagen agreed that the associates could join, provided they met
some strict political, econom ic, and social conditions. The accession criteria, also known
as the Copenhagen criteria, required that before gaining membership Europe Agreement
countries had to achieve stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law,
human rights and respect for and protection o f minorities; the existence o f a functioning
’Ibid., 91.
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market economy as well as the capacity to cope with com petitive pressures and market
forces within the Union: and the ability to take on the obligation of m em bership including
adherence to the aims o f the political, econom ic and monetary union and the adoption of
some 80,000 pages of laws, norms and standards that are in force throughout the EU. the
so-called acquis communautaire.4 No tim etable for accession was set up; that would
depend on the progress in meeting the criteria. The European Council also established a
structural relationship between the Com m unity and the associated members, thus
formalizing the burgeoning relationships with East European countries.
The setting of broad membership criteria by the Copenhagen European Council
marked a departure from the previous U nion's enlargements. M ajor integration treaties of
the European Union, including Article O o f the Treaty of Rome in 1957 (now Article 49
o f the Amsterdam Treaty) did not determine specific criteria for membership in the
organization. With the exception of the E C 's southern expansion to Greece, Spain, and
Portugal when the European Council insisted that prospective members need to respect
human rights and maintain representative democracy, the expansion in 1973 and the most
recent one in 1995 included countries with established dem ocracies and m arket
economies, so the organization had no reason to define membership conditions. An
eventual eastward expansion o f the EU to include the post-communist countries of
Eastern Europe, however, caused the Union to face the prospect of incorporating rather
diverse states exhibiting political, econom ic, and social levels o f development
significantly lower than the ones enjoyed in the Western societies. According to the
European Union statistic agency Eurostat there is a huge variance in wealth between the
4European Commission, European Union Enlargement: A Historic Opportunity
(Brussels: Directorate General for Enlargement Information and International Relations
Unit, 2000), 9.
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candidate countries, including the increasing poverty in 1997 in Bulgaria and Romania.
GDP per capita, when measured according to the Purchasing Power Standard (PPS)
method, varied from 23 percent of the EU average in Bulgaria (4,400 PPS) to 68 percent
in Slovenia (13,000 PPS).3 In fact, the im m inent enlargement facing the EU poses a
unique challenge as it is without precedent in terms o f its scope and diversity.6 As the
East European countries are trying to jo in the Union, the organization itself is becoming
more complex as it m oves toward m onetary and political union. In order to address this
challenge and at the sam e time maintain the cohesiveness o f the Union, the member
states established strict criteria for m em bership while carefully avoiding com mitment to a
timetable for accession.
After recognizing East European countries as eventual future m em bers, the Essen
European Council in Decem ber 1994 em barked on a pre-accession strategy which
provided the route plan for the integration o f the associated states. The key element of the
pre-accession strategy was the creation o f a “structured dialogue" between the associated
states and the EU institutions which w ould prepare the East European stales for
accession.7 It provided a framework in which associated states would becom e more
involved in the EU activities—including the discussion of issues of com mon interests
within the policy field o f the organization, increasing familiarity with the process of
decision making, and synchronizing policies ranging from home affairs to foreign and
3“ E. Europe W ealth Gap with EU Steady in ‘97-Eurostat." Reuters ( 11 September
1998).
°The new m em bers will increase the Union's territory by 34 percent and its
population by 105 million.
7European Com m ission, ‘T he European Union’s Pre-accession Strategy for the
Associated Countries o f Central Europe,” in William Nicoll and Richard Schoenberg,
eds.. Europe Beyond 2000 (London: W hurr Publishers, 1998): 9-28.
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security policies. The goal was to create a close working relationship between associated
states and m em ber states prior to the accession negotiations. It should be noted that the
common foreign and security policy became an area where after 1994 the structural
dialogue increasingly played an important role in integrating associated states’
international policies with member states by aligning themselves with statements,
initiatives and joint actions in the framework o f the EU’s C om m on Foreign and Security
Policy (C FSP).8 The growing political and econom ic power o f the EU boosted the feeling
among mem ber-states that the Union should create a more robust foreign and security
identity. It was only natural that one of the first C FSP joint actions would involve Eastern
Europe and m ore specifically the prevention and settlement of conflicts. In 1993, for
instance, F rance’s proposal for a treaty to guarantee stability and peace in Europe was
developed for that aim. The role o f the treaty, called the Pact o f Stability and signed in
May 1994. encouraged parties to conclude good neighbor agreem ents covering the
problems o f borders and minorities, and set up regional cooperation agreements. In
addition, the member-states invited in 1994 the associated countries and the Baltic states
to join the W estern European Union, the military arm of the EU. as associated partners. It
is, however, difficult to evaluate the independent effect of these steps on the security
status o f the candidate countries as the WEU was virtually defunct and the Pact o f
Stability included recommendations and requirements already posed by the pre-accession
process.
Follow ing the Essen European Council, the interaction between the m em ber states
and associated states reached high levels and the Europe Agreements, the structured
dialogue, and PHARE became the main tools at the EU ’s disposal for helping associated
sSee Karen Smith, 135-48.
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states achieve full membership in the Union. Indeed, the M adrid European Council in
December 1995 clearly indicated that membership for the associated states was simply a
matter o f time and instructed the European Commission to produce opinions, also called
avis, on the applicants in terms o f how they satisfy the criteria for opening of
negotiations. The C om m ission’s opinions were to be com pleted six months after the
conclusion of the Intergovernmental Conference, a process to reform the U nion's
institutions. The avis not only judge the applicants' readiness for membership but also
evaluate their ability to meet the membership criteria within the duration o f negotiations.
In other words, the avis provide a snapshot of a country’s preparedness for membership
and the ability of the country to be ready for membership in the future.
The Comm ission published the opinions as part of a document. Agenda 2000,
which looked at the future of the Union's policies, its financial perspectives for the period
2000-2006, and the EU ’s enlargem ent.9 It recommended that, on the basis of the
Copenhagen criteria and membership applications from ten East European countries,
negotiations be launched with the Czech Republic. Estonia, Hungary, Poland and
Slovenia. Agenda 2000 also established a financial framework for supporting the pre
accession process in the associated states, including EUR 21 billion for the period 20002006. 10 The Luxemburg European Council in Decem ber 1997 approved the
Com m ission's Agenda 2000 and decided to start negotiations with the five recommended

9The opinions, also known as avis, are based on information and analyses
provided by the applicants themselves. Com m ission’s experts, international institutions,
academics and various parts o f the policy-making community. Sec, Heather Grabbe and
Kristy Hughes, Enlarging the EU Eastward (London: Royal Institute of International
Affairs. 1998). 42.
l0European Com m ission, Enlargement: Preparing fo r Accession (May 2001).
Available from http://europa.eu.int: INTERNET.
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countries. It also allocated financial assistance to the remaining five associated states in
the amount of EUR 100 m illion to help them catch up with the first wave countries. In
March 1998. the negotiations with the first countries officially began. The Commission
also began a process of detailed evaluation or screening of the situation in ail ten
countries in relation to Union legislation and the second and third pillars of the Treaty of
the European Union. The aim o f screening was to help applicant countries increase their
understanding o f the Union’s institutional framework and assist them in identifying the
issues they need to address as they adopt the acquis. 11
In November 1998 the Comm ission presented the initial evaluation reports o f
progress made by each of the applicants toward membership. The reports set out to
analyze the progress made by each candidate in implementing the acquis and the
adoption of reforms in light o f the Copenhagen criteria. Assuming the obligation o f
membership, the ability to take on the acquis and adherence to the aims of the union
became the fundamental requirem ents evaluated by the Commission. The evaluation
reports were to become an im portant indicator o f the countries' progress toward
membership and more specifically o f the extent to which national institutions and
processes were approximating those o f the Union’s. Following the publication o f the first
Commission’s opinions on the progress of applicants in 1997. the EC submits annual
Regular Reports to the European Council on further progress of each country.
The Helsinki European Council in Decem ber 1999 decided to open accession
negotiations in 2000 with a second group of applicants including Bulgaria, Lithuania,
Latvia, Slovakia and Romania. It must be noted that while the C om m ission’s reports on

"European Commission, Glossary: Institutions, Policies and Enlargement o f the
European Union (Brussels: Directorate-General for Education and Culture, 2000). 60.
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the progress m ade by the first group o f applicants found that they were able to take on the
obligations o f the acquis in the medium term if they pursued their preparatory efforts
vigorously, som e o f the countries in the second group were unable to meet all the
Copenhagen criteria in the medium term. The Council also announced plans to convene
another Intergovernmental Conference in 2000 to reform the U nion's institutions to meet
the requirements o f enlargement.
The actual accession negotiations take the form of bilateral intergovernmental
conferences between the member states and each o f the applicants. Following the
screening process conducted by the European Com m ission, negotiations are opened with
each candidate on the acquis communautaire, which is divided into 31 chapters (for
instance, com pany law, energy, external relations, and others).1" The Commission
proposes and the m ember states approve unanimously a common negotiating position on
each chapter. Negotiating sessions are held at the level of chief negotiators for the
applicant countries and permanent representatives for the member states.
The European Union has also explicitly addressed the problem of security in
Eastern Europe. Although international relations theory still debates whether dem ocracy
promotes stability and peace, the Union seemed convinced, very shortly after the collapse
o f communism, that the promotion o f democracy in the East would engender secu rity .1’
The EU does not see itself as a traditional type o f security institution as the organization's
unsuccessful intervention in the civil wars in Y ugoslavia attested. O nly after the C old
W ar has the European Union tried to create a stronger common defense and security
i;:For the full list of chapters see, European Commission, European Union
Enlargement, 35.
1’On the E U ’s view on the relationship o f democracy and security see Karen
Smith, 135-38.
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identity by institutionalizing its pattern o f foreign and security cooperation, CFSP, or the
second pillar of the Union as set out in Article 11 o f the Treaty o f Amsterdam—and
agreeing on the creation of a Rapid Reaction Force by 2003. However, because the CFSP
remains so limited, most of the discussions of traditional security matters still take place
within the context o f NATO.
Nevertheless, the Union has proved to be successful in preventing conflicts from
erupting in the first place. Political, economic, and social integration and the promotion
o f development and dem ocracy-the main strengths o f the EU project—have promoted
significant change in Europe and elim inated centuries-old patterns of conflict and
warfare. The extension o f EU institutions and values to include the countries of Eastern
Europe, the leaders believe, holds the promise o f spreading peace and stability to the
entire continent.

The EU and Bulgaria

The relations between Bulgaria and the European Community were initiated as
early as 1986. But while the Bulgarian government wanted to establish a comprehensive
economic and trade relationship, the European Com m ission preferred to limit any
agreement to trade with only general principles agreed upon for wider cooperation.
However, intentions to establish relations were soon overtaken by concerns over
Bulgaria’s treatment o f its Turkish minority, especially after the Bulgarian authorities
increased their pressure and thousands o f ethnic T urks left the country in 1988-89.14

l4On the early Bulgaria-EC relations see Karen Smith. 60.
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Negotiations with the EC were resum ed in March 1990 and the two sides signed a
trade and cooperation agreem ent a month later. On 22 Decem ber 1990 the Grand
National Assembly adopted a resolution officially declaring Bulgaria's desire to become
a full member o f the European Com m unity.13
On 30 September 1991. the European Council agreed to begin exploratory talks
for Europe Agreement with Bulgaria. In April 1992 the European Commission asked the
Council to approve the negotiating mandate. In contrast to Europe Agreements concluded
previously with Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the Commission asked that the
agreement contain, against the strenuous objection of Bulgaria, a reference to human
rights and democracy. In M ay 1992, the Council approved the mandate and in December
negotiations were concluded. The Europe Agreement with Bulgaria was unanimously
ratified by the Bulgarian Parliament in April 1993. entered into force on 1 February 1995.
and contained conditions with respect to human rights, dem ocratic principles and the
principles of a market econom y. This conditionality, also present in Rom ania's
Agreement, was the first tim e such a clause was included in a Union’s treaty with third
countries.
Backed by the unanim ous decision o f the Parliament, on 14 July 1995 Bulgaria
formally applied for m em bership of the EU, and in the next year the government adopted
a national strategy for the implementation o f the European Com m ission's Single Market

l5On Bulgaria's Drive to join the EU see Jasmine Popova, “Bulgaria-EU: The
New Beginning,” in W illiam Nicoll and Richard Schoenberg, eds., Europe Beyond 2000
(London: Whurr Publishers, 1998): 135-68.
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W hite Paper preparing the countries o f Eastern Europe for their integration into the
Internal M arket.16
The beginning o f the regular process of evaluating the candidate countries’
progress in meeting the membership criteria came in the wake o f the most serious
political, social, and economic crisis in Bulgaria after 1989. The events o f 1996-97 which
led to the near-collapse o f the national economy and, more significantly, to the near
breakdown of the still fledgling political and institutional order seriously questioned the
country’s commitment to meeting the membership criteria. In the avis published as part
of Agenda 2000 in July 1997, the Commission recommended that Bulgaria be excluded
from the start of negotiations on econom ic grounds, while, despite the Commission
concern for the stability o f institutions, the country was judged to meet the democratic
criteria.17 It must be noted that although the Commission divided the ten applicants into
two groups the way the avis were written provided a degree o f differentiation among the
countries within the groups. Countries were evaluated to face problem s and processes of
different order of severity. Accordingly, although the Report recognized the efforts made
by Bulgaria’s newly installed reformist government, the country was judged to be clearly
at the bottom of the group of countries excluded from the negotiations. The avis found
Bulgaria to meet the democratic criteria for membership but also pointed out that the
democratic institutions lacked the stability to assure the consolidation of democratic

uThe White Paper, which includes over 1,4000 elements, sets out the body of
essential market legislation the East European countries need to adopt in order to prepare
their economies for the internal market. The candidates choose the order o f adopting this
legislation depending on the countries’ political, economic and social capacities to absorb
new market legislation.
l7European Commission, Agenda 2000: F o ra Stronger a n d Wider Union, 1997
(M ay 2000). Available from http://europa.eu.int: INTERNET.
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order. The Commission also found the econom y represented the most significant problem
the country faced in the process o f joining the Union. The country clearly ranked at the
bottom o f the economic performance scale as m easured by the scope and degree o f
economic transition. The Report did not expect Bulgaria to m eet the condition of a
functioning m arket economy until early in the next century. The country was also judged
to be unable to cope with com petitive pressure and market forces within the EU. M ost
significantly, the Commission judged Bulgaria to have made very little progress and to
emerge worst o ff in terms o f how near the country is to EU standards and policy norms.
As late as 1999, international and dom estic developm ents gave the Bulgarian
government no assurance that the country w ould be invited to begin formal negotiations
with the EU. Prime Minister Kostov became increasingly frustrated with what he saw as
a lack of the E U ’s commitment to a firm early date for including Bulgaria in the second
group candidates to begin negotiations. The Prim e M inister even suggested that given the
reluctance o f the West to support the reforms in the country his government might
reassess its international priorities and objectives.18 Meanwhile the continued crises in the
Balkans and especially the ethnic conflict in K osovo further circum scribed Bulgaria’s
attempts to achieve stable political and econom ic development and integration with
Western Europe. In 1999 in its annual report on Bulgaria’s progress towards accession
the European commission deem ed the country to have failed, along with Romania, to

18
“Ako Ne Poluchim Pokana Za Pregovori s ES, Shte Preformulirame Tcelta Si:
Ministyr Predsedateljat Ivan Kostov Pred R euters” [If Not Invited to Negotiate with EU.
We Will Reformulate Our Goal: Prime M inister Ivan Kostov B efore Reuters] in Kapital,
9 (3 June, 1999). Available from http://w w w .capital.bg: INTERNET.
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establish a market economy.

The Com m ission’s annual reports on progress only

confirmed the already prevailing view that, am ong the applicant countries, Bulgaria and
Romania were the laggards and both countries w ould require longer until deemed ready
to join the Union. However, what worked in both countries' favor and ultimately led to
the Commission recommendation to the European Council to extend invitation for
negotiations was the two states’ behavior during the Kosovo crisis. Despite public
resistance to the way NATO and the EU were handling the crisis, the Bulgarian
government sided with the W est and supported officially and privately NATO’s actions
against Serbia. Furthermore, although not a NATO member, Bulgaria agreed to allow the
forces o f the Alliance to use its air space during the air-strikes against Serbian targets.20
Thus, paradoxically, the crisis that initially seem ed to distance Bulgaria from its goal of
joining the European Union ultimately accelerated the country's accession to the EU. In
pursuit of stability in the Balkans and in recognition of progress, the Helsinki European
Council in 1999 decided to include Bulgaria in the second group o f candidate countries to
begin negotiations in 2000. In its 1999 report the Commission summed up the prevailing
view among the member states that "one of the key lessons o f the Kosovo crisis is the
need to achieve peace and security, democracy and the rule o f law, growth and the
foundations of prosperity throughout Europe. Enlargement is the best way to do this.
There is now a greater awareness of the strategic dimensions of enlargement.”21
Accordingly, despite the lack o f full compliance with the economic requirements for the
1’European Commission, Composite Paper 1999: Reports on Progress Toward
Accession by Each o f the Candidate Countries, supplem ent 2/99 (Luxemburg: Office for
Official Publications o f the European Communities, 2000), 19.
-'’“Bulgarian MPs Give NATO Airspace G reenlight,” Agence France-Presse (4
May 1999).
"’European Commission, Composite P aper 1999, 5.
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start of admission, the Commission recommended that Bulgaria be accepted as a
candidate at the Helsinki summit on 10 December 1999.
Despite B ulgaria's inclusion in the Helsinki group o f candidates, it was obvious
that the country lagged behind the others in its integration in the EU as measured by the
pace o f implementing reforms and adopting the acquis. The European Comm ission's
annual evaluation o f the applicant countries in 2000 still listed Bulgaria, along with
Romania, as the only tw o candidates without functioning market econom ies." Although
the European Com m ission, following the Kosovo crisis, declared Bulgaria as meeting the
Copenhagen political criteria, the country was judged to have serious problems in all
transition areas. Only in its reports in 1999 and 2000 did the Com m ission evaluate the
country to have achieved a level of economic stability and a m ore satisfactory pace of
meeting the m em bership criteria. Yet, even in 2000, Bulgaria, according to the annual
report, had no functioning market economy. The two countries were deem ed to be
prepared to open negotiations on the fewest chapters of the acquis and by March 2001
Bulgaria was able to close only eight o f the thirty-one chapters." ' Not surprisingly,
Bulgaria is always paired with Romania as the two countries needing extra time to gain
EU membership.24

i ■>

"European Commission, Enlargement Strategy Paper: Report on Progress
Toward Accession by Each o f the Candidate Countries, supplem ent 3/2000
(Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Com m unities, 2001). 37.
2'European Comm ission, Bulgaria: State o f Negotiations (6 April 2001).
Available from http://ww w .euractive.com : INTERNET.
"4The com m issioner for EU enlargement Gunter Verheugen declared that all
candidates, excepting Bulgaria and Romania, would be able to finalize the negotiations
by the end of 2002 and gain membership by 2004. “Verheugen Sees EU Enlargement
W ithout Bulgaria, Rom ania,” RFE/RL Daily Report (23 October, 2000). Available from
http://www.rferl.org; INTERNET; “The Big EU Extension to T ake Place by 2004.”
M onitorul Online (5 April 2001). Available from http://ww w .centraleurope.com ;
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B ulgaria's rear position in the Helsinki group resulted not only in the EU’s
reluctance to integrate the country into the Union but also ensured a differentiated
treatment o f its citizens. While the citizens o f all applicant countries could travel visa-free
to the members o f the Schengen C onvention,’3 Bulgarian nationals, along with
Romanians, had to obtain visas, a process which caused much indignation among the
public and increased the cost o f traveling to the West.26 After many failed attempts to
remove the country from the Schengen list o f states whose nationals require visas to visit
the members o f the Convention, the EU finally on 1 December 2000 agreed to allow
Bulgarians to travel to the Union visa-free.27

The Czech Republic and the EU

More extensive relations between Czechoslovakia and the European Union date
back as far as the early 1980s. In N ovem ber 1986. the European Council gave the
Commission a mandate to negotiate an agreement on trade in industrial products with
Prague. The agreement was signed in 1988 and went into effect on I April 1989. Within

INTERNET; A report by ING Barings suggests that the most likely date Bulgaria would
join the EU is 2008. See ING Barings, E U Enlargement and Convergence, March 2000
(New York; ING Barrings LLC, 2001), 20.
' 3The Schengen Convention (also known as Schengen acquis), signed in 1990 by
thirteen EU members plus Iceland and N orway, removed frontiers controls and
introduced freedom of movement to all individuals who are nationals of the signatory
states. See European Commission, G lossary, 59.
26“Survey Shows 95 Percent o f Bulgarians Feel Affected by EU Visa
Restrictions,” Bulgarian Telegraph Agency (21 November, 2000).
27”Schengen Countries Drop Visa Requirements for Bulgarians as o f Tuesday,”
Bulgarian Telegraph Agency (10 April, 2001).
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days o f the new government after the V elvet Revolution in November 1989,
Czechoslovakia asked the Com m ission to negotiate a new trade and cooperation
agreement. In recognition o f the speedy reform s taking place in the country, the European
Commission and Prague concluded a new agreement which went into force on November
1990. As with the agreements with the o th er East European states, it included economic
cooperation in a variety o f areas. By then however, the reformers in Prague already
defined a membership in the Com m unity as priority of Czechoslovakia’s foreign policy;
in March 1990 Foreign M inister Jiri D ienstbier declared that his country w anted to
conclude an associated agreement and eventually become a EC member. In May Prime
M inster Marian Calfa said he hoped C zechoslovakia would join the Com m unity by 2000.
In addition, in contrast to Bulgaria, C zechoslovakia was able as early as 1990 to reach
agreements on visa-free travel with alm ost all members of the Community.
Czechoslovakia, along with Poland and Hungary, was the first country declared to
meet the newly formulated conditionality—including the rule of law. human rights, free
and fair elections, among others—for concluding a Europe Agreement. The agreement,
however, was seen by the new governm ents in Eastern Europe, including in Prague, as
little more than an improved version o f the ju st concluded trade and cooperation
agreements. Czechoslovakia’s governm ent repeatedly demanded that the European
Community commit to the country's inclusion in the organization, but to no avail. The
Europe Agreement between Prague and th e EC was signed on 16 D ecem ber 1991. After
Czechoslovakia’s velvet divorce was com pleted on I January 1993 the Com m ission
initiated negotiations of a new Europe A greem ent with the Czech Republic. The
agreement was signed on 4 O ctober 1993 and entered into force in February 1995. By
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then, o f course, the European Union had already com m itted to enlargement. In January
1996, the Czech governm ent submitted the application for EU membership.
Although the Commission does not formally rank the applicant countries, the
annual avis provide comparison between the countries’ extent o f meeting the membership
criteria. In its first avis in 1997 the Czech Republic appeared as one o f the star
performers. Although none of the countries fully met the ability to take on the acquis and
none was a fully functioning market economy, the Comm ission evaluated the Czech
Republic, along with four other countries, to be ready to begin negotiations on joining the
Union.28 The country along with Hungary were judged to have made the greatest progress
in terms of their capacity to cope with competitive pressures and market forces within the
Union and the Czech Republic was already ready to take on the main part of the acquis in
the medium term.29 T he Czech Republic became the first post-communist country to be
adm itted in 1995 to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, a
recognition of the state's transformation by the club o f the most developed Western
democracies. The R eport also rated the country as a dem ocracy with stable institutions
and a market econom y capable of coping with com petitive pressures and market forces
within the Union in the medium term. It was noted, however, that the Czech Republic
needed substantial efforts to fully apply and enforce the acquis. Consequently, the
Luxemburg European Council in December 1997 decided to begin negotiations with the
Czech Republic in the spring of 1998.

■ European Com m ission, Agenda 2000: Commission Opinion on the Czech
Republic's Application fo r Membership o f the European Union. 1997 (June 2001).
Available from http://europa.eu.int; INTERNET; Nicoll and Schoenberg, eds., 54-55.
~9European Com m ission, Enlargement Preparing fo r Accession.
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Paradoxically, the invitation to begin membership negotiations coincided with a
serious economic and political crisis in the Czech Republic. The collapse o f several banks
and a general economic stagnation put an end to what was considered to be an exemplary
political and socio-economic post-communist transition. Furthermore, the Klaus
government was less than enthusiastic about what was perceived as a European Union
bound on circumventing nation-states’ sovereignty: accordingly, the Czech Republic was
reluctant to align its legislation with the Union’s and reform national institutions in
preparation for membership. Not surprisingly, the second Commission report released in
late 1998 noted the state’s lack of preparedness for jo ining the EU .30 The report observed
no progress at all in several key areas since its last avis in 1997, including public
administration, internal markets, anti-trust legislation, ju stice reform and the treatment of
Roma. The report called for decisive reforms in the areas o f finance and banking,
corporate governance and corruption. The Commission also severely criticized the
quality and adequacy o f the country's National Program for the Preparation o f the Czech
Republic for Membership o f the European Union, prepared by Tosovsky's interim
government. In fact, the annual report defined the Czech Republic as one o f the lagging
members o f the first group o f negotiating countries, well behind the leaders Poland and
Hungary.
The ascent of the Social Democrats to power m arked the end of political
instability in the Czech Republic and more favorable conditions for consistent efforts to
meet the membership criteria. Still, the next Commission Report in 1999. although
recognizing newly energized effort to implement reform, pointed to many o f the same
,()European Com m ission, Regular Report fro m the Commission on Czech
R epublic's Progress Tow ard Accession, 1998 (May 2001). Available from
http://europa.eu.int: INTERNET.
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shortcomings included in the previous report.31 It labeled the pace of legislative
approximation as inadequate and found that there had been only mixed progress to set up
the institutions needed to implement the limited legislation passed by the Parliament.
Only in its report in 2000 did the Com m ission establish that the country had significantly
accelerated the rate o f legislative alignm ent with the EU acquis and that the government
had begun to implement major reforms in key areas. ’2
The Social Democrats also ended a period of official Czech doubts about the
nature and purpose o f the European Union as a process. W hile in power. Prime Minster
Vaclav Klaus, a self-proclaim ed Tacherite, frequently criticized EU developm ents and
stimulated a debate in the Czech Republic about issues such as monetary union and the
social dimensions of the EU. ’3 Klaus resented what he saw as the federalization of the EU
and the gradual centralization of authority and powers in Brussels at the expense of
national governments. Instead, he favored admission into the Common M arket but
opposed key aspects o f political unification, particularly the Social Charter. The Zeman
government, in contrast, adopted a more positive attitude toward integration.
Despite the criticism in the European Comm ission's 1998 and 1999 reports, the
Czech Republic's place in the first group o f countries negotiating m em bership was never
threatened. By March 2001 the Czech Republic had already closed fifteen o f the

’’European Comm ission, Regular Report from the Commission on Czech
Republic’s Progress Tow ard Accession, 1999 (May 20001). Available on
http://europa.eu.int; INTERNET.
'“European Comm ission, Regular Report from the Commission on Czech
Republic's Progress Tow ard Accession, 2000 (May 2001). Available on
http://europa.eu.int; INTERNET.
"G rable and Hughes, 73.
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chapters. ’4 A nd although the pace o f meeting the membership criteria made the country
more suited to a second wave of enlargement, EU officials suggested that it may be
politically im possible to exclude the Czech Republic from the first wave of
enlargem ent.0

Lithuania a n d the EU

Relations between the European Union and Lithuania have developed rapidly
since the country gained independence in August 1991. The tw o sides signed a Trade and
Cooperation Agreement on 11 May 1992, which entered into force in 1993. Sim ultaneous
with signing the Agreement, the two sides signed a Declaration on Political Dialogue
creating conditions for political cooperation. Consequently, the Essen European Council
reaffirmed the Copenhagen decision and extended the pre-accession strategy to the three
Baltic states and Slovenia.
The EU and Lithuania signed in July 1994 an Agreement on Free Trade and
Trade-Related M atters, which stipulated for the establishment o f a free trade area during
a transitional period lasting a maximum of six years beginning in January 1995. Even
more significantly the two sides signed a Europe Agreement on 12 June 1995. which
entered into force on 1 February 1998. As with the agreements with other East European
countries, it provided a legal framework for political dialogue and gradual integration of
the country in the Union, and promoted the expansion of econom ic and trade relations

j4European Commission, Czech Republic: State o f Negotiations (April 2001).
Available on http://www.euractive.com; INTERNET.
3:,ING Barings, 22.
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between the two sides. The Europe Agreement recognized Lithuania's aspirations to
become a member o f the Union and created conditions for the country’s participation in
the pre-accession strategy.
Lithuania applied to join the EU on 8 D ecem ber 1995. On 25 March 1998 the two
sides adopted an Accession Partnership to help the country’s reform efforts and
preparations for accession. In its first report the European Commission did not
recommend Lithuania as one of the countries to begin negotiations to join the Union. In
terms o f the political criteria the avis rated Lithuania among the best performers along
with Hungary, the C zech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia. In terms of economic
development, however, Lithuania, given its later start on economic reform, was judged to
lag behind the most advanced countries, but to be ahead of Bulgaria and Romania. The
country was evaluated as lacking a functioning market economy: the country's economy
was deemed to be unable to withstand competitive p re ssu re s/6 The Commission urged
the country to increase its effort in preparation to take on the acquis and adhere to the
aims o f political, econom ic, and monetary union. In accordance with the EU
recommendations, the Lithuanian government accelerated its efforts especially in the area
o f meeting the acquis. '7
Later reports by the European Commission observed accelerated reform efforts in
Lithuania as the country gradually shortened the distance from the first wave countries.,s

,6European Comm ission, Regular Report fr o m the Commission on Lithuania's
Progress Toward Accession, 1997 (M ay 2001). A vailable from http://europa.eu.int:
INTERNET.
'7Gediminas Vitkus, “National Parliamentary Control of EU Policy in Lithuania.”
Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review no. 2 (1998): 65-76.
,xSee European Commission, Regular Report fro m the Commission on
Lithuania's Progress Towards Accession, 1998 (M ay 2001). European Commission,
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M ost significantly, in its 2000 report the Commission deemed the country to be a
functioning market economy, thus elim inating the last factor, which informally defined
the country as an economic laggard. ’0 Yet. while the country was judged to face no
political obstacles to entry, econom ic, institutional and legislative issues continued to
keep the country behind the first wave countries. The 2000 report presented Lithuania
among the states which best met the Copenhagen political criteria but still lagged behind
even the other Baltic states in term s of econom ic development and market, legislative and
institutional reform—although it must be noted that the country was well ahead of
Bulgaria and Romania.40 In any event, the country was making a smooth transition and
by March 2001 it had closed thirteen chapters, only two less than the Czech Republic: a
remarkable success given that Lithuania started the negotiations in 2000.41

NATO

There was a short-lived hope in Eastern Europe following the Cold W ar that
collective defense as a means o f ensuring national security would give way to a collective
security system which would address new instabilities and threats. Vaclav H avel's

Regular Report fro m the Commission on Lithuania's Progress Towards Accession, 1999
(May 2001). Available on http://europa.eu.int: INTERNET.
'°European Commission, Agenda 2000: Enlargement Strategy Paper, no. 50.
Available on http://europa.eu.int; INTERNET.
40On the state of the Lithuanian econom y see European Commission. Commission
Presents Forecasts fo r the Candidate Countries, file IP/01/595 (Brussels: European
Commission, 2001); ING Barings, 64-65.
4lEuropean Commission, Lithuania: State o f Negotiations (April 2001). Available
on http://www.euractive.com; INTERNET.
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eagerness to see the Warsaw pact dismembered was as strong as his enthusiasm for a
Europe free of m ilitary alliances. In the spring o f 1990, addressing the Council of Europe,
the Czech president called for the dismantling o f both alliances. Just a few months prior
Havel was a dissident and now was responsible for formulating his country's transition to
democracy. The dissident movement believed that communism and Soviet dominance
were to blame for the artificial division on the continent. The existence o f NATO and the
Warsaw Pact was the military dim ension of an ideological confrontation. Now that
communism was in retreat--at least in Eastern Europe if not in the Soviet Union, and
Moscow was gradually withdrawing its troops—it was only natural, the former dissidents
thought, that military blocs should become irrelevant.4'
Paradoxically, it was Hungary, a country still ruled by com m unists, with its
decision to seek closer links with NATO and calls for the dissolution o f the Warsaw Pact
that signified the Cold War was not only about ideology nor was NATO only about
security against the Soviets. In early 1991, following the dissolution o f the Warsaw Pact,
Hungary was joined by Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria in its calls for NATO to
provide security guarantees to the emerging dem ocracies in Eastern Europe. Later that
year, the newly independent Baltic states sought closer ties with the Alliance as well.
Soon NATO membership came to be seen as a panacea for Eastern European countries’
inherent instability and insecurity as emerging elites in the region realized that NATO

42Ironically, President Havel insisted in early 1990 that the W arsaw Pact be
preserved only tem porary as a means o f bringing the Soviet Union into a new CSCE
security system in which both blocs would dissolve. For a discussion o f the early
relationship between NATO and the post-com munist countries see C hristopher Jones,
“The Security Policies o f the Former Warsaw Pact States: Deconstruction and
Reconstruction," in Andrew A. M ichta an Ilya Prizel, eds., Postcommunist Eastern
Europe-.Crisis and Reform (New York: St. M artin’s Press, 1992), 111-149.
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would be the only institution capable of providing robust security guarantees in a still
dangerous world.
Only months after the revolutions in Eastern Europe. NATO invited the six
Warsaw Pact members to visit the North A tlantic Council, its highest body, and establish
regular diplom atic relations. N ATO ’s response to the emerging willingness o f East
European states for membership committed the Alliance to a closer cooperation with the
post-communist countries but avoided any discussions of enlargement.43 The new
Strategic Concept adopted by the NATO H eads o f States and Government in Rome in
November 1991 outlined a new approach to security based on dialogue, cooperation, and
collective defense capability, and including cooperation with East European countries as
an integral part o f the A lliance's strategy.44 M ore specifically, the summit established a
North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) to oversee the em erging relationship and
involve the post-communist countries in a cooperative framework. The first meeting of
the NACC took place on 20 December 1991 and included six Eastern European countries
as well as the three Baltic states. The members adopted a “Statement of Dialogue,
Partnership, and Cooperation” that endorsed enhanced cooperation between NATO and
the former W arsaw Pact members. When the Soviet Union disintegrated in January 1992,
NATO decided to include the former Soviet republics in the NACC.

43On the early post-Cold War evolution o f the Alliance see North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, NATO Handbook (Brussels: O ffice o f Information and Press, 1998), 27-31:
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO H andbook (Brussels: Office of Information
and Press, 1995). 21-40; Jeffrey Simon, “Partnership for Peace and Civil-Military
Relations,” in Jeffrey Simon, ed., NATO Enlargem ent: Opinions and Options
(Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1995): 45-72.
■^The new Strategic Concept replaced the 1967 strategy o f “Flexible Response”
and moved aw ay from mass mobilization and tow ard enhanced crisis management
capabilities and peacekeeping operations. See Sim on, Partnership fo r Peace, 48.
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Although the Alliance took significant steps to address East European states’
growing appeal for extensive cooperation it hesitated to address their pressing dem ands
for immediate membership, made all the more urgent by the unsuccessful August 1991
Moscow coup and the continuing w ar in Yugoslavia. In January 1994 in Brussels, NAC
launched a m ajor new initiative, Partnership for Peace (PfP), aimed at enhancing stability
and security in Europe. Although the PfP did not promise immediate membership it
established a long-term com mitment to expansion. The PfP marked a shift from a
multilateral dialogue to a bilateral relationship between individual partners and the
Alliance in the form o f Individual Partnership Programs (IPP).
The Brussels Summit in Decem ber 1994 decided to initiate an extensive study to
determine how NATO will enlarge, the principles to guide this process and the
implications o f membership. The NATO Enlargement Study, released in September
1995, emphasized that candidate countries should meet five criteria: democratic elections,
individual liberty and the rule of law; demonstrated com mitment to economic reform and
a market economy; adherence to O SC E norms and principles involving ethnic minorities
and social justice; resolution of territorial disputes with neighbors; and establishment o f
democratic control o f the military. NATO also required new members to assume the
financial obligations o f joining and establish interoperability with N ATO structures. In
fact, there are striking similarities between many o f the NATO and EU admission criteria
including level of democratization, minority issues and economic progress. Based on the
study's findings, the Alliance conducted an intensive dialogue with interested partners,
providing member states with valuable information about East European countries’
preparation and intention for membership. This in turn, provided potential candidates
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with experience in dealing with the Alliance and knowledge o f the responsibilities and
obligations of m embership.
At the Sintra Sum m it in May 1997 the NACC was replaced by the Euro-Atlantic
Partnership Council (EAPC), whose purpose was to launch a new stage o f cooperation.
The EAPC provided the overall framework for political and security-related cooperation
under the PfP. Along with practical cooperation, the EAPC provided a m echanism for
self differentiations so that partner countries would be able to decide individually the
level and areas o f cooperation with the Alliance. In other words, states were able to
choose whether to pursue membership or enhanced cooperation in specific areas.
At the M adrid Summit in July 1997, the Alliance invited the Czech Republic,
Hungary and Poland to start accession negotiations and reaffirmed its openness to new
members. The Sum m it also strengthened the role o f the partners in PfP decision-making
and planning, and adopted an enhanced PfP.43 The enhanced PfP was intended to have a
more operational character, as well as increased opportunities for the candidate-countries
to participate in decision-m aking and planning relating to PfP activities. The accession
talks with the three partners were followed by the signing and consequent ratification of
accession protocols. The three countries gained formal membership on 12 M arch 1999.
N ATO's W ashington Summit in April 1999, introduced the M em bership Action
Plan (MAP), a design which went further than the Study of NATO Enlargem ent in
defining what the candidate countries needed to do in preparation for m em bership.40 The

43The M adrid Summit, in an attempt to engage Russia, also created a NATORussia Permanent Joint Council. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization, N ATO
Handbook (Brussels: O ffice o f Information and Press, 1998), 31.
46On the M A P see Am bassador Klaus-Peter Klaiber, “The M em bership Action
Plan: Keeping N A T O ’s Door O pen,” NATO Review 47 no. 2 (Sum m er 1999): 23-25;
Stephen Blank, “M A P Reading: N A TO ’s and Russia's Pathways to European Military
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MAP gave the candidates a list o f five issues—political and economic, defense and
military, resources, security, and legal—from which each country will select the most
valuable and w ork on them assisted by the Alliance to improve their ability to meet
membership criteria. In fact, w ith the MAP initiative. NATO created its own acquis
against which the Alliance could assess the progress made by each partner.47 The
Alliance set to draw up an annual report for individual partners providing feedback on
their progress in the areas covered in their individual national programs. The reports were
to become the basis for an annual meeting o f the NAC with each aspiring candidate.

Bulgaria and NATO

The beginning of Bulgaria-NATO relations was laid down by a decision o f the
Bulgarian government in 13 July 1990 to accept the invitation extended by the London
Declaration of the NACC to establish diplomatic links with the Alliance. Compared to
the other East European countries, however. Bulgaria remained ambivalent toward
membership in NATO as there was no domestic consensus on the foreign policy
priorities of the country. The Socialist Party, internally split on foreign policy priorities,
either insisted that the Alliance should first transform and even agree to accept Russia as
Integration,” occasional paper no. 61 (W ashington, DC: Woodrow W ilson International
Center for Scholars, February 2001). Available from http://www.wilsoncenter.com:
INTERNET; Jeffrey Simon, “N A T O ’s M embership Action Plan (M AP) and Prospects
for the Next Round of Enlargement,” occasional paper no. 61 (W ashington, DC:
Woodrow W ilson International C enter for Scholars, November 2000). Available from
http://www.wilsoncenter.com; INTERNET.
47It must be noted that in contrast to the EU accession process, a NATO decision
to accept new members remains overw helm ingly a political one. Sim ply fulfilling the
M AP criteria is no guarantee for membership although a failure to meet the objectives
will almost certainly disqualify a country from prospective membership. See Blank, 5-7.
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a member before Bulgaria’s accession to the Alliance or outright resisted any moves to
establish long-term relations with NATO.48 On the other hand, the pro-Westem UDF
remained internally divided and ineffective in making the case for membership. In fact,
the only consistent and forceful voice o f support to the idea o f joining the Alliance was
the first democratically elected president, Zhelju Zhelev.
Bulgaria’s ambivalence on relations with NATO between 1990 and early 1997
left the country unprepared for integration in the Alliance. The Parliament passed a
declaration in December 1993 on the Euro-Atlantic orientation o f the country and on 14
February 1994 the country signed the Partnership for Peace Framework Document.49 The
Socialist Party, however, undermined any attempt to establish solid relationship with the
Alliance and after its overw helm ing electoral victory in 1994 put the relations on hold. In
1996, after rounds o f discussions with NATO in accordance with the PfP guidelines
concerning prospective desire to jo in the Alliance. Bulgaria concluded that it did not want
to pursue m embership.3"
The collapse of the Socialist government in early 1997 marked not only the
ascendance o f the UDF but also a dram atic change in the country’s foreign policy
priorities. One of the first acts o f the interim government o f Stefan Sofiyanski was to

48See Videnov, 3-5; Council o f Ministers of the Republic of Bulgaria,
“ Kontceptcija za Natcionalnata Sigum ost na Republika Bylgarija” [National Security
Concept of the Republic of Bulgaria] (Sofia, 1995), 34. Available from the Bulgarian
Embassy in W ashington, DC.
49Nikolay Slatinski and M arina Kaparini, “Bulgarian Security and Prospects for
Reform,” NATO Review no 2 (M arch 1995): 28-32.
3°Jeffrey Simon, “Bulgaria and NATO: 7 Lost Y ears,” Strategic Forum no. 142
(May 1998). Available from http://ww w .ndu.edu; INTERNET.
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declare Bulgaria’s aspiration to join the Alliance.51 After the UDF won the parliamentary
elections and formed a stable majority government, the country became quite active in its
quest to establish a strong relationship with the Alliance and ultimately gain membership.
The government quickly established an infrastructure to catch up with the other
candidates. On 17 March 1997 Bulgaria adopted the National Program for Preparation
and Accession to NATO and set up an Intergovernmental Committee on NATO
Integration. Yet, it was obvious that the country had lost valuable time and the final
document o f the M adrid Summit, which did not even mention Bulgaria as a potential
future member, caused disappointment in the country but cam e as a no surprise.
Indeed, political will aside, Bulgaria was hardly prepared to join NATO. While
the country met some o f the criteria listed in the NATO Enlargement Study, including
democratization, protection o f individual liberties, among others, and governmental
control over the military, Bulgaria failed to take any substantial steps to reform the
military.5' Until 1997 consecutive governments had not started the restructuring of the
military retained close to the pre-1989 level o f over 100,000 troops and an extremely
bloated. 3.000 strong defense ministry personnel. Since the country until 1997 did not
seriously consider joining NATO no efforts were made to achieve interoperability and
train personnel for work with NATO members. No efforts were made to coordinate its
defense budget, planning, and resource management.
The government o f the UDF a made considerable effort after 1997 to implement
wide ranging military reforms, and more importantly, end B ulgaria’s self-imposed
5,Council o f M inisters o f the Republic o f Bulgaria, 17 February 1997-D ecision
o f the Council o f M inisters f o r Full NATO M embership (November 2000). Available
from http://www.m d.govem ment.bg; INTERNET.
5;:Simon, “ Bulgaria and NATO.”
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isolation and convince the Alliance of the benefit o f the country's membership. Bulgaria
approved its National Security Concept in April 1998, a Military Doctrine in April 1999,
a Defense Plan in O ctober 1999, and Partnership Goals in April 2000.55 The government
also established an inter-departmental structure, co-chaired by the foreign and defense
ministers and an integration council in the M inistry o f Defense, to coordinate NATO
integration.
At the time of the UDF’s ascendance to pow er in early 1997 the size of the
military was still at pre-1989 force levels and structure. The new defense reform
envisioned to cut its size from roughly 100,000 to 45,000 by 2004. It also called for
restructuring of the forces in three corps and their gradual modernization to meet NATO
standards.54 Although the reform plans were well conceived, attempts to trim the size of
the military force encountered a lack of political support and the Parliament failed to
support Plan 2004.55 Thus by early 1999 Bulgaria still retained a defense establishment of
112,000. only slightly lower than pre-1989 levels.56 The military is still characterized by

5 Sce Simon. “N ATO ’s M embership," 10.
54Ministry of Defense o f the Republic o f Bulgaria, Military Doctrine o f the
Republic o f Bulgaria. Available from http://www.m d.govem ment.bg; INTERNET;
Ministry of Defense o f the Republic of Bulgaria, Plan 2004 (June 2001). Available from
http://www.md.govcmment.bg; INTERNET; Jeffrey Simon, “Transforming the Armed
Forces of Central and East Europe,” Strategic Forum no. 172 (June 2000). Available
from http://www.ndu.edu; INTERNET; Simon, "Bulgaria and NATO.”
55Bulgaria's Joint Chiefs o f Staff insisted that the country needed 65,000 strong
military and clashed with the civilian authorities over the reform pririties. See Momchil
Milev, “Bylgarskata Armija Prez Pogleda na Pentagona” [The Bulgarian Military
Through the Pentagon’s Eyes], Kapital 15 (17 April, 1999). Available from
http://www.capital.bg; INTERNET. Momchil Nedelchev, “Shefyt naG enshtaba Plashi s
Ostavka” [Chair o f Joint Chiefs o f Staff Threatens to Resign], Kapital 1 (9 January.
1999). Available from http://www.capital.bg; INTERNET.
56Simon, “Transform ing.”
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poor training, low unit readiness levels, and poor morale throughout the officer corps and
the enlisted ranks. As a late reform er, the country also suffered from the lack of
institutional experience dealing with the member countries and PfP partners. Problems
ranged from the absence from the num erous NATO and PfP program s designed to
integrate partners' militaries in the A lliance’s institutional framework to a lack o f military
participation in various peace-keeping operations providing real operational experience,
to the lack o f language skills essential in any coalition effort.57
The crisis in Kosovo in 1999 provided the biggest boost to B ulgaria's attempts to
join the Alliance. Even before the beginning of the air campaign, the government
•

~

5S

intensified its consultations with N ATO officials in anticipation o f arm ed conflict. 1
President Stojanov and Prime M inister Kostov also met with their Balkan counterparts
and issued appeals to Serbia’s leader Milosevic to accept N A TO 's plan for solving the
crisis in Kosovo.3'* Later, during the air campaign, the government and the Parliament
granted the Alliance the use o f B ulgaria's airspace for attacks against targets in
Yugoslavia. The government recognized that the Kosovo crisis, although posing
numerous security challenges to the country, presented a unique opportunity to prove the
irreversibility o f Bulgaria’s transform ation, its choice to integrate in the Euro-Atlantic

57Until 1997 Bulgaria was the only PfP partner with no participation in the IFOR
and SFOR operations in Bosnia. O nly after July 1997 did the governm ent send a 25-man
engineering platoon to join the D utch troops in SFOR and later more troops joined.
“Bulgaria-Bosnia-Blue H elm ets,” Bulgarian Telegraph Agency (7 July, 1998).
58”Bulgaria-NATO C onsultations,” Bulgarian Telegraph A gencv (13 October,
1998).
^ “Bulgaria, Romania U rge M ilosevic to Accept NATO Force,” Agence France Presse (22 February, 1999).
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area, and more immediately, the strategic value o f an aspiring NATO m em ber/’0 Indeed,
Bulgaria's support and cooperation with the Alliance significantly enhanced the country’s
standing, allowing to catch up with the rest of the partners in their quest to gain
membership. In return for its wartime support, the NAC at the Washington summit in
April 1999 extended a limited, in space and time. Article 5 guarantee to Bulgaria.61 Even
before this explicit statement of commitment, the Alliance on numerous occasions
conveyed its interest in the security and stability o f the country.02 This was not lost on the
Bulgarians and the government widely publicized any statement of support and
com m itm ent/”
The end of allied air strikes over Yugoslavia did not diminish the growing
cooperation between NATO and Bulgaria. The need to maintain multinational forces in
Kosovo and the beginning o f a new conflict, this time in neighboring M acedonia, gave
Bulgaria another chance to enhance its status among the aspiring membership candidates.
In March 2001 the government agreed to sign an agreem ent allowing NATO forces to use
0()Anatoly Verbin, “Bulgarian Government Tested Over Kosovo.” Reuters (19
April, 1999); In a interview, Ivan Krastev, a Bulgarian political scientist, argued that the
“crisis in Kosovo makes Bulgaria a real candidate for NATO membership.” “ Krizata v
Kosovo Napravi Bylgarija Vidima” [Kosovo Crisis M ade Bulgaria Visible), Kapital 13
(5 April. 1998).
6‘in a "Statement on Kosovo,” the NAC com m itted the Alliance to the security
and territorial integrity o f the countries challenged during the crisis by S erbia's regime.
Quoted in Simon. “N ATO ’s Membership,” 19.
62Steve Holland, “NATO Vows to Guard Border States from Serbs,” Reuters (25
April, 1999).
6'Interview of foreign minister Nadezhda M ichailova. “NATO Razprostira
Sistem ata si za Sigumost i nad Bylgarija” [NATO Extends its Security System Over
Bulgaria], Kapital 41 (19 October, 1998); In an interview. Prime M inster Ivan Kostov
said that NATO Secretary General Javier Solana had send a letter stating that “NATO is
ready to guarantee the security of Bulgaria in a case o f attack by Yugoslavia.” Bulgarian
Telegraph Agency (13 October, 1998).
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Bulgarian territory, including the establishment of military bases, in the event of a Balkan
crisis.64 Remarkably, all political parties represented in the Parliament supported the
agreement and it was approved without the usual resistance from the Socialist Party.63 In
fact, the successful conclusion of the A lliance's air campaign against Serbia marked the
transformation of the B S P ’s position on the country's membership o f NATO. After a
relatively short and uncontroversial intra-party debate, the Socialists decided to embrace
NATO membership as the only politically attainable means to guarantee national
security.66 The change in the BSP’s long-standing opposition to NATO was an attempt by
the party leadership to transform the party into a modem social-democratic organization
and position itself as a potential coalition partner ahead o f the 2001 parliamentary
elections.67 Even then, however, the Socialists remained the only party represented in the
Parliament which insisted that the country should hold a referendum on NATO
membership.
Ultimately, the policies of the government during the Kosovo crisis along w ith its
efforts since 1997 significantly enhanced Bulgaria's prospects of joining NATO. Yet. the
country's late start o f reform s and systemic economic and political weaknesses continued
to hinder its ability to convince the Alliance o f the worth o f its membership.

w“Deal Will Let NATO Forces to Use Bulgarian Territory," Reuters (29 March,
2001 ).

63“Socialists Decide to Vote for Ratification of Agreement with NATO."
Bulgarian Telegraph Agency (4 March, 2001).
“ “BPS Declares Itself in Favor o f Active Partnership with NATO," Bulgarian
Telegraph Agency (7 M arch, 2000); “Ex-Communist Socialist Back Bulgaria’s NATO
Bid.” Reuters (6 M arch, 2000).
67“Socialists Break with Past, Back NATO.” Reuters (7 May. 2000).
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The Kosovo crisis tested not only the political p arties’ resolve to seek
membership in NATO but also public consensus on Bulgaria-NATO relationship. As
elsewhere in Eastern Europe, the Bulgarian public resisted the air campaign against
Serbia: 77 percent were against NATO’s military intervention against Belgrade and 77
percent were against A lliance equipment or personnel crossing Bulgaria/’8 Furthermore,
although a majority o f the public had supported the country’s membership in NATO,
during the air campaign the majority of Bulgarians refused to recognize that failure to
grant the Alliance access to the country's territory and air space would most likely hurt
Bulgaria’s membership hopes.69 Thus the Kosovo crisis indicated that public support for
Bulgaria’s membership in the Alliance, although routinely over 50 percent in the latter
part of the 1990s, has no deep commitment based on understanding of the costs and
duties associated with participation in NATO. On the other hand, the same crisis
provoked all political parties to finally go through an internal debate on eventual
membership and ultim ately led to the intra-party consensus on the priority o f seeking to
join the Alliance.

NATO and the Czech Republic

After the collapse o f communism in Eastern Europe, it seemed as if
Czechoslovakia was ready to accept some modified role for the Warsaw Pact, especially
in the area of arms control and multilateral security consultations and as a counterbalance

68“Bulgaria-Survey-Kosovo,” Bulgarian Telegraph Agency (23 March, 1999).
6<)“Vyzdushen D ostyp Po Po-Trudnija Nachin’’ [A ir Space Access, the Hard
W ay|. Kapital 16 (24 M arch, 1999).
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to unified Germany. Thus, although the government negotiated for the quick withdrawal
of Soviet troops stationed in the country, it took a cautious approach to the Pact.70 The
new national leadership accepted that both the Warsaw Pact and NATO would exist until
the international com m unity established a new Europe-wide security system based on the
Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe.
The reluctance o f the Soviet leadership to contemplate reform o f the Pact, the
military crackdown in Lithuania in January 1991, and the refusal of NATO members to
design any non-NATO based security arrangem ents convinced the Czechoslovakia
leadership to define membership in the Alliance as a high security priority. As early as
February 1991, President Havel urged closer cooperation between Czechoslovakia and
NATO.71 Indeed, Vaclav Havel became the most ardent proponent of NATO enlargement
as essential to the peace and stability in Eastern Europe.
Along with the clearly defined political will to join the Alliance, the Czech
Republic, initially as part o f Czechoslovakia and later as an independent state, was quick
to implement drastic military and security reforms which were virtually com plete by
1994.7" The government asserted total civilian control over the military and carried out a
thorough restructuring o f the force structure and command. W hile in 1993 the country
had over 106,000 troops, the next year it downsized the forces down to 87,000 and

70Andrew Cottey, 61 -69.
7l“Weekly Records o f Events,” Report on Eastern Europe 2 (15 February. 1991).
72David M. Glantz, “ Military Training and Education Challenges in Poland, the
Czech Republic, and H ungary,” Journal o f Slavic Military Studies 11 no. 3 (September
1998): 1-55; Jeffrey Simon notes that by 1994 the Czech Republic had made the most
progress among the Central European countries in developing civilian control over the
military. Simon. “Partnership for Peace,” 65.
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further to approximately 60,000 in 1999.7’ The reform, however, also included a
substantial decline in m ilitary expenditures, which hampered any efforts to achieve
modernization of the arm ed force interoperability with NATO standards.74 In 1997 the
military budget accounted for 1.7 percent o f the GDP--a decline from 2.6 percent o f the
GDP in 1993-94.75
Although the Czech Republic was one o f the first East European countries to seek
NATO membership, the country seemed to have achieved no strong consensus on the
issue. Vaclav Havel em erged as the driving force behind the drive toward membership
but his efforts met no strong support by the rest o f the political elite. Indeed, as early as
1993. Prime M inister Vaclav Klaus questioned the need of his country to seek
membership at any price given the declining relevance of the Alliance and the high cost
eventual membership might incur.76 The political elite, save Havel, did not initially
campaign vigorously for membership until after the Alliance decided in late 1993 to
enlarge eastward.77 As security and defense policy enjoyed very little priority and
attention among the political leadership of all main political parties, the society as a

"’Jeffrey Simon, 'T h e New NATO M embers: Will They Contribute," Strategic
Forum no. 160 (April 1999). Available from http://www.ndu.edu: INTERNET.
74“Czech Army to Use Russian W eapons for Many More Years." Reuters (29
March. 2001).
73Simon, “The New NATO Members.”
76“NATO Supreme Commander Meets Czech Leaders.” RFE/RL News Briefs (2125 June, 1993), 19.
77Thom as S. Szayna, “The Czech Republic: A Small Contributor o r a Free Rider."
in Andrew A. Michta, ed., A m erica's New Allies (Seattle: University of W ashington
Press, 1999), 124.
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whole seemed to ignore the country’s policies aimed at joining the Alliance.78 The lack o f
any substantial problems and confrontations accompanying the reform of the national
military forces also made it impossible to tum Alliance membership into a hot political
issue to be exploited by both ruling coalition and opposition. Even the Social Democrats,
who initially opposed C zech membership, gradually came to accept it as inevitable and
politically noncontroversial.
In accordance with its will to join NATO, the Czech Republic from early on
became very active in international peacekeeping operations in order to demonstrate its
military worthiness as a potential ally and to gather experience in the NATO operational
environm ent. Very significantly, the country contributed to the coalition efforts during
the 1991 G ulf War by dispatching a special chemical warfare-protection battalion to the
G ulf region.74 From 1993 to 1998 Czech m ilitary observers were deployed in 15 United
Nations or OSCE missions in the territory o f 11 countries. The country has also been
taken part in operations in the former Yugoslavia since 1992.80 The participation in these
missions provided the Czech Republic with valuable operational and political experience
in multinational NATO settings. The military expanded bilateral relations with Alliance
members by signing defense cooperation agreem ents with all major members and
conducting military exercise with France.81

78Nelson and Szayna, 19-24.
79On the Czech Republicss participation in peace-keeping operations see Rene
Nastoupil, “Current C zech Defense Policy,” Journal o f Slavic Military Studies 12 no. 2
(June 1999), 117-18.
on

Nelson and Szayna observe that in 1993-94, the country had 1 percent of its
armed forces committed to UN missions. Nelson and Szayna, 27.
8lCottey, 82.
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Despite concerns over the rational behind the creation of the PfP, the Czech
Republic was am ong the first countries to embrace the initiative by signing it in March
1994. By then the first Czech strategic concept already identified integration in EuroAtlantic institutions as the means to deal with any m ajor threat to its security. " However,
in contrast to the other Central European countries, the Czech government was slow to
develop the conceptual framework o f the country’s security and defense policies. The
Parliament failed to approve any o f the concepts advanced by the M inistry o f Defense,
once again confirm ing the low priority defense and security policies enjoyed among the
elite. Only the im peding Madrid Sum m it in 1997, which was to decide on NATO
expansion, made the country approve a hastily framed Defense Strategy.s3 In fact, the
invitation issued by the Alliance found the Czech Republic without basic documents
outlining security and military strategies or the country's place and role in the Alliance.
Only after the formal invitation to jo in did the Czech Republic accelerat its efforts to
establish the conceptual foundations o f its defense and security policies.
NATO’s invitation to the Czech Republic issued by the Madrid Summit was
followed by increased criticism of the country’s preparedness to gain membership.
Although Prague met the political and economic criteria for joining the political
leadership was seen as unsupportive to further reforms in the field of defense and
security. Member states, particularly the United States, repeatedly pointed to falling

K2Szayna, 134,
Ben Lombardi observes that Prague followed incoherent policy; the government
approved defense doctrine of the arm ed forces before the national security policy and the
national defense strategy had been determ ined and implemented. The Security Policy was
approved several m onths after the defense doctrine. Ben Lombardi, “An Overview of
Civil-M ilitary Relations in Central and Eastern Europe,” Journal o f Slavic Military
Studies 12, no. 1 (M arch 1999), 25.
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defense expenditures, lagging modernization and interoperability o f forces, and the
general lack o f political support to the reformers in the General Staff.84 Only after public
NATO pressure did the government agree to increase military expenditures by 0.1
percent to reach 2 percent o f GDP by 2000.83 The resulting tensions between members
states and successive Czech governments did not end with the country’s formal accession
to the Alliance.86 It reached a high point during the K osovo campaign when the
government, fresh from achieving the ratification of the country’s entry into NATO,87
broke ranks with the allies and offered to mediate in the conflict.

Lithuania and NATO

After gaining independence in 1991 Lithuania found it difficult to escape the
realities of geo-politics. As a small country and former part o f a larger state, it confronted
an uncertain security environment with limited resources, including no standing military
force. Therefore Lithuania faced the dual challenge o f building state institutions and a
defense establishment in close cooperation with the other Baltic states, Latvia and
Estonia. Cognizant o f the country’s security vulnerability as a newly independent state
84Glantz. 51.
8:>Simon, “The New NATO M embers.”
86“NATO 2002 Need Not be Held in Prague, Threatens USA,” Czech News
A gency (29 March, 2001); Robert Anderson, “Washington Bars US Com panies from
Czech Fighter Tender,” Financial Times (23 May, 2001). Available from
http://www.ft.com; INTERNET.
87Czech Republic’s entry into NATO was ratified in April 1999 by the Lower
House o f the Parliament 154 against 38 with only the Comm unists and the Republicans
voting against and 6 Social Democratic MPs abstaining. It was followed by its ratification
by the Upper House and the President in May.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

184
which had just seceded from the Soviet Union, Lithuania's leadership quickly came to
believe that national security could be guaranteed within a transatlantic defense system.
This perception is shared by the public and as late as 1998, 72 percent of Lithuanians
believed that their country could not effectively defend itself in the event o f a military
ou

attack.

Thus even before NATO developed a comprehensive framework to integrate

East European countries in the Alliance, Lithuania sought to establish military and
security cooperation with member states.89 Lithuania also participated in the creation of a
Baltic Council along with Estonia and Latvia in the Baltic Sea Council in 1992, both
designed to address the need for cooperation in the Baltic region and more ambitiously,
the problem o f “soft” security.
On 4 January 1994, Lithuania sent a formal letter applying for a membership to
NATO. The same month, the country signed a Partnership for Peace Framework
Document, thus formally joining the PfP. In cooperation with the other two Baltic states,
Lithuania created in 1994 a peacekeeping battalion-B A L TB A T—following a join
initiative to increase their individual and jo in t security. The Baltic states also heavily
involved NATO members in the initiative as a way to address their lack of experience
and resources, including basic military hardw are.'10 From Lithuania's perspective.

88Paul Goble, “Divided on Security,” RFE/RL Newsline (27 August. 1998).
Available from http://www.rferl.org; INTERNET.
80On security cooperation between Lithuania and NATO and EU m embers see
Olav F. Knudsen, ed.. Stability and Security in the Baltic Sea Region (Portland, OR:
Frank Cass Publishers, 1999); Charles M. Perry, Michael J. Sweeney, and Andrew C.
Winner, Strategic Dynamics in the Nordic-Baltic Region: Implications fo r U.S. Policy
(Dulles, VA: Brassey's, Inc., 2000)
°°On the goals and structure of BA LTBA T see Annikab Bergman, “ BALTBAT:
The Emergence of a Comm on Defense Dimension to Nordic Coordination,” working
paper (Copenhagen, Denmark: Copenhagen Peace Research Institute. August 2000).
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national security under the conditions o f scarce capacities and uncertain environment
could be assured only by cooperating with NATO. Indeed, as late as 1995 the country's
military numbered only 7,000 troops and its defense posture relied heavily on preparing
citizens for self-defense on a massive scale.91 Accordingly, the 1996 Law on the
Fundamentals o f National Security—which lays out the country's basic defense concept
and command structure—explicitly required that Lithuania’s national security “be
developed as part o f the transatlantic defense system.”9* Consequently, the country
established coordination between 14 government institutions and five working groups to
specifically work toward joining the Alliance.9’
Because Lithuania's defense capabilities were and still remain very limited, the
political elite very early on recognized that traditional national self-defense was not
achievable and pursued regional and institutional means to guarantee the state’s security.
Even before its international recognition. Lithuania and the other two Baltic states
established an institutionalized framework for cooperation first by signing a Baltic
declaration for cooperation in 1990 and later the establishment o f Baltic Council of
Ministers in 1994. Increasing interaction with Baltic and Nordic ministers of foreign

Available from Colum bia International Affairs Online. http://www.cc.coIumbia.edu;
INTERNET.
91Hans Binnendijk and Jeffrey Simon. “Baltic Security and NATO Enlargement.”
Strategic Forum no. 57 (Decem ber 1995). Available from http:// www.ndu.edu;
INTERNET.
92Perry, Sweeney and W inner, 104.
93Simon. “N ATO ’s M embership Plan”, 11-12; Lithuania went as far as to create a
Vice-Minister o f Foreign Affairs position responsible for overall coordination o f national
efforts in the framework of NATO integration. See, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Lithuania, Fact Sheet—April 2001 (29 April 2001). Available from http://www.urm.lt;
INTERNET.
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affairs and defense led to cooperation on air space, borders, and Baltic Sea rescue
operations.94 In addition, Lithuania enthusiastically joined any institution and initiative
considered to enhanced the country’s chances of joining the Alliance. In June 1994
Lithuania became an Associate member o f the Western European Union—seen by the
national leadership as a backdoor to the A lliance-just months after applying to join
NATO and signing the PfP agreement.
Recognizing that the major challenges facing the Baltic states result from their
small size and requires cooperation and coordination in building their arm ed forces and
addressing security threats, Lithuania participated in the creation of a jo in t Baltic
peacekeeping force-B A LTB A T—and a joint Baltic naval squadron and airspace
surveillance system—BALTRON and BALTNET. The three states went as far as to create
in 1999 a joint military academy, Baltic Defense College o r BALTDEFCOL. in
Estonia.93 In order to prove its worth as a potential ally, the foreign policy and defense
elite cultivated an extensive military relationship with Poland by establishing a combined
peacekeeping unit and an airspace management regime. Lithuanian troops were
com m itted to BALTBAT and international peace-keeping forces.'*’ In fact, since 1994

94See Knudscn, ed„ Stability' am i Security: Perry. Sweeney and Winner.
93In a interview, Brigadier General Janas A. Kronkaitis hypothesized that
regardless o f whether the Baltic states are in NATO or not ’‘if one of us is attacked,
there’s no doubt that the other two will also be attacked, maybe later.’’ Mel Huang, "So
Far So Smooth,” Central Europe Review 2, no. 27 (10 July, 2000). Available from
http://www.centraleurope.org; INTERNET.
96On Lithuania’s international military cooperation see. Walter C. Clemens, The
Baltic Transformed: Complexity Theory and European Security (Lanham, MD: Rowman
& Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2001), 2 0 9 -1 1.
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over 600 Lithuanian peacekeeping troops have served with United Nations missions in
Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo.97
NATO’s decision at the 1997 Madrid Sum m it to invite only three countries was
met with disappointment, yet not surprise, in Vilnius. The Summit communique, which
left the door open to more candidates and specifically mentioned Lithuania as one,
however, was considered significant progress. Furthermore, the signing of a Charter of
Partnership, agreed upon between the U.S., Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia in January
1998, although not providing security guarantees, was seen by Vilnius as an important
document reflecting A m erica's political com mitment to the future o f the three countries.
The agreement stipulated for consultations am ong the signatories and other countries in
the event that “a Partner perceives that its territorial integrity, independence, or security is
threatened or at risk.” Seeing 2002 as the date o f the next NATO expansion prompted
Lithuania to concentrate its efforts on increasing the size and effectiveness of the national
military. Accordingly, the military budget was consistently increased and was planned to
reach almost 2 percent in 2001, up from 1.13 in 1999 and .85 percent in 1997." National
armed forces were planned to grow from the January 1999 total o f 12.200 to 23.000 by
2008.99
Membership in NATO has consistently enjoyed strong support in Lithuania not
only among the political elite but also among the public. The leadership has believed that
EU and NATO integration are mutually reinforcing processes, thus integration in the
97Ministry o f Foreign A ffairs o f Lithuania, Lithuania in International Peace
Operations (23 February. 2001). Available from http://ww w .urm .lt: INTERNET.
"M inistry o f Foreign A ffairs o f Lithuania, Fact Sheet-April 2001 (29 April,
2001). Available from http://www.urm .lt; INTERNET.
"Sim on, “Transform ing,” 6.
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Alliance would provide not only hard core security benefits but also would significantly
facilitate integration in the European Union. Accordingly, changes in governing political
parties and coalitions led to no essential changes in foreign and security policy as
governments, regardless o f their ideological make up, maintain the priorities o f their
predecessors. Thus NATO membership has been consistently one of the top foreign
policy objectives of the political elite. This consensus is sustained by a public, which
routinely ranks the Alliance among the m ost trusted international institutions and sees
NATO as the best guarantee o f national security. According to a public survey conducted
in 1998, 55 percent of Lithuanians approved o f their country's quest for NATO
membership.100 Another survey, conducted in August and December 2000, found the
approval o f a NATO m em bership at 49 percent as only 22.3 percent disapproved.101 Very
significantly, more Lithuanians. 26 percent, in 1998 believed NATO membership alone
would give their country the best chance for security, while fewer, 23 percent, backed
neutrality and another 23 percent backed membership in both the EU and the Alliance as
the best security option.10' The only slip in public approval o f NATO occurred during the
Alliance's air campaign against Serbia when for the first time the support for joining fell
to 43.5 percent.10’

looCited in Perry, Sweeney and W inner, 104.
101Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania, Fact Sheet-April 2001.
l0'S ee Paul Goble, “Divided on Security,” RFE/RL Newsline (27 August, 1998).
Available from http://www.rferl.org; INTERNET.
l03“Polls Show Balts Against NATO Airstrikes on Yugoslavia,” Agence Franee Presse (8 April, 1999).
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Trade with the European Union

Trade relations between the European community and the Soviet bloc were
limited as throughout the Cold W ar Moscow refused to recognize the Com m unity and
worked to underm ine the integrative processes taking place in the Western part o f the
continent. The Soviet Union created its own organization, the Council of M utual
Economic A ssistance (CMEA), in order to achieve similar integrative processes among
the East European states. For its part, the Community was reluctant to contribute to
Soviet domination over other communist states by extending trade relations to the East.
Only after the beginning of the Helsinki process in 1975 did Western Europe open itself
modestly to trade with the com munist states.104 Accordingly, at the wake o f
communism’s fall the value of trade between individual East European countries and the
countries of the EC was negligible.
The European Community quickly responded to the collapse of com m unism by
liberalizing trade with the East and concluding bilateral trade agreements. W hat followed
was the massive reorientation o f East Europe’s trade from the East to the West. This
process reflected not only the desire of newly independent states to limit Soviet, and later
Russian, influence over them and the collapse o f the Soviet econom y, but also the explicit
policy of the European Community to use trade as one of the means to promote a market
economy and democratization in the former Soviet bloc, and ultimately its integration in

l04On the trade-offs involved in the Helsinki process see Ariel Bloed, ed.. The
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Analysis a n d Basic D ocum ents
(Boston: K luew er Academic Publishers, 1993), 1-117.
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the W est.103 The com bined effect o f rapidly declining restrictions on goods from the East
and new exchange rates increased trade flow in both directions.
Even in this early phase of increased trade between the EC and the East, however,
differences in the levels o f economic development am ong the post-communist countries
led to different levels o f trade flows. W hile Czechoslovakia, and later the Czech
Republic, could exploit not only its geographic proxim ity to the West but also its
relatively advanced stage o f economic development and dramatically increase trade with
the West, the relatively backward Bulgarian economy w itnessed a hard time taking
advantage o f the opening o f Western markets. Lithuania, unlike the other two countries,
was a formal part o f the Soviet econom y and encountered harder times reorienting its
trade to the East. Well into the 1990s Lithuania's international trade continued to be with
the Commonwealth o f Independent States (CIS), mainly R ussia.106 In fact, both Bulgaria
and Lithuania throughout the 1990s rem ained greatly dependent on Russia as a source o f
energy and natural resources.107
The early liberalization of trade between the EU and post-communist countries, of
course, accounts only partially for the structure and volume o f trade between the two
sides. The consequent market reforms, and more specifically their success or failure,
determined the general economic growth and the ability o f the economy to compete in the
l0:,John Pinder, “The European Community and Democracy in Central and
Eastern Europe,” Jeoffrey Pridham, Eric Herring, George Sandford Pridham ct al.,
Building Democracy ? The International Dimension o f the Democratization in Eastern
Europe (New York: St. M artin’s Press, 1994): 119-43.
I06A s late as 1999 Russia was still Lithuania’s largest trading partner and
accounted for 19.5 percent of the country’s imports. See, Vilniaus Bankas A.B.
Lithuanian M acroeconomic Review I (April, 2000) 46, Table C 1.

I07ln 1998, 21 percent of B ulgaria’s imports cam e from Russia. See, ING Barings,
53, Figure 51.
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Western market. Accordingly, the success of market reforms in the Czech Republic not
only boosted the co u ntry's econom ic development as reflected in the growth o f G D P but
also increased the ability of the national industry to diversify and increase its exports to
the European Union, including the export of high value-added products. The growing
economic prosperity through 1998 also boosted the demand for imports from the EU.
Thus the Czech Republic witnessed a steady growth o f trade with the core countries both
in total value and as a percentage o f its total international trade (See Table 12). Bulgaria,
on the other hand, was reluctant to implement radical and quick m arket reforms until
1997 and the ensuing economic slow down prevented the national economy from taking
advantage of the opening of Western markets. In fact, unlike the Czech Republic and
Lithuania. Bulgaria did not achieve stable economic development and growth and this
inevitably reflected in both the total volume of trade with the W est and the W est’s share
of Bulgaria’s total trade (See Table 12).
Lithuania is clearly placed between the Czech Republic and Bulgaria in term s of
volume and share o f its international trade with the European Union (See Table 12).
Starting the reforms after the other countries and implementing relatively slower and less
radical market policies than the Czech Republic's. Lithuania, nevertheless, was able to
achieve economic stabilization and resum e growth relatively quickly. Although, like
Bulgaria, its exports to the West were dominated by low value-added, low-skill products,
Lithuania was able to increase the total value of trade with the West. The country’s total
value of international trade is com parable with Bulgaria’s but given that Lithuania's
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population is not even half as large, it reflected the general stability and healthy growth o f
the national econom y.108

Foreign Investments in the National Economy

Along with trade liberalization, foreign investments in the post-com munist
countries were seen by the West as another means o f promoting the political, economic
and social transformation. The European Comm ission, after the fall o f communism,
quickly became the body coordinating the flow of financial assistance provided by the
industrialized countries, the International Monetary Fund and the W orld Bank as well as
the institutions specifically designed to assist the transition in the East European
countries, including PHARE and the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD).109 The official financial aid and investments, how ever generous,
were not enough to satisfy the countries' hunger for massive resources in the reform
process. Indeed, the EU financial transfer was designed to increase the countries' ability
to attract private investments on their own by providing technical assistance, making
visibility studies, co-financing infrastructure projects, and assisting in the development of
capital markets, among others. The geographic proxim ity o f those countries to the West,

IOS

‘ Along with the general backwardness of Bulgaria and Lithuania's economies
relative to the Czech’s, another explanation of the inability of the tw o countries to
increase their exports to the EU is the relatively large share of their agriculture as share of
the GDP. The European Union, traditionally very protective of its fanners, failed to
liberalize restrictions on imports o f agricultural products, including from the associated
members. On the share o f the farming sector in the three countries see ING Barrings,
Figures 49, 55,67.
10*)
On the coordinating functions o f the European Commission in providing aid to
Eastern Europe see Smith, The M aking o f EU, 66-82.
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the liberalization o f trade, the prospects o f future inclusion in the EU, and the relatively
low labor cost, made those countries a natural destination o f foreign capital and
investments. Here again, however, differences in political and economic development led
to wide disparities am ong the countries’ capacities to attract capital. While the Czech
Republic, following the success of reforms, quickly became a prime destination of
foreign direct investments, Bulgaria and Lithuania greatly lagged behind (See Tables 13
and 14). Lithuania and Bulgaria attracted com parable am ounts o f foreign investments,
but once again, the larger size of the Bulgarian population translated into much smaller
foreign direct investment stock per capita in the period 1989-2000 (See Table 14). Most
of the direct investments in Bulgaria were m ade only after the beginning o f the
comprehensive economic reforms in 1997, several years after the start of transition to the
market in the Czech Republic and Lithuania. W hile in the period 1989-2000, the Czech
Republic attracted $1,884 o f foreign direct investments per capita, and Lithuania, starting
the reform a few years later, attracted $626 per capita, Bulgaria was able to achieve only
$388 per capita in the sam e period.

Stock

The end of the C old W ar not only uncovered the diversity of the Eastern
European countries’ legacies, experiences, capacities and goals but also rem oved the
homogenizing Soviet and communist influences and exposed them to a variety of
environments and external challenges facing each society and the political elite. Soon
after the beginning o f reform s, many authors began to identify differences in external
factors as partially accounting for the variances in transformation outcomes. In fact.
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students o f post-com m unism , ever seeking more precision in identifying the diversity of
what was com munist Europe, branded new regions to substitute for the generic "Eastern
Europe." Following the collapse o f Soviet dominance, diverse developments ranging
from successful transitions to inability to establish a stable democracy, to open ethnic
warfare validated the need to approach the study o f post-com m unist countries through
recognizing the unique characteristics of each country’s regional environment. That post
communist countries w ere a former part of the Soviet sphere of dominance and now they
are still at the periphery o f the Western core does not fully ascertain their position on the
core-periphery continuum or their capacity to become part o f the core. Bulgaria, the
Czech Republic and L ithuania's ability to integrate in the Euro-Atlantic institutions
depends not only on th eir political elite and societies’ political will and com m itm ents but
also on their neighboring countries’ degree o f integration in the same institutions. In the
best case, a country w ould be enveloped by states, which are members of NATO and the
EU: in the worst case, a country would be surrounded by states that have adversarial
relations with the core. W hen surrounded by core countries, a post-communist state
willing to integrate in the core would be receptive to the flow o f ideas and institutions
across its border, w hile, if conflicts flare in neighboring states, the country w ould be
interested in the resolution o f those conflicts and would try to limit flows across borders.
Not surprisingly, those hard realities o f geopolitics clashed with some of the
fundamental requirem ents for regional behavior imposed on the associated states by the
EU and to a lesser degree by NATO. The EU demanded that candidates actively pursue
regional cooperation an d good neighborhood relations. It m ade no sense, the memberstates argued, in the U nion opening its doors to new m em bers if the aspiring states did
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not open their doors to each other.110 Both the Union and NATO dem anded that
candidate countries not simply im prove relations and cooperation with neighboring states
but solve all serious issues of contentions with them, including borders and minorities.
Accordingly, the EU mobilized resources, mainly through PHARE, to assist cross-border
projects and solutions to common problems designed to create a pattern o f practical
cooperation and integration. In other words, the European Union insisted that it would
accept only states that in practice em braced the U nion’s ideas of openness to outside
influences, flows and institutions. The post-CoId W ar environment, however, presented
the East European states with risks and challenges that inhibited som e o f the fledging
dem ocracies’ willingness to fully em brace cross-national interaction and openness.

Bulgaria's Stock

The three countries in the study are located in three distinct regions representing
very different challenges to their security and transitions—Bulgaria in the Balkans, the
Czech Republic in Central Europe, and Lithuania in the Baltic region. Among the three
countries, Bulgaria’s regional politics and developments represented most trying
challenges to the country's policies o f transition and integration in the Western core.
Almost as soon as Bulgaria’s transition had started in the early 1990s, the region
witnessed the beginning of the most violent and destructive European conflict after the
Second World W ar—the wars of Yugoslavia’s disintegration. The w ars brought about not
only the institutional isolation of Serbia from the larger process o f dem ocratic transition
ll0Hans van den Broek, “Preparing for the Enlargement o f the European U nion,”
in W illiam Nicoll and Richard Schoenberg, eds., Europe Beyond 2000 (London: W hurr
Publishers, 1998): 3-9.
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and integration with the West taking place in Eastern Europe, but also led to the state's
physical segregation as core countries and neighboring states imposed political, military,
and economic sanctions for a better part o f the last decade. Thus Bulgaria had to limit its
interaction with a country located betw een itself and the core countries. Furthermore, the
wars caused frequent disruption o f the road and river travel through Serbia and B ulgaria's
trade flow with the W est had to be diverted through longer and more expensive routes.111
Another Bulgarian neighbor, M acedonia, posed a challenge o f a different kind.
G aining sovereignty for the first tim e in its history, Macedonia faced major difficulties in
state-building and nation-building. C onsequently, the country failed to develop an
extensive relationship with both the EU and NATO, and only recently did Macedonia
express a willingness to join both, although remaining far from being ready to start even
initial negotiations. In addition to its relative isolation from the larger integrative
processes in Europe, M acedonia also failed to reach a bilateral agreement with Bulgaria
on the terms of their relationship. A lthough Bulgaria was the first state to recognize
M acedonia’s independence, Sofia refused to recognize Macedonians as a separate
nationality and the Macedonian as a language rather than a mere Bulgarian dialect thus
effectively dooming the prospects o f an extensive relationship. Consequently, political,
social, and economic relations between the two countries remained stagnant until finally

11‘During the N ATO ’s air strikes against Serbia in 1999, the Bulgarian
governm ent estimated that Bulgaria foreign direct investments would be half o f the
envisioned for the year and the originally forecast for a 5 percent growth had to be scaled
down to 3.7-4 percent. M ike Dolan, “ Balkans Count Rising Cost of War at EBRD,"
Reuters (18 April, 1999).
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an agreement in 1999 in which Bulgaria recognized the existence o f a Macedonian
language, opening the way to a more intensive bilateral cooperation.112
To the north, Bulgaria borders Romania, an EU associated m em ber and candidate
for NATO mem bership. In its transition, Romania achieved sim ilar to Bulgaria's degree
of integration into the Euro-Atlantic institutions as both countries concluded their Europe
Agreements and were invited to begin negotiations to join the Union at the same lime.
Both countries have also achieved a sim ilar pace o f adopting the acquis and are almost
always singled out as the only two states without chances of being accepted in the EU
before 2005. In their quest to join NATO, Romania holds a slight advantage as Bucharest
defined m em bership in the Alliance as a top foreign policy priority long before Bulgaria
decided to seek it in 1997. In fact at the Madrid Sum m it, which extended invitation to the
first three new members, the Alliance specifically pointed to Rom ania as a strong
candidate for the next wave of expansion.
To the south, Bulgaria borders Greece and Turkey: both m em bers of NATO.
Greece has also been an EU m em ber since 1982 but remains the poorest member-state,
even after successive Union enlargements. Being a relatively underdeveloped EU
member prevented Greece from becom ing an agent o f institutional and value flows into
Bulgaria as Athens failed to establish significant political, social, and, most significantly,
financial and trade presence to the n o rth .11. Its weak position also precluded Greece from
successfully prom oting Bulgaria’s interests before both NATO and EU. The other

l!2“Bulgaria, Macedonia Sign Language A ccord,” Agence France-Presse (22
February, 1999).
ll3On G reece's failure after the Cold War to assert itself and influence outcomes
in the Balkans see Efstathicos Faciolas, “Greece in the New Balkans: A Neo-Realist
Approach.” European Security 6 no. 4 (Winter 1997): 130-156.
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southern neighbor, Turkey, although m ore powerful econom ically and geopolitically, has
remained outside the EU dimension o f the Western core as its attempts to join the Union
have been thwarted for not meeting the political and econom ic membership criteria.
The EU and N A T O ’s requirements that candidate countries solve bilateral
conflicts with neighboring states and actively seek regional cooperation and integration
presented Bulgaria with a difficult dilem m a. Almost constant armed conflict to the West
and historically rooted regional problems challenged the country's political will and
capacity to undertake practical steps tow ard cooperation and integration before political
solutions were found to existing conflicts and problems. Furthermore, the Balkan region
has historically w itnessed a very low level of economic and political interaction and
flow .114 Persistent ethnic conflict, political instability, and underdevelopment made the
likelihood o f increasing cooperation and integration am ong the countries in the Balkans
extremely lo w ."3 Indeed, several post-Cold War attempts to forge closer cooperation
through the creation o f regional organizations have met the resistance of some Balkan
countries, which failed to achieve their goal. In the case o f Bulgaria these regional
initiatives were seen as institutions diverting the country from its foreign policy
priori lies—the EU and NATO. Thus although Bulgaria participated in the early 1990s in
the creation o f a Black Sea Economic Cooperation (B SEC)—an institution designed to
facilitate political and econom ic cooperation among the Black Sea countries—Sofia

1l4Aurel Braun, Small-State Security in the Balkans (Totowa. NJ: Bames & Noble
Books, 1983).
1,:>As late as 2000, Bulgaria’s trade with the Balkan states represented only 6
percent o f its total external trade. Deutcshe Bank Research, Bulgaria (May 2001).
Available from http://www.dbresearch.com ; INTERNET; This trend is consistent with
the historical record as Braun observes that in the early 1980s the intra-Balkan trade
represented merely 6 percent of the total international trade of the Balkan states.
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resisted any proposals to forge integration am ong the members, including the creation of
a free-trade zone and an inter-parliamentary body.116 Similarly when the European Union
and the U.S. created the Southeast European Cooperation Initiative in the mid-1990s, and
in 1999 the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe to financially assist the reconstruction
of South East Europe in the wake o f the Kosovo crisis, Bulgaria perceived these
initiatives simply as yet another resource to utilize in the process of joining the EU rather
than as institution designed to forge cooperation and integration among the Balkan states.
The inability of the Stability Pact to live up to expectations as a latter day Marshal Plan
notwithstanding, the P act’s leadership often complained about Bulgaria’s attitudes toward
the initiative.117 Similarly, when the head o f the Stability Pact suggested that a framework
was created to monitor and address corruption in the Balkan countries, President
Stoyanov reminded him that Bulgaria already negotiates with the EU on a chapter of the
aquis dealing with this issu e.118 All in all, while Western institutions see these initiatives
as facilitating the im plem entation of the EU and NATO membership requirements for
practical cooperation and partnership among neighboring countries.110 Bulgaria saw them

llf’In an interview for the Turkish Turkiye in early 1992, President Zhelev
expressed doubts about the effectiveness o f the BSEC and cautioned that Bulgaria's
priority is joining the European Community rather than regional organizations. Huseyin
Tanrikulu (text). Istanbul Turkiye in Turkish (29 February 1992). Translation by the
Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Dailx Report-East Europe. 6 March 1992
(PrEx"7.10: FBIS-EEU-92-045; p. 4).
ll7“ Bulgaria W ants Revisions of Stability Pact,’’ Reuters (3 May, 2001). Bulgaria
threatened to withdraw from the Pact unless the country was removed from the Schengen
visa list.
1,8Bulgarian N ational Radio (31 July, 2001).
1l0On the shortcomings o f the W est’s attempts to create peace through
cooperation and assistance see International Crisis Group, “ A fter Milosevic: A Practical
Agenda for Lasting Balkans Peace” (29 April, 2001). Available from
http://www.crisisweb.org; INTERNET.
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as attempts to postpone the country's integration in the Western co re.120 Although the
ascent to power o f a reform government in 1997 ended Bulgaria's relative international
isolation and ushered Sofia into a more active foreign policy, the country embraced
regional cooperation strictly as a means of enhancing its chances of Euro-Atlantic
integration. Indeed, most of B ulgaria's Balkan policy was in response to various crises in
the region rather than a long-term policy of regional integration.121 Not surprisingly, even
when the Balkan states were able to create institutions o f the type the EU and NATO
envisioned as creating the fundamentals of a more integrated region, it was often found
that those organizations had no viable missions.122

The Czech Republic's Stock

The C zech Republic borders Poland, G erm any. Austria and Slovakia. Two o f the
countries-G erm any and Austria—are members o f the EU, and Poland and Slovakia are
associated members. In addition. G erm any is a m em ber of NATO and Poland was invited
u>On the Western perspective see the interview o f M ediapool agency with the
head o f the Stability Pact, Bodo Hombach. “Investitorite Chakat Kraja na Konflikta v
Makedonija" [Investors Await the End o f Macedonia Conflict] M ediapool (6 July, 2001).
Available from http://www.m ediapool.bg; INTERNET.
121Alistair Bell, “Balkans Sum m it Backs Kosovo Autonomy." Reuters (13
October, 1998); Elisaveta Konstantinova, “Bulgaria, Turkey. Romania Discuss Kosovo."
Reuters (1 1 July, 1998); Costas Paris, “Greece, Bulgaria, Romania Appeal for Kosovo
Peace." Reuters (4 October, 1998); “Balkan Foreign Ministers to Meet on Kosovo,"
Reuters (10 M arch, 1999).
’"S o u th east European states—Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Macedonia.
Romania and T urkey—created in 1998 a joint peacekeeping force envisioned to have up
to 4,000 troops and a headquarters to be rotated in each country. A year later, however,
the NATO Secretary-General Robertson suggested that the newly-established
peacekeeping force should not be deployed in a Kosovo operation. “ Balkan Peacekeeping
Force Should Not be Deployed in Kosovo: Robertson." Reuters (13 January, 1999).
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to join the Alliance along with the Czech Republic in 1997. Slovakia is an active
participant in the PIP program seeking m em bership in 2002, w hile Austria chose to
remain outside of NATO. Among the three case studies, the C zech Republic possessed
the best stock throughout the decade following the demise o f communism. In fact, the
country’s regional environm ent improved when the separation between the Czech and
Slovak parts o f Czechoslovakia paradoxically increased the quality o f the Czech
Republic’s stock as the independent state o f Slovakia substituted for the potentially
unstable, and institutionally isolated from the W est, Ukraine. Thus the Czech Republic
found itself surrounded by either core countries o r states seeking integration in the core.
Furthermore, the neighboring states seeking to join the core—Poland and Slovakia—were
among the most advanced East European countries as reflected, more so Poland than
Slovakia, by their advanced stage of integration in Western institutions. The Czech
Republic's favorable geographic position and stock combined with success of political,
social and econom ic reforms translated into a quick institutional and economic
reorientation o f the country toward the W estern core.12’ G eographic proximity to Western
markets and a relatively advanced national econom y enabled the Czech Republic to
attract Western capital, which further boosted competitiveness o f the economy and its
integration in the world m arket. In the decade following the start o f economic reforms.

,2’Czech reorientation toward the W est was both econom ic and political.
Accordingly, Czech-Russian relations cooled significantly; the heads of states met very
few times, regular consultations between deputy foreign ministers from both countries
ceased in 1998 and the Russian Foreign M inister visited Prague in 2001 after seven years
of no show in Prague. “Russian Foreign M inster Visits Prague A fter Seven Years,” Czech
News Agency (31 January, 2001).
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the country accumulated alm ost three times as much foreign direct investment per capita
as did Lithuania and almost five times as much as did Bulgaria (See Table 14).124
The direction of Czech trade, too, quickly shifted from East to West. Even in the
early stage o f reform, over 50 percent of international trade was with the European Union
consequently, by the end o f the decade it reached over 70 percent o f the total. O f the EU
members, G erm any, from early on, emerged as the Czech Republic’s largest trade partner
absorbing 35 percent of the exports and providing 35 percent of the total im ports.1-3 Very
significantly, the Czech Republic greatly decreased its dependence on Russian sources of
energy and by 2000 Russia accounted for only 6 percent of the total im ports.126
Conversely, Russia still rem ained a main source of imports, particularly energy and raw
materials, to Bulgaria and Lithuania, accounting for 21 percent o f total imports to each
country.
The reorientation o f the Czech economy towards the W estern market was
consistent with the overall national policy of seeking quick and com plete integration in
the Western core. This policy was based on a single-minded strategy, which saw'
demands by W estern states and institutions for more cooperation and integration among
the Eastern European countries as attempts to postpone or even reject integration in the
West.
l24Josef Tosovsky cautioned in 1995 that the national econom y cannot absorb the
huge inflow o f foreign capital and warned that short-term speculative capital is producing
strong inflationary pressures. “ Bank Governor Says Capital is Flooding Czech
Economy.” RFE/RL Research Report (7 June. 1995).
I25ING Barings, 57; Russia became a very m inor Czech trade partner, accounting
for only 2,5 percent o f the total exports in 1998, down from 3.4 percent in 1994. Czech
Statistical Office, External Trade Structure by Country Group, U pdated Figures, table
no. 6 (August, 2001). Available from http://www.czso.cz; INTERNET.
I26lbid., 57.
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The spectacular success o f Czech reforms convinced the political elite that the
country was well positioned to enter all Western institutions and it did not need to wait
for the other post-communist countries until they caught up with the Czech Republic.127
Therefore, when Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary initiated in February 1991 the socalled Visegrad G roup-designed to facilitate cooperation in a variety o f areas, ranging
from scientific research and trade issues to security— Prague saw it only as a consultative
organ.128 The Czech leadership consistently rejected calls by its H ungarian and Polish
counterparts for a com m on and coordinated approach to their quest to join Western
institutions and for more regional cooperation.129 Accordingly, only after great pressure
from the West did Prague agree to create a Central European Free T rade Area (CEFTA)
among the Visegrad states, which went into effect in March 1993.1‘1°

l_7The admission, in November 1995, o f the Czech Republic to the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development, an institution of the m ost advanced
democracies, as the first o f the post-communist countries can be seen as a recognition of
the country’s transformation effort by Western democracies.
I2sln an interview for the French newspaper Le Figaro, Prime M inster Vaclav
Klaus described the Visegrad Group as an artificial process created by the West. Xavier
Gautier, “Prime M inster on Partion o f Czechoslovakia” (text). Paris Le Figaro in French
(12 January 1993). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily
Report-Easi Europe, 13 January 1993 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-EEU-008-93; p. 22-23); On the
Czech ambivalence about the Visegrad Group see Cottey, 126-41.
l2)The Czech Republic refused to submit a common application for membership
of the EU with Poland and Hungary and applied individually only after the other two
states did so.
l ,aTrade am ong the CEFTA states is not particularly high. As o f early 1997 the
Czech-Slovak trade, based on long-standing economic and historic links, accounted for
more than one-third o f the total intra-CEFTA trade. Sue Tapply and Carolyn Tang,
“Central Europe: Trade Group Gathering Strength,” RFE/RL Research Report (4 March,
1997). Available from http://www.rferl.org; INTERNET. On the creation o f the freetrade zone the Czech ambivalence see Karoly Okolicsanyi, “The V isegrad Triangle’s
Free-Zone,” RFE/RL Research Report 2, no. 3 (15 January, 1993): 19-22.
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The Czech political elite throughout the 1990s challenged the proliferation of
Central European cooperative arrangem ents, claiming that the Czech Republic was a
Western rather than Central European state. The government reluctantly agreed to
participate in 1993 in the so-called Central European Initiative including m ost post
communist states in the region plus Austria and Italy.Ij>1 Later, when CEFTA began to
include more East European countries, the Czech Republic saw this development as
another attempt by the EU to slow dow n the enlargement process.132 Instead Prague
consistently demanded a speedy Union expansion.
More recently, when Austria in early 2001 suggested the setting up o f a “Strategic
Partnership" among the countries o f Central Europe along the lines o f the defunct AustroHungarian Empire, the Czech leadership once again expressed skepticism o f the idea o f
creating yet another institution in which an EU member state would play a leading role
rather than work for EU expansion.' ’4 Prague's suspicion o f any regional arrangement
that might divert the country from its course toward the Western core, however, did not
lead to isolation from the neighbors as two of them were already in the core and the other
two were among the frontrunners to join it. Indeed, most o f the Czech Republic's
1' ’Alfred Reisch, ‘T h e Central European Initiative: To Be or Not to Be," RFE/RL
Research Report 2, no. 34 (27 August, 1993): 30-37.
’ ''W hile some East European and EU leaders saw CEFTA as a step toward
integration into Western institutions, Czech officials insisted that the Area is nothing
more than a free-trade agreement rather than a “preparatory school for the EU." Nigel
Stephenson, “CEFTA Premiers to Hold Prague Summit,” Reuters (10 September, 1998).
’"Initially the Czech Republic hoped for EU expansion in the year 2000 and as
this date became increasingly unrealistic the leadership consistently pressed for speeding
up the process. “Havel in France Seeking Support for EU Expansion.” Agence FrancePresse (2 March, 1999).
l34Lubos Palata, “ In the Em pire’s Shadow,” Transitions (6 June, 2001). Available
from http://www.tol.cz; INTERNET.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

205
interaction, especially econom ically, was with its neighbors. In that sense, by rejecting
regional institutional arrangem ents and single-mindedly pursuing integration in the
Western core. Prague did not seek to alter its relationship with its neighbors but rather to
transfer this relationship to a different institutional environm ent—the Western institutions.

Lithuania's Stock

Lithuania shares borders with Latvia to the North, Belarus to the Southeast,
Poland to South and the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad to the southwest. None of
Lithuania's neighbors is a m em ber of the EU and o f them only Poland in 1997 was
invited to join NATO. Poland and Latvia are also EU associated members negotiating to
join the Union. Latvia along with Lithuania is a PfP member and actively seeks
membership in the Alliance. O f all neighbors, Belarus is the most institutionally isolated
state as it has not sought m em bership in either NATO or the E U .1'5 Belarus' lack of
democratization and social and economic reform have relegated the country as the only
authoritarian political system in Eastern Europe. Therefore, the country has been shunned
by the European core and no significant relationships have been established between the
Western institutions and the government of Belarus. In fact, bilateral relations have
frequently been strained and confrontational.116

1 sBelarus is PfP m em ber but has stated no intention o f joining the Alliance and
therefore developed no M A P after the 1999 Washington Summit.
‘ '‘’Following N A T O ’s expansion in 1999, Belarus' president Alexander
Lukashenko suggested that his country will strengthen its m ilitary forces in collaboration
with Russia to counter-balance the admission o f the three form er communist states to the
Alliance. “Belarus to Strengthen Forces to Balance NATO Enlargement,” Agence
Franee-Presse (12 March, 1999).
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The period leading to independence demonstrated to L ithuania’s leadership the
utility of joint action and coordination of policies with neighboring countries toward the
Soviet Union.1'7 Being a republic in the USSR and having no standing army or stable
democratic institutions forced the political leadership to seek the cooperation and
assistance of the international community and, in particular. Poland and two other Soviet
republics-Latvia and Estonia.1’8 Having successfully gained independence, the Baltic
states were initially committed to a high level of mutual cooperation and assistance. This
commitment represented a sharp break with the inter-war pattern of antagonism and
mutual suspicion, which partially accounts for the changing fortunes o f Lithuania.
Estonia, and Latvia since gaining independence after the First W orld W ar.1 The West,
for its part, intensively cultivated the idea o f Baltic unity. A fter 1991 Western institutions
and states preferred to negotiate and deal with the three states sim ultaneously and at the
same encouraged integration and cooperation among them as a precondition for joining
those same institutions. The E U ’s policy, in particular, indicated that it perceived the
three countries as a unified group whose closer links would m ake the accession to the
Union easier. Accordingly, the Baltic states created a Baltic A ssem bly in late 1991, the

1 'Clem ens, 39-52; Norgaard, Hindsgaul, et al.: Krickus.
1,sOn M ay 12, 1990 the tree republics established the Baltic States Council,
designed to forge political cooperation and assist the member states in consolidating their
sovereignty in the face of Soviet hostility to the countries’ independence. It ceased to
function in m id-1993. Egidijus Vareikis and Jurate Zygelyte, ‘T h e Eastern Baltic
Subregion: Conflict and Cooperation,” Lithuanian Foreign P olicy Review no. 2 (1998):
145-64.
l39On the inter-war attem pts to forge Baltic cooperation see Zaneta Ozolina, “The
Impact of the European Union on Baltic Co-operation,” occasional paper (Copenhagen,
Denmark: Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, January 1999). Available from
Columbia International Affairs Online; INTERNET.
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Baltic Council of Ministers in 1994, the Baltic Free Trade Agreement, biannual sum m its
o f the heads of states, and other regional institutions.140
Paradoxically, however, the three states found it increasingly difficult to
cooperate as the EU and NATO started to make specific decisions about their respective
enlargements. Then, the progress o f reforms, the implementations of acquis and even
geographic location, rather than their sub-regional integration, increasingly came to
determine their chances o f joining the institutions o f the Western core.141 The EU
decision in 1997 to begin accession negotiations with Estonia, but not Lithuania and
Latvia, clearly split the Baltic states and further strained their resolve to cooperate with
one other.
The Baltic states also were gradually included in a Nordic framework of
cooperation. This framework must be seen in the context of two parallel tracks, including
the so-called “5+3" cooperation between the Nordic states-Finland. Sweden, Norway.
Denmark, and Iceland—and the Baltic states; and bilateral cooperation, which in the case
o f Lithuania included extensive interaction with D enm ark.14' After 1991 the Nordic states
focused on creating a pattern o f regional institutions and cooperation and acted as model
for the creation of the Baltic Council between Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. A Danish
140According to Ozolina. in 1990 alone, the Baltic states signed 36 agreements on
mutual cooperation. Ozolina. 6.
141It must be noted that although Lithuania is frequently singled out as a laggard,
ahead o f Bulgaria and Romania but behind the other associated members, what works in
the country’s advantage is its geographic position. Thus, in scenarios envisioning a large
EU enlargement o f up to ten countries, Lithuania is always included am ong the countries
to join the EU with this group. Drawing a line between Lithuania and Poland and L a tv ia two countries deemed to be better prepared to join—only to remove in a couple o f years
later, makes no political sense. For this argument see “ Knocking at the Clubhouse D oor.”
The Economist 360, no. 8237 (1-7 September, 2001): 22-24
I42See Knudsen, ed„ Stability and Security.
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initiative also led to the creation of the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) in 1992,
which included all Baltic coastal states, as well as Norway and Iceland. The CBSS was
designed to improve cooperation and coordination in the region and prom ote democracy,
the rule of law and econom ic development in the post-communist countries. Consistent
with the traditional political culture o f the Nordic states was the em phasis this institutions
and bilateral cooperation arrangements put on "soft security”--cultivating post
com m unist countries in the peaceful resolution of common problems and promotion o f
mutual trust.
While embracing various regional arrangements and institutions, Vilnius pursued
multiple track policies in its major foreign policy goal-joining NATO the EU.
Responding to calls in the W est to accept at least one Baltic state in NATO Lithuania
initiated a campaign to convince the member states of its worth as a future ally. Vilnius,
giving relatively more w eight to NATO membership than the other Baltic states, turned
its attention to Poland and tried to cultivate strong political, economic, and military
relations as the more practical way to obtain membership o f the Alliance as well as the
EU .143 Simultaneously, Lithuania began increasingly to see itself as a Central European
rather than a Baltic country and Poland was seen as a natural intermediary in the process
of interacting with Central Europe.144 Accordingly, trade between the tw o states

,43Perry, 104-7: “Lithuania, Poland to Cooperate on European Integration Bids,”
RFE/RL Newsline (18 December, 1998).
l44Mare Haab, "Potentials and Vulnerabilities o f the Baltic States: Mutual
Competition and Cooperation,” in Birthe Hansen and Bertel Heurlin, eds.. The Baltic
States in World Politics (Richmond, VA: Curzon Press, 1998), 1-24.
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increased and while Poland accounted for 5 and 4 percent o f Lithuania’s total export and
import in 1994, in 1999 it accounted for 4.5 and 7 percent respectively.143
Lithuania also maintained strong trade exchange with Latvia; in 1999 it accounted
for 12.7 and 4.6 percent of L ithuania's total exports and imports, up from 5 percent o f its
total trade in 1992.146 In fact, Lithuania, to a much greater extent than either the Czech
Republic or Bulgaria, maintained extensive trade relations with its neighbors, a pattern
established during the Soviet years.147 Latvia, Belarus, Poland and Russia accounted for
29.9 percent of the country’s exports and 33.4 percent o f its imports in 1999.148 O f them.
Russia remained the largest trade partner with 6.8 percent o f total exports and 19.5
percent of imports, mostly energy and raw materials. I'w
The Russian enclave of Kaliningrad and Russia in general represents one of the
most important elements o f Lithuania’s stock. Because o f the small share o f the Russian
minority in Lithuania and its early decision to grant them all citizenship rights, relations
between Vilnius and Moscow are, with the exception o f the Kaliningrad enclave.

l45Knudsen, 212; Vilniaus Bankas, 46.
l46Vilniaus Bankas, 46; O zolina. 7.
I47ln 1992, 57.7 percent o f Lithuania’s trade was with Russia. United Nations.
Department for Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis. Statistical
Division, 1995 International Statistical Yearbook (New York: United Nations
Publications, 1996), 142.
I48lbid.
l4<,The high level o f econom ic interaction between the two countries, however,
meant that the 1998 Russian econom ic crises had a significantly negative impact on
Lithuania’s economy. During the 1998 financial crisis in Russia, Lithuania’s export to the
East declined 20-30 percent. “Long Haul to Prosperity,’’ Financial Times (29 November,
1998). Available from http://w w w .ft.com ; INTERNET; See also “Baltics Hit by Fallout
from Russian Financial meltdown,” Agence France-Presse (28 August. 1998); Jonathan
Leff, “ Baltic Markets seen recovering from Record Low ‘9 8 ,” Reuters (16 December,
1998).
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reasonably good. In fact, Moscow, ev er since independence, has had the least problematic
relations with Lithuania compared with the other two Baltic states. Yet, having been a
part o f the Soviet Union puts Lithuania in a precarious position as its security and
development are greatly affected by R ussia's behavior. While relations for most of the
1990s had been relatively calm, they have frequently become hostage to the unsettled
nature o f Russian politics and rapidly changing regional and European dynamics. The
need to establish good neighborly relations as a precondition for joining the Western core
and Russia's need to assure rail and road passage to Kaliningrad through Lithuania forced
both countries to cultivate a stable relationship. Yet moves by Vilnius to integrate the
enclave in a sub-regional Central European pattern o f cooperation has aroused R ussia's
fears about its territorial integrity.130 Lithuania, too, sometimes becomes a victim o f its
newly found independence from its form er hegemon and unnecessarily challenges
Russia’s sensibilities.131 Thus, although the relationship between the tw o countries
remains extensive, it still remains capable of greatly affecting, both positively and
negatively, the stability o f Lithuania and its chances o f joining the W estern core. The
unpredictability o f R ussia’s future political and econom ic development and the power
discrepancy between the two countries places Lithuania in a hard position as Vilnius has
little ability to determ ine the success o f bilateral relations. For instance, although the two

l50Stephen Blank, “Russia and the Baltic States in the Age O f NATO
Enlargement," occasional paper no. 49 (Washington: Woodrow Wilson International
Center for Scholars, July 1998), 5.
131 In late 2000, in com pliance with a law passed in June, a com mission appointed
by the Lithuanian governm ent announced that USD 20 billion is the equivalent of
damage Lithuania incurred under Soviet occupation. The government, after receiving the
figure, was expected to initiate negotiations with Russian about the compensation. Inga
Pavlovaite and Mel Huang, “News From Lithuania," Central Europe Review 2, no. 35
(16 October, 2000).
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states signed a border treaty, the Russian parliament still refuses to ratify it in the hopes
o f maintaining M oscow’s influence on Lithuania's foreign policy.152

Conclusion

The three states have clearly achieved different levels of international
institutionalization (See Figures 2, 3, 4 and 5). W hile all of them had relatively sim ilar
com m unist experiences and in the 1990s declared almost identical foreign policy
priorities and goals, differences in socio-economic development, political developments
and regional environm ents endowed them with varying capacities and opportunities to
achieve their stated objectives. Among the three cases the Czech Republic clearly
achieved the highest degree of integration in the Western core, being among the first
post-communist states to conclude a Europe Agreement with the European Com m ission,
being invited to join NATO in 1997 and beginning negotiations on EU accession in 1998.
The country was also able to quickly reorient its econom ic relations toward the W estern
core without the econom ic hardship associated with market reforms. The ability o f the
Czech Republic to attain the highest degree of integration was created by its stable
political and economic development as well as its geographic location as the post
com munist state closest to the Western core. Indeed, geographic location seemed to have

^ " ‘Duma Urges Yeltsin to Review Russia-Lithuania Border Treaty” (text).
Moscow Interfax in English (26 September 1997). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast
Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-Central Eurasia, 26 September 1997 (PrEx 7.10:
FBIS-SOV-97-269). Avaliable from W orld News Connection; INTERNET.
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a significant impact o f a country’s ability to integrate. 153 Paradoxically, all three
countries were reluctant participants in regional integrative and cooperative
arrangements, as these were perceived as diverting them from integration in the Western
core. Here, however, geographic location made the Czech Republics' cost o f avoiding
non-EU and NATO integration relatively low, as ail o f its neighbors are either already
members o f these institutions or actively seeking to join them. In other words, regional
integration and cooperation was achieved in the context o f the country’s Euro-Atlantic
integration and cooperation.
In contrast, Bulgaria and Lithuania achieved relatively weaker integration in the
same core (See Figure 2). Lithuania, having achieved independence from the Soviet
Union after the other tw o countries, faced major challenges in its integration efforts as
along with its efforts to join the West it had to build state and political institutions from
scratch.134 Consequently, Lithuania initially lagged behind the other two states in
concluding a Europe Agreement and m em bership in all-European institutions such as the
Council o f Europe and OSCE. Economic and political stabilization, however, enabled the
country to speed up the process of joining the Western core; the country was quickly
recognized as a potential NATO member, and although having started negotiations to
join the EU two years after the Czech Republic, Vilnius speedily caught up with the first
group o f candidates in term s of adopting the acquis. And as for the impact on country

l3 ’Public opinion seemed to have little independent effect on the three countries’
integration in the W est as all publics m aintained consistent approval of integration in
both the EU and NATO (See Tables 15 and 16).
l34On the challenges of building state institutions in the Baltic states after
independence see Ole Norgaard, Lars Johannsen, M ette Skak and Renee Hauge Sorensen,
The Baltic States A fter Independence (Northam anpton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing,
1999), 161-65
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stock, although Lithuania’s geographic location was not as advantageous as the Czech
Republic's, what played in Lithuania’s favor was the pre-existing integration, especially
economic integration, am ong the countries in the region.
O f the three cases, Bulgaria attained the lowest level o f integration in the Western
core (See Figure 2). Although Sofia concluded an European Agreement the same year as
the Czech Republic did, slow economic reform and political instability until 1997
relegated Bulgaria to the group of countries which are consistently seen as achieving EU
membership only after the other ten candidates become members. In addition, until the
ascent to pow er of the Kostov government in 1997. Sofia was not considered a serious
NATO candidate, and even then its chances were seen as no better than most o f the other
candidates. The weakness o f national capacities to integrate in the Western core were
com pounded by the handicaps o f its international stock. The almost constant armed
conflict to the west and the low level of integration
of the neighboring
countries in the
C
C
O
Western core further weakened Bulgaria's ability to integrate internationally. Historically
low levels o f cooperation and integration with neighboring states and constant regional
threats and risks hampered Bulgaria’s willingness to stim ulate interaction within the
region.
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Appendix 11
Variable Flow
Figure 2 represents an attempt to provide a comparison o f the three states' (lows on an ordinal scale. The figure
measures the position o f each country on the already discussed international variable How. The three countries arc
ranked by summing the five variables by assigning values o f 3 to the highest ranking on each variable. 2 to the next and
I to the lowest ranking. In case two or more slates share the same ranking, the states receive the same value on the 1-3
scale. The assigned values represent the countries' ranking for the period 1990-2000.
The country's llow is estimated by using a 1-3 scale and assigning the value o f three to the country, which has the
highest integration in NATO and the EU. the highest amount o f foreign direct investments per capita, and consistently
highest public approval o f membership in the Euro-Atlantic institutions. The value of one is assigned to the country
which scores lowest on each o f the same variables.
Figure 2.
Variable Flow
NATO

EU

FDI

EU
Trade

Public
Approval

Total

Average

Bulgaria

1

1

1

1

3

7

14

Czech R.

3

3

3

3

3

15

3.0

Lithuania

2

2

i

1

3

10

2.0

Variable Slock
Figures 3 .4 and 5 represent an attempt to provide a comparison o f the three slates' stocks on an ordinal scale. The
figure measures the position o f each country on the already discussed international variable stock. The three countries
are ranked by summing the values each o f the three stales' neighbors has in terms of their integration in the EU and
NATO. The country's slock is estimated by using a 0-4 scale. The value o f 4 is assigned to a country which has a
membership in the institution. 3 to a country which is in the process of negotiating membership. 2 to a country
interested in joining. I to a country which has maintained a very weak relationship with the institution, and 0 to a
country which had a hostile relation with the institution. The assigned values represent the countries' rankina for the
period’1990-2000
Figure 3.
Bulgaria's Stock
NATO

EU

Total

Romania

2

3

5

Serbia

0

0

0

Macedonia

1

->

3

Greece

4

4

8

Turkey

4

•>

6

Total Score: 22; Overage Score: 4.4
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Figure 4.
Czech Republic's Slock
NATO

EU

Total

Poland

4

3

7

Germany

4

4

8

Austria

2

4

8

Slovakia

3

3

6

Total Score: 29: Overage Score: 7.25
Figure 5.
Lithuania's Stock
NATO

EU

Total

Latvia

3

3

6

Russia

1

2

3

Poland

4

3

7

Belarus

1

2

3

Total Score: 19: Overage Score: 4.75
The Czech Republic has the highest international slock o f 7.25. Lithuania scores 4.75. anil Bulgaria has the lowest
stock o f 4.4.
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Tabic 12
Trade with the European Union
(percentage o f total)

Bulgaria

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

20

36

28

34

37

38

41

47

52

53

54

53

57

61

60

61

64

67

69

71

18

26

37

40

42

44

48

Czech R
Lithuania

7

19

Source: ING Barings. 53-65: United Nations. 1998 International Trade Statistics Yearbook I. Trade By Country (New
York: Publishing Division United Nations. 1999). 136. 262. 580.
Table 13.
Foreign Direct Investment
(net inflows recorded in the balance o f payment, in millions o f US dollars)
1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

1989-2000

Bulgaria

98

138

507

537

806

820

3.152

Czech R.

2.526

1.276

1.275

2.641

4.912

4.500

19.424

Lithuania

72

152

328

921

478

295

2.307

Source: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Annual Report 2000 (June 2001). 18. Available from
http://w ww .ebrd.org: INTERNET.
Table 14
Cumulative Foreign Direct Investment Per Capita. 1989-2000
(in US dollars)
_____
Bulgaria

388

Czech R.

1.884

Lithuania

626

Source: Ibid.
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Tabic 15
Public Approval o f Membership in NATO
(in percentage)________________________
1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

52

46

50

57

46

59

47

59

68

83

28

Bulgaria
Czech R

60

56

Lithuania

2000

52

49

55

2001

64

Source: United States Information Agency. "Support for NATO Membership Strong Among Invitees," European
Opinion Alert, no. L-J4-98 (Washington. D.C.: Office of Research and Media Reaction. 26 June. 1998): United States
Information Agency. "Bulgarians Favor Joining NATO." European Opinion Alert, no. M -107-98 (Washington. D.C.:
Office of Research and Media Reaction. 7 July. 1998): Ministry o f Foreign Affairs o f Lithuania. Fact Sheet-April 2000
(June 2001). Available from http://www.urm.lt: INTERNET: Perry. Sweeney and Winner. 104: Ministry o f Foreign
Affairs o f Lithuania. Over 60 Percent o f Lithuanian Residents Support Lithuania's Aspiration o f Joining N ATO (June
2001). Available from http://www.urm.lt; INTERNET: "Poll Suggests "Only" 40 Percent Favor Entry Into NATO"
(text). Bratislava TASR in English (25 August 1999). FlIIS D aily Report-East Europe. 25 August 1999 (PrEx 7.10:
FBIS-EEU-1999-0826). Available from W orld News Connection; INTERNET. "Poll Shows 46',7 Strongly Support
Joining NATO" (text). Sofia Bulgarian Telegraph Agency in English (30 November 1999). I B IS Daily Report-East
Europe. 30 November 1999 (PrEx 7.10: FB IS-EEU-1999-1130). Available from World News Connection:
INTERNET: "Bulgaria’s Stoyanov to Attend NATO Council Meeting. Danube-Carpathian Summit." Bulgarian
Telegraph Agency (27 April. 2001); Roman Blasck. "Perceptions o f Security Risks by the Population of the Czech
Republic." Journal o f Slavic Military Studies 11, no. 3 (September 1998). 91.
Table 16
Public Approval of Membership in the European Union
(in percentage)____________________________________
1995

1996

1997

Bulgaria

75

49

57

Czech R

72

43

49

35

40

Lithuania

1998

42

1999

2000

2001

60

86

35

55

45

27

39

47

Source: European Union: United States Information Agency. The N ew European Security Architecture (W ashington.
D C Office of Research and Media Reaction. September. 1995). 27. "Poll Shows Czech Public's "Lukewarm"
Attitude Toward EU" (text). Prague l.idovc Noviny in Czech (8 N ovem ber 2000). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast
Information Serv ice. FBIS Daily Report-East Europe. 8 November 2000 (PrEx 7 10: FB1S-EEU-2000-1109). Available
from World News Connection: INTERNET: "Public Support to Early EU Entry Crows in Lithuania" Itext). Tallinn
BNS in English ( I February 2001). FBIS Daily Report-Central Eurasia. 1 February 2001 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-EEU-20010201) Available from Word News Connection: INTERNET: "Estonians and Latvians Skeptical About M erits o f EU
Accession" (text). Riga l-eta in English (2 1 May 2001). FBIS D aily Report-Central Eurasia. 21 May 2001 (PrEx 7.10:
FBIS-SOV-2001-052). Available from World News Connection; INTERNET: "Poll: Lithuanian Support for EU
Drops" (text). Tallinn BNS in English (9 June 1999). FBIS Daily Report-Central Eurasia. 9 June 1999 (PrEx 7.10:
FBIS-SOV-I999-6IO). Available from Word News Connection: INTERNET: "Low Support for EU M em bership in
Baltic States." Agence France-Prcssc (2 December. 1999): "Czech Support for EU Entry Declines." Reuters (4 May.
1999)
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CHAPTER VI
DEPENDENT VARIABLE SECURITY

C hapter VI investigates the dependent variable, national security. Separate
sections are devoted to each o f the three states’ levels of security. Each section surveys
the objective security o f each of the three countries in the post-communist period, the
evolution of the official conceptualization of national security and the evolution of
popular perceptions o f security. The last section compares the levels o f security achieved
by each country.

Bulgarian Security

The end of Soviet domination in Eastern Europe presented Bulgaria with
fundamentally different security challenges. Bulgaria's entire security arrangement was
based on the assumption that the Warsaw Pact, and the Soviet Union in particular, would
provide unconditional assistance in the event o f military conflict. Thus Bulgaria lost not
only its sources of cheap raw materials, energy, and reliable markets but also its
traditional partners to provide security. This explains why initially the Bulgarian
leadership was reluctant to let the Warsaw Pact go. The only notable exception was
President Zhelev, who, from early on, argued that the Pact was already a political corpse
and insisted on closer ties with the West.1 Zhelev made several visits to the West,
including Western Europe, the United States and Japan in 1990-91 to dem onstrate the
‘“Pact Outlived Its Tim e” (text). Prague CTK in English (I February 1991).
Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-East
Europe, 1 February 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-EEU-91-022: p. 7).
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country's reorientation away from Moscow. While the governments in the first two years
after 1989 were broadly supportive of this reorientation, they had a hard time
contemplating an alternative to the existing security arrangem ents in a new security
environment. Thus Bulgaria did not initially consider the unilateral dissolution o f the
Warsaw Pact as a valuable option.2
When the end of the Warsaw Pact became inevitable in 1991. Bulgaria was at a
loss to produce an alternative security policy. While acquiescing to the loss of traditional
security guarantees, Sofia attempted to ensure national security by enhancing national
military power, improving relations with neighboring states and nurturing a new, more
equal relationship with the Soviet Union.3 Although the governm ent recognized that the
new approach required good relations with NATO, it doubted Bulgaria would become a
member of the Alliance.4
■>

"Foreign Minister Boyko Dimitrov rejected the idea that Bulgaria might join
NATO and instead called for the simultaneous dissolution o f both alliances. Ricardo
Estarriol, “Foreign Minister Views European Issues” (text). Barcelona La Vanguardia in
Spanish (date not given). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS
Daily Report-East Europe, 29 March 1990 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-EEU-90-061; p. 8-9).
'Defense Minister Yordan M utavchiev suggested that after the dissolution of the
Warsaw Pact, Bulgaria must rely on its own defense forces and bilateral treaties with the
Soviet Union. Zvyatko Belenski and Ivan Staevski, Our M ilitary Doctrine is Defensive"
(text). Sofia Otechestven Vestnik in Bulgarian (21 November 1990). Translated by the
Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-East Europe, 30 November
1990 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-EEU-90-231; p. 16); Pesident Z helev’s spokesman, Valentin
Stoyanov, argued that Bulgaria will seek security through im proved relations with Balkan
neighbors, positive relations with East European countries, including the Soviet Union,
but mainly through internal stability. “New Military, Security Doctrine Discussed” (text).
Sofia Bulgarian Telegraph Agency in Bulgarian (3 February 1991). Translated by the
Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-East Europe, 1 February
1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-EEU-91-026; p. 2).
4See interview with M inister of Foreign Affairs Viktor Vulkov. Vikhra Rizova,
“ Bulgaria Has Renounced the Satellite Syndrom e" (text). Sofia Anteni in Bullgarian (26
June 1991). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily
Report-East Europe, 3 July 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-EEU -91-128; p. 5-7).
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The loss o f the traditional security framework which guaranteed Bulgaria’s
security in the context o f fundamental political, social and economic transformation in
the country coincided with the em ergence o f acute regional security challenges. The
beginning of Yugoslavia’s disintegration and the accompanying civil w ars presented the
country with unfamiliar threats and risks to which the leadership had no readily available
responses. The Bulgarian leadership faced the necessity of formulating new policies and
strategies to address the new challenges in a completely new international environment.
The conflicts o f Yugoslavia’s disintegration involved, among others, Serbia, a
state with which Bulgaria had a long history of rivalry, and Macedonia, a country which
Balkan states have traditionally sought to possess or dom inate.3 Sofia feared that the
conflict might spill over and engulf the entire region.6 Feeling extremely vulnerable.
Bulgaria’s policy, until at least 1996. o f addressing the likelihood of a w ider military
conflict was to try to persuade its Balkan neighbors to avoid any involvement in the
Yugoslav conflict. This policy explains why Sofia was the last state among the associated
members of the EU to provide troops to various peacekeeping operations in the region. It
considered such involvement risky and exacerbating conflicts among Balkan states.7
Accordingly, Bulgaria was the first state to recognize M acedonia’s independence in
^Joseph Rothschild. Return to Diversity: /\ Political History o f East Central
Europe Since World War II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); Barbara
Jelavich, History o f the Balkans (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
6On the Bulgarian perspective on military implications of the Yugoslav conflict
see Michail Srebrev, “Southern Europe: Concerns and Implications from a Bulgarian
Perspective,” in Charles L. Barry, ed., The Search fo r Peace in Europe: Perspectives
fro m NATO and Eastern Europe (Fort Lesley: National Defense University Press, 1993).
7See interview with Acting Foreign Minister D im iter Ikonomov. Ryszard Bilski,
“Stop the War” (text). Warsaw Rzeczpolita in Polish (25 February 1993). Translated by
the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS D aily Report-East Europe, 4 March
1993 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-EEU-93-041; p. 4-5).
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1992, thus trying to prevent the repeat of past attempts by various Balkan states to
dominate the area. The growing international isolation o f rump Yugoslavia and
Bulgaria's commitment to observe political, economic, and military sanctions against
Belgrade denied Sofia opportunities to work with Serbia on any o f the outstanding issues
between the two countries and. in general, rendered impotent any Bulgarian attempts to
affect developments in this part of the region.
The disintegration o f the Warsaw Pact left Bulgaria alone to face G reece and
Turkey, two states Bulgaria was supposed to confront militarily in the event of war
during the C old War. W ithout external security guarantees. Sofia became increasingly
concerned about military imbalances in the region. These concerns became more resilient
as. in accordance with the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, excess weapons from
NATO members in W estern Europe, including advanced systems, poured into Greece
and Turkey. In addition Sofia complained that Yugoslavia never signed the Treaty and
thus was under no international obligation to limit its military power or participate in a
confidence-building framework.
Consecutive Bulgarian governments adopted different policies to address the
perceived threat. The short-lived first non-communist government of Filip Dimitrov in
1991-92 reoriented Bulgarian foreign policy toward greater cooperation with the West
and Turkey. In this period, however, Bulgarian leadership, with the notable exception of
President Zhelev, did not actively seek NATO membership as a means of guaranteeing
national security.9 D im itrov’s policy led to improved ties with Ankara, which was

8See statement by President Zhelev in the daily Balgarska A nnia (18 November.
1991), 1.
9In his election address before the 1991 parliamentary elections, U DF leader and
future Prime M inister Filip Dimirtov listed Bulgaria's integration in the EC as a number
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pleased to see changing treatment o f the country’s Turkish minority.10 The two countries
signed a Treaty of Friendship, Goodneighborliness, C ooperation and Security in May 6,
1992. Along with econom ic and social agreements, the tw o governments arranged to
develop bilateral confidence-building measures. Accordingly. Sofia and Ankara signed in
December 1991 the Sofia Document on M utually Supplem enting M easures to Strengthen
Confidence and Security and Military Contacts Between Bulgaria and Turkey, in which
they agreed to give each other advance notice o f military exercises taking place within 60
kilometers of the borders, an exchange o f military observers, etc. Military strength along
the border was reduced on both sides. The Sofia Document was later strengthened by the
Edime Document on Some Additional Measures for the Strengthening o f Security and
Confidence and Military Contacts, signed in 1992." The Edim e Document reduced the
threshold for military activity notices and expanded the cooperation in military training
and contacts.
Similar attempts were made to establish security ties with Greece. The BulgarianGreek Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborhood, Cooperation and Security was signed
in October 1991 to last for period of 20 years. The two countries also signed in December
1992 a confidence building agreement committing to lowering the Vienna Document’s

one foreign policy priority, but failed to even mention NATO. “Election Address” (text).
Sofia Demokratsiya in Bulgarian (16 September 1991). Translated by the Foreign
Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-East Europe, 20 Septem ber 1991
(PrEx 7.10: FBIS-EEU-91- 183; p. 9).
l0Dunkan M. Perry, “New Directions for Bulgarian-Turkish Relations,” RFE/RL
Research Report 1, no. 41 (16 October, 1992): 33-40.
" “Military Accord with Turkey,” RFE/RL Research Report 1, no. 48 (4
December, 1992), 58.
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threshold on the number o f troops, tanks and artillery pieces involved in military
exercises.
Despite Bulgaria's early attempts to address its security concerns by seeking more
extensive security ties with the West, in general, and regionally with Turkey and Greece,
the Bulgarian leadership continued to see the country as dangerously exposed in a
uncertain security environm ent. Political and military leaders continued to com pare the
national force structure and armaments with those of Turkey and G reece.12 Discussions
of the deteriorating state o f the Bulgarian military and the increasing scope o f military
hostilities in Yugoslavia frequently evoked comparisons to the accelerated modernization
of the Greek and especially the Turkish military forces as a result of the cascading
transfer o f weapons system s from Western Europe.
Although Bulgaria dramatically increased its ties with the West, the lack o f
security guarantees forced the country to fall back on previously tested security ties. In
contrast to most other East European countries, Bulgaria did not see Russia as security
threat to its independence and territorial integrity. Accordingly, in August 1992. Bulgaria
and Russia signed a Treaty on Good Neighborliness and Friendly Relations, which went
beyond similar treaties between Russia and its former Warsaw Pact allies, as two o f the
articles in this treaty were security related. Article 4 states that consultations will be held
if a particular situation endangers international peace and security, and Article 5 that
"none of the contracting parties shall allow its territory to be used for military aggression
or other violent activities against the other contracting party."1’ Some Bulgarian

l2Statements by President Zhelev and General Tsvetan Totomirov. Bulgarian
Telegraph Agency (2 O ctober, 1994).
n Kyril Haramiev-Drezov, "Bulgarian-Russian Relations on a New Fooling,”
RFE/RL Research Report 2, no. 15 (9 April, 1993): 33-38.
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politicians interpreted the treaty as leaving the possibility o f Russian military assistance
to Bulgaria.14 Sofia was also highly encouraged by the fact that the treaty w as signed
during a visit o f Russian President Boris Yeltsin to Sofia, his first visit to a East European
country as a head o f state. Yeltsin also promised his guests more oil deliveries and greater
access to the Russian market.
The signing of the treaty coincided with an increased sense of insecurity among
the public. W hile in 1991 and 1992 the world closely followed developments in
Yugoslavia, the Bulgarian public seemed preoccupied with the domestic transition
process and disinterested in the disintegration o f the neighboring state.13 National media
provided little coverage of the conflict and politicians found it only too convenient to
avoid taking a stand on events over which the country seemed to have no control,
influence, or interest.
In early 1993, however, Bulgaria was forced to take a more definite stand on the
conflict in Yugoslavia, as the W est demanded that the Bulgarian government meet its
obligations under international law and enforce the embargo on the neighboring country.
Yugoslavia was regularly defying international sanctions and using the D anube River to
smuggle in badly needed supplies. Pressed to meet its obligations and fearful o f
provoking conflict with its neighbor, the government of Berov requested from the EU and
the U.S. security guarantees and assistance but received none.16 In February 1993,
Bulgaria ruled out the unilateral use of force to halt the convoys along Danube.

l4Ibid„ 37.
b Kjell Engelbrekt, “A Vulnerable Bulgaria Fears W ider War.” RF E/RL Research
Report 3, no. 16 (22 April, 1994): 7-12.
l6Ibid„ 8
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Only in 1993 did part of the Bulgarian political leadership, notably the UDF,
begin to seek NATO membership as a guarantee for national security. After the BSP
formed a majority government in 1994, however, the issue o f joining the Alliance
became extremely politicized as the Socialists concluded that NATO was not the answer
to national security concerns. Although the new government maintained formal relations
with the Alliance, it was clear that the formal membership was not a foreign policy
priority.17 The Socialist government proved to be much more conservative in it foreign
policy as its displayed a tendency to fall back on alliances and affinities that had been
based in the course of history. During the C old War Bulgaria and Greece developed close
ties, an affiliation based on the shared m istrust of Ankara. Following the UDF
governm ent’s policy that led to strained relations with Russia and especially with Greece,
after Bulgaria recognized Macedonia the Socialist governm ent embarked on restoring ties
with M oscow and fostering an even closer relationship with Athens. Thus Bulgaria tried
to address its security needs by establishing closer relations with what it saw as
historically tested allies while gradually isolating itself from the broader process of the
East European countries' forging of increasingly extensive relations with the West. In
fact. B ulgaria's shunning o f NATO m em bership was accom panied by difficult relations
with other institutions including the EU, the International M onetary Fund, and the World
Bank.
Better relations with Moscow and Athens did not, however, translate into
perceptions o f more security on the part o f the ruling elite. Politicians and military elites
continued to compare the structure and pow er o f the national military forces with those of

I7Videnov; See also Council of M inisters of the Republic o f Bulgaria.
Kontceptcija.
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neighboring countries.18 Even Yugoslav troops, although deployed to fight M uslim and
Croat forces, remained one o f the best-equipped armies in Europe and thus superior to the
deteriorating Bulgarian military. At the same time, NATO w as perceived to have
encouraged an arm s race on the Balkans to Bulgaria's disadvantage by further cascading
weapons from Central Europe to Greece and Turkey.19 This perception was shared not
only by the Socialists but also by the opposition UDF.20
The Socialist government defined national security in narrow , traditional terms
reflecting the governm ent’s preoccupation with external threats and risks. In the National
Security C oncept approved by the Videnov government on 13 July 1995, national
security is defined as the lack o f immediate threat of military aggression, political
control, or econom ic coercion to the state and the society.21
The Concept identifies international and domestic factors determining the state of
national security. While the docum ent recognizes the growing m ultiplicity of

l8Liubom ir Denov, “At O ne Stroke, NATO Pushes Us Into a New Arms Race."
24 Chasa (27 October, 1994): 10; Vasil Lyutskanov, “Army N eeds Urgent
M odernization, O r We Will Be Hopelessly Behind in One or Tw o Years” (text). Sofia
Trial in Bulgarian (6 February 1995). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information
Service. FBIS D aily Report-East Europe. 10 February 1995 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-EEU-95028; p. 4).
l9“At O ne Stroke, N A TO Pushes Us Into a New Arms Race" (text). Sofia 24
Chasa in Bulgarian (27 O cotober 1994). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information
Service. FBIS-D ailx Report-East Europe. 1 November 1994 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-EEU-94211; p, 6).
20Nikolay Slatinski, form er Chairman of the National A ssem bly’s National
Security Com m ittee, worried in early 1995 that the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty
exacerbated an already great regional imbalance to Bulgaria’s detrim ent by allow ing
modernization o f weapons system and cascading o f military hardw are to Greece and
Turkey. Given the economic and social crisis in the country, Bulgaria was seen as unable
to compete and keep up with these countries. Slatinski and C aparini, 32.
2lCouncil o f Ministers o f the Republic of Bulgaria, Kontceptcija, I.
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international threats and risks, it firmly identifies the traditional, specifically regional,
hard-core threats—regional civil wars and their spill-over potential, historical conflicts
among some Balkan states, serious asymm etry o f institutional security guarantees among
states, dem ands for territorial changes, and the em ergence o f new states after
Y ugoslavia’s disintegration-as the most significant security challenges to national
security. The docum ent warns that the growing asymmetry between the military power of
Bulgaria and most o f its members may lead in the future to aggression against the
country. Very significantly, the Concept fails to state that Bulgaria does not see an
immediate threat to its territorial integrity and sovereignty stemming from the conditions
existing in the region.
Although the Videnov government did not identify any country as threatening
national security, it implicitly regarded Bulgaria’s traditional enemies, especially Turkey
and Yugoslavia, as posing a threat to national sovereignty. Although no country in the
Balkans had declared any territorial claims to Bulgaria, the government and part o f the
society seemed to assume th em .'2 Both failed to realize that Yugoslavia had no intentions
o f antagonizing Bulgaria and, in any event. Belgrade was in no position to mount any
effective military challenges to the East. In addition, Sofia’s preoccupation with the
growing military disparity between Bulgaria, on the one hand, and Greece and Turkey on
the other, indicated a m isreading o f the security dynamics between Athens and Ankara.
In fact, the two countries came to blows in the midd- 1990s over their deep divisions

'"In an interview with the Kontinent daily, Turkey’s president Suleyman Demirel
was asked to assure the Bulgarian public that his country had no evil designs on Bulgaria
or the Balkans. “Suleyman Demirel, Interview” (text). Sofia Bulgarian Telegraph Agency
in English (10 Decem ber 1993). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information
Service. FBIS Dailv Report-East Europe, 13 Decem ber 1993 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-EEU-93237; p. 10).
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involving Cyprus, air space, territorial waters and treatment o f minorities, and both were
only happy to maintain unproblematic relations with Bulgaria.
Discussing dom estic factors, the Concept identifies the pace and direction of
political and econom ic reform, the social effects of those reforms, and the strength of
state institutions, especially judiciary, police and army as the major factors affecting
national security. It also includes demographic factors, environmental problem s,
organized crime’s effects, and the “non-Bulgarian spiritual invasion o f the society."23
The document contains implicit criticism of the previous governm ents’ policies,
which led to severe econom ic and social problems, in turn severely exposing the country
to threats and risks. It also points out that the country neglected traditional allies in its
pursuit of integration in international institutions without regard for national autonomy
and interests. A ccording to the Concept, the state’s goal is to guarantee its territorial
integrity and sovereignty, to ensure the conditions for econom ic developm ent and to
guarantee the dem ocratic character of the society, among others.24 The decisive way of
achieving this is through the sustained process o f increasing national power, active
cooperation and coordination with international partners and stimulating the nation’s
patriotism and loyalty to the state through sustained econom ic and social prosperity.
National interests can be protected by relying mainly on the national m ilitary forces.
Moreover, military security is seen as determ ined by the strategic, political and military
factors in the international environment, on the one hand, and national m ilitary capacities,
on the other. Although the concept defines cooperation with international institutions and
friendly states as an additional way to guarantee security, it makes no explicit
23Ibid„ 10.
24Ibid„ 11-12.
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com mitment to seeking integration in NATO as a major foreign policy goal. Instead, it
suggests that Bulgaria may seek NATO membership only after the Alliance transformed
itself into one o f the elements o f a pan-European security fram ework in which Russia will
have a m ajor role. Accordingly, while m em bership in the EU and the WEU is defined as
a priority, the relationship with NATO is seen as a partnership.
The Videnov governm ent’s Concept reflected the em ergence of a deep division
among the political elite over the nature o f national security and how best to achieve it.
While the Socialists’ conception perceived the issue in largely traditional ways,
em phasizing the accumulation o f mostly military power and the maintenance o f alliance
with friendly states, the UDF opposition insisted that integration in both the UN and
NATO is both consistent with Bulgaria’s quest to join a com m unity of states sharing
common values and the best way to guarantee the country's security and prosperity.25
The BSP government correctly concluded that membership in both organizations is only
a distant possibility and was skeptical of the organizations' ability and willingness to
address the country’s security needs."6 Yet Bulgaria, in their view, was facing immediate

-:,On the UDF’s view o f Bulgarian membership in N A TO in 1994 see interview
with then Deputy Defense Minster and a future Defense M inster in the Kostov
government, Boyko Noev. Lyubomir Denov, “ Boyko Noev: The Time for Neutrality Has
Passed” (text). Sofia 24 Chasa in Bulgarian ( 1 1 March 1994). Translated by the Foreign
Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-East Europe. 15 March 1994 (PrEx
7.10: FBIS-EEU-94-050; p. 2).
"f>The Socialists’ mouthpiece Duma com m ented that the signing in 1994 o f a
memorandum by the Bulgarian government and visiting U.S. Defense Secretary William
Perry was serving America’s strategic interests in the Balkans, but none of Bulgaria’s.
“Bobi M ichailov is Not G uarding the State's G oal” (text). Sofia Duma in Bulgarian (20
July 1994). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS D ailv ReportEast Europe, 26 July 1994 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-EEU-94-143; p. 7-8).
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and grave threats and challenges.27 The government saw neighboring states as
competitors, some o f which—G reece and Turkey—were already members of a security
organization which Bulgaria had no chance of joining in the neat future. Bulgaria fell
back on already tested security arrangements by reviving its close relations with Russia
10

and cultivating more extensive cooperation with Greece."
In addition to its reverse in foreign and security policies, the government also
ended the gradual reduction in m ilitary budgets implemented by previous governments.
At the wake o f com m unism ’s collapse, Bulgaria was spending $2.46 billion on its
military, accounting for more than 4.5 percent of the G DP (See Table 17).29 After
declining to 2.5 percent of the G D P in 1994, the Videnov government refused to
implement further military reform s and maintained the armed forces' structure and high
budgets. In fact while in Eastern Europe military budgets were declining, Bulgaria
continued to have high military expenditures, becom ing a heavy burden on the stagnated
econom y.’0

"7The public seemed to share the Socialists' perception o f the likelihood o f NATO
accession. In 1995 only 31 percent o f the public believed that accession within five years
was likely. United States Information Agency, The N ew European Security. 15: The
public also seemed to have little confidence in international organizations. 35 percent
trusted OSCE, 29 percent trusted WEU, and 33 percent expressed trust in NATO. Ibid..
33.
■>s

"’Russia was more than happy to reward Bulgaria’s lack o f interest in NATO. In
July 1995 Moscow sent to Bulgaria free of charge 100 T-72 tanks along with armored
fighting vehicles. Kontinent (27 February, 1995), 7.
^International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance (London:
Oxford University Press, 1990), 84.
'°It must be noted that differences in accounting practices explain the
discrepancies between figures provided by Bulgaria’s Ministry o f Defense and W estern
sources such as The Military Balance. Thus according to the Ministry o f Defense
between 1990 and 1996 the budget for defense averaged slightly over 3 percent o f the
GDP and in 1997 and 1998 it declined to slightly over 2 percent. In any event, until 1996
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The public seemed to share som e o f the governm ent's assum ptions about security.
The relatively strong relationship w ith Russia established by the bilateral treaty in 1992
and enhanced by the Videnov governm ent after 1994 was an unproblem atic issue in
domestic politics. In 1992 only 6 percent o f the public perceived R ussia to represent a
threat to Bulgaria and by 1994 only 5 percent seemed to share this p erc e p tio n /1 In fact,
the Bulgarian public did not see any o f the great powers as posing any threat to its
security. In 1992 and 1996. only 3 percent perceived Germany to be a threat, and 4 and 9
percent respectively saw the US as a threat.32 In other words, neither a single great pow er
nor a conflict am ong great powers w as seen to be a likely threat to national security.
Conversely, in 1992, 61 percent o f the public perceived neighboring countries as
representing a threat to peace and security in Bulgaria, although by 1996 this feeling o f
threat was shared by only 31 percent.

Threats emanating from the region and within

countries were perceived to be the m ost likely challenges to national security. The
beginning of the Yugoslav conflict generated a sense of grave insecurity; the negotiated
end o f the war in Bosnia and the consequent deployment of NATO peacekeeping forces
in late 1995 only slightly abated the public’s security apprehensions. Raging and dorm ant
ethnic conflicts in the region heightened security fears about the possible threat posed by
the military budget remained high by East European standards. For budgetary estimates
see Ministry o f Defense of the Republic o f Bulgaria, Parliamentary’ Oversight and
Democratic Control o f the Bulgarian A rm ed Forces and M inistry o f D efense, study no.
3/1998 (June 1999). Available from http://www.m d.govem ment.bg; INTERNET.
’’in most other East European states the perception o f threat from Russia actually
increased. Christian Haerpfer, Claire W allace and Richard Rose, P ublic Perceptions o f
Threats to Security in Post-Com m unist Europe (Glasgow, Scotland: University of
Strathclyde, C enter for the Study o f Public Policy, 1997). 6.
32Ibid., 6-11.
33Ibid., 12.
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Bulgaria’s own ethnic groups (See Table 18). Remarkably, in the decade following the
collapse o f communism the public never ceased to see ethnic minorities as a possible
threat to territorial integrity and national security.
The public’s perceptions o f external threats to national security were compounded
by a grow ing sense of personal and social insecurity. The Bulgarian economy witnessed
one of the most dramatic declines in Eastern Europe. In the first six years the country
experienced significant shrinking o f its GDP, high inflation and constantly growing
unemployment (See Tables 19 and 20). These developments inevitably led to social and
economic dislocations whose consequences challenged the relative sense of social
security the public was accustom ed to during the years of com munism. In the years
following the end o f com munism, infant mortality rates reached numbers higher than the
one in 1989 (See Table 21). In addition, life expectancy for males reversed its previous
tendency o f steady increase and slightly declined (See Table 22). In the years 1990-1996
Bulgaria experienced a dramatic drop in its Human Development Index (HDI), from .854
to .758, thus sliding from 40lh to 63rd place among states (See Table 23). '4 Serious crim e,
previously a rare occurrence, quickly became one o f the most important social issues and
was placed am ong the greatest threats to social peace and personal security (See Table
24). These developments increased the public’s perceptions o f domestic threats to the
levels of social and economic security enjoyed during the last years of communism. The
rule of the Socialists in 1994-96 coincided with the greatest public dissatisfaction with
the developm ent o f democracy and the direction o f the country in the period analyzed in
this study. Accordingly, the populace also perceived little respect for human rights in this
34Developed by the United Nations, the HDI combines life expectancy,
educational attainm ent and incom e indicators to give a com posite measure of human
development in various countries.
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period of Bulgaria’s transition. Increasingly, as the economic and social crisis deepened,
the public came to see the consequences o f this crisis as the more significant threats to
security even as external threats continued to be identified by the Socialists as the most
significant among m ultiple threats.
The ascendance o f UDF to power in early 1997 dram atically changed Bulgaria's
approach to cooperation with and integration in the international community. Bulgaria
saw membership in N A TO , the EU and the W EU not only as a reliable source o f security
guarantees but also as a natural expression o f the country's foreign policy orientations.
Accordingly, the Kostov government not only reoriented the country’s foreign policy but
also altered its approach to security.
The National A ssem bly approved in April 1998 a new National Security Concept
which reflected the new governm ent’s security policies and priorities. ° Like the Concept
of the previous governm ent, the new Concept identifies both external and internal factors
affecting and determ ining national security. National security is defined as a condition
“when the major rights and liberties of the Bulgarian citizens are protected as well as the
state borders, the territorial integrity and independence o f the country, when there is not
any danger o f armed attack, violent change in the constitutional order, political dictate or
economic com pulsion for the state and the democratic functioning of the state and
civilian institutions is guaranteed.’” 6 Although the Concept sees a considerably decreased
danger of direct m ilitary aggression against Bulgaria, it still emphasizes the importance

35G ovem m ent o f the Republic of Bulgaria, National Security Concept (June
1999). Available from http://ww w .m d.govem m ent.bg; INTERNET.
36Ibid., 3.
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of military and force factors in international relations. '7 In contrast to the previous
government’s approach, however, the new Concept recognizes the inability of the
country to ensure its security on its own or to seek security through neutrality, because of
insufficient financial, econom ic and military potential. Instead it identifies integration in
international organizations and participation in the globalization process as the means to
address these shortcomings. Along with identifying the national scarcity of security
resources, the docum ent points out that national security is affected by world econom ic,
political, scientific and environm ental processes as well as regional developments. Thus
it becomes very unlikely that unilateral decisions, including m ilitary ones, are im posed in
regional and bilateral conflicts. The Concept points out that these developm cnts-scarcity
of national resources, the significance of world processes, and the institutional, rather
than unilateral, solution of problem s—prompts Bulgaria to seek security through
transition to dem ocracy and a market economy and integration in Euro-Atlantic
institutions, including the EU and NATO. Significantly, the lack o f security and stability
until recently were caused by the failure of the previous government to pursue these same
policies.’8 In other words, it is not mainly the external threats that affected the state of
national security but the failure to advance reforms and the refusal to integrate in the
Euro-Atlantic institutions.
The new Concept, like the old one, devotes much attention to threats in the
Balkans, especially the ones associated with the conflicts in Yugoslavia. The effects of
the crisis in the neighboring country are seen not in the form o f a direct military challenge
but rather as the existence of conditions for the development o f organized crime and
37Ibid.. 1.
’8Ibid., 2.
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corruption and for the isolation of Bulgaria from the process o f integration in the Western
institutions. These conditions jeopardize the stability o f the Bulgarian state institutions
whose integrity is a precondition for national security. In other words, the regional threats
to national security are not in the form o f direct military challenges to the territorial
integrity and sovereignty o f Bulgaria but in their effects on the capacity o f the country to
reform and integrate in Western institutions. Bulgaria’s perception o f regional and limited
threats to its national security were also evident in its M ilitary Doctrine, which did not
envision any direct military threat but defined any arm ed conflict in the Balkans as
potentially presenting the challenges already identified in the Security C o n cep t/9
Significantly, after the U DF’s ascendance to power, political leaders and officials ended
their references to any military unbalances between Bulgaria and its neighbors as Greece
and Turkey were already seen as soon-to-be allies. Even the Socialists, although
fundamentally opposed at least until 2000 to a membership in NATO, were unable to
generate public support for their security and foreign policies. In fact, while in opposition
after disastrous electoral results in 1997, the BSP did not develop any cohesive foreign
policy vision o f its own.
The new security concept was adopted shortly before a new escalation of armed
conflicts in the Balkans. In early 1999 NATO initiated air strikes against Yugoslavia, the
second such action in less than four years. This time the military action was even closer
to Bulgarian territory, in Kosovo and Serbia, and presented an even more dramatic
challenge to national perceptions of security. Both the rhetorical and already institutional
commitment to Euro-Atlantic integration, forced Bulgaria to take a firm stand on the
'^The military doctrine was approved on 8 A pril, 1999. Government o f the
Republic o f Bulgaria, M ilitary Doctrine o f the Republic o f Bulgaria. (June 1999).
Available from http://www.m d.govem m ent.bg; INTERNET.
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conflict. In contrast to the 1991-96 period, when Bulgarian governments saw neutrality
and noninterference as the best guarantee o f national security, the Kostov government
firmly committed the country to the A lliance’s strikes, including providing overflight
rights, imposing sanctions on Serbia in accordance with EU associate members'
obligations, and urging Belgrade to accept the international community’s conditions.40
It must be noted, however, that the governm ent's decision to support the West in
the conflict was taken over the public’s disapproval o f N A TO ’s action and o f the
government’s involvement in the conflict.41 UDF was the only party which unequivocally
supported the NATO air campaign, w hile the BSP strongly objected and frequently tried
to end the agreement between the A lliance and the government. Public resistance
reflected the perception o f an acute threat to national security and exposed the public’s

40In a sharp reversal of previous Bulgarian policy o f neutrality toward Yugoslavia,
President Stoyanov stated that Bulgaria's long term interests did not coincide with the
interests of today's leadership of Y ugoslavia and described the conflict as “a collision
between the dem ocratic community and the last communist regime in Europe." "Bulgaria
Sides with NATO O ver Kosovo,” Agency France-Presse (16 April, 1999): In an
interview for Le Mond, President Stoyanov noted that in the past seven years Bulgaria
had been a hostage of M ilosevic’s policies and that it is time to solve the Serbia problem.
Bulgarian Telegraph Agency (5 May, 2001); In an interview for the daily Trud. Prime
Minster Ivan Kostov stated that Bulgaria cannot have a neutral policy toward the Kosovo
crisis for neutrality would bring about m ore threats to Bulgaria. Valeriya Velva. “You
Stop Violence with Violence” (text). Sofia Trud in Bulgarian (3 May 1999). Translated
by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-East Europe, 3 May
1999 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-EEU -1999-0503). Available from W orld News Connection:
INTERNET.
4lIn March 1999, 72 percent o f th e public was against NATO military
intervention in Yugoslavia and 77 percent were against NATO equipment and personnel
crossing Bulgaria. ‘‘Bulgaria—Survey—K osovo,” Bulgarian Telegraph Agencv (23 March.
1999).
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belief that neutrality to conflicts in the Balkans is still the best guarantee for Bulgaria’s
security.42
Although the perception of insecurity was widespread, the public did not exactly
identify the nature o f the threat posed by the Kosovo conflict. Yugoslavia did not issue
any specific w arnings about Bulgaria’s support to N A T O 's action as Sofia’s behavior did
not substantially differ from the policies o f the other Balkan countries which provided
political and practical assistance to the Alliance. Moreover, Bulgaria did not turn into a
destination for refugees leaving Kosovo, and aside from several stray American missiles
landing on Bulgarian territory43 the short war did not inflict any damages on the
country.44 Yet the public was afraid the country would be dragged in the conflict.43
Despite governm ent assurances that Bulgaria was ready to face any challenge with the
assistance o f W estern Europe, and despite the widely publicized NATO commitments to
national security, the public remained skeptical.40 Conversely, the ruling elite saw the

42In the same survey, 58 percent o f the public viewed the conflict in Kosovo as
the worst threat to national security. While one-third considered NATO guarantees a
reliable protection only 59 percent said Bulgaria would be better protected if it did not
allow its territory to be used in a possible attack on Yugoslavia. Ibid.
43“ Fifth Stray NATO Missile Hits Bulgaria.’’ Agence France-Presse (7 Mav.
1999).
'‘‘‘During the air cam paign the Bulgarian military was not placed on higher alert
although some special security measures were implemented, including additional security
for the nuclear plant in Kozloduy. Galina Sabeva, “Bulgarian Leaders W ork to Grant
NATO Request,” Reuters (19 April, 1999).
43A natoly Verbin, “ Bulgarian Government Tested O ver Kosovo.” Reuters (19
April, 1999).
46Durign the crisis Bulgaria and the Alliance held intensive consultations, and in
late 1998, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana sent a letter, which, according to Prime
M inster Kostov, provided security guarantees to the country. “ Bulgaria—NATO
Consultations,” Bulgarian Telegraph Agency (13 October, 1998).
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crisis as enhancing Bulgaria’s security as it prompted Euro-A tlantic institutions to further
assist Bulgaria's quest to join the West.47
What partly explains the heightened sense of insecurity among the public during
the Kosovo crisis is to be found within the states. Even before the conflict, the public
exhibited a high level o f econom ic and social insecurity even as the government was able
to implement reforms, stabilizing the country after the disastrous rule of the Socialists.
Although the economy resum ed growth and inflation was brought under control, rising
unemployment, stagnating individual incomes and the inability o f the government to
bring crime under control increased social tensions. Very im portantly, after a short period
o f high public support after the 1997 parliamentary elections, the public's approval of the
government, political institutions and the direction of the co u n try declined significantly.48
The public tended to blame politicians and ineffective institutions for falling standards of
living, corruption and crime. Indeed, life expectancy continued to fall, infant mortality
remained high, and the HDI increased only slightly but rem ained way below the 1990
level (See Table 23). Thus, the Kosovo crisis simply com pounded public fears that
national political leadership and institutions would be unable to deal with yet another

47As was discussed in the previous chapter, the K osovo crisis prompted the EU to
initiate accession negotiations with Bulgaria. For the political e lite ’s view see President
Stoyanov’s interview with Le Mond. Bulgarian Telegraph A g en cy (5 May. 2001).
48A poll by the National Public Opinion Center in 1998 found that the Bulgarians'
perception o f the incidents o f crime and the risks to which the person in the street is
exposed has not changed in the last four years. Three out o f 20 respondents said they or a
member of their family was victimized during the last year. '‘B ulgaria-C rim e—Poll,”
Bulgarian Telegraph Agency (16 July, 1998). In another poll the same year found that 55
percent o f the population believed corruption in the law enforcem ent authorities is the
greatest obstacle to fighting crim e. “Bulgaria—Corruption—F ight Against C rim e,”
Bulgarian Telegraph Agency (7 July, 1998).
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crisis that threatened security.49 A ccording to the public, national and social capacities
were insufficient to address m ultiplying threats.

Czech Security

The collapse o f com munism in Eastern Europe was seen by the leadership in
Prague not only as the end of totalitarianism but also as the end of the Cold War w hich
had been the m ajor threat to peace and security on the continent. As discussed in the
previous chapter. President Havel, w ho at this first phase of transition emerged as
Prague’s foreign policy leader, called for the transformation of both the Warsaw Pact and
NATO. Prague believed that after the Cold War. post-communist states needed to be
gradually incorporated into a Europe-wide security system in which there would be no
divisions.30 In the initial post-communist period, the security policy efforts of Prague
were focused on transforming the C SC E into a pan-European security organization that
would guarantee European security.31 The reluctance to call for a quick dissolution o f

49According to a poll by the National Public Opinion Center conducted before the
Kosovo crisis, the government scored high marks for its foreign, defense and security
policies, but only 28 percent approved o f its efforts in public peace and fighting
corruption, 66 percent disapproved the government’s income policy, 63 percent o f its
handling of unem ploym ent and 62 percent disapproved health care policies and the
corruption in the executive. Public support for the governm ent’s foreign and security
policies, however, ended with the beginning of the Kosovo crisis. “G ovem m ent-O pinion
Poll,” Bulgarian Telegraph Agency (16 November, 1998).
3°Havel’s interview for Die Welt. Manfred Schell, “Havel Discusses European
Political Future” (text). Hamburg D ie Welt in German (10 March 1990). Translated by
the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS D aily Report-East Europe, 12 M arch
1990 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-EEU-90-048; p. 13-15).
5lCotey, 149-53.
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both alliances was provoked by latent fears about the role of a reunified Germany.32
Thus, while Czechoslovakia was striving for a m ore independent foreign policy and the
withdrawal o f Soviet troops from its territories it was also seeking to modify the existing
security arrangements in a new security environm ent.33 Soon, however, Czechoslovakia
cam e to accept the enduring need for a robust security institution on the continent, a role
that only NATO could provide.
In this early phase, two issues dom inated Czechoslovakia’s foreign and security
policies—the presence of Soviet troops and the policy known as the “return to Europe.”34
The national leadership identified the presence o f Soviet troops in the country as the only
immediate threat to the country’s national security and sovereignty. Prague recognized
the USSR as the main threat due to the possibility that Moscow would try to reimpose its
dominance over Eastern Europe and reverse the reforms in post-communist states.

32During a visit to London, Havel suggested that Germany should rid its
neighbors of fears o f new expansion. “Havel C alls for Dissolution of Military Pacts"
(text). Prague C TK in English (22 March 1990). FBIS Daily Report-East Europe, 23
March 1990 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-EEU-90-057; p. 17-18).
3'Foreign M inister Jiri Dienstbier suggested Europe needed to transform its
security architecture. In the first phase the two blocs would continue to exist but lose their
military significance. In the next phase, there w ould emerge a United States of Europe.
"Dienstbier Discusses European Security” (text). Prague CTK in English (4April 1990).
FBIS Daily Report-East Europe, 5 April 1990 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-EEU-90-066; p. 17).
Even in early 1991 when it was obvious that the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact was a
matter o f time, Prague still did not call for C zechoslovakia’s NATO membership. “Havel
on Slovakia, C ountry’s Role in Europe” (text). Vienna ORF Television Network in
German (5 May 1991). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS
D aily Report-East Europe, 7 May 1991 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-EEU-91-088; 9-14).
54In an interview for Lidove Novini, Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier stated that
Czechoslovakia’s most important foreign policy tasks in 1990 were the renewal of the
sovereignty o f the state and the normalization o f relations with the W est. “More Acitve
Attitude Toward the World” (text). Prague Lidove Novini in Czech (19 December 1990).
Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Dailv Report-East
Europe, 27 D ecem ber 1990 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-EEU-90-249; p. 21-22).
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Accordingly, national diplomacy attempted to curtail M oscow’s ability to use the
Warsaw Pact as a means to deny Czechoslovakia full sovereignty and later advocated its
dissolution altogether. Concurrently, the non-communist government was able to
negotiate an agreement on a swift troop withdrawal from Czechoslovakia. The
withdrawal of more than 73,000 troops was formally agreed upon in February 1991
during President H avel's visit to Moscow, and formally completed in June 1991.35 Along
with the withdrawal o f foreign troops the country made swift progress on its return to
Europe priority as it joined the Council of Europe in February in 1991 and signed a
European Association Agreement in December. Even more importantly from a security
perspective, in N ovem ber 1991 Czechoslovakia and Germany signed border treaties, an
issue of symbolic significance for Prague.
With the Soviet troops gone, Czechoslovakia found itself in a benign security
environment. No neighboring country seemed to have territorial dem ands on
Czechoslovakia and, in Prague’s view, no attempt by any country to make changes to the
country's borders was seen as even slightly probable. The disintegration of
Czechoslovakia into two independent states rendered the security environment of the
Czech Republic even more benign. This change had several important security
consequences for the new state. It moved the country's geographical gravity westward:
the shift created more distance from the already increasing turmoil in the Balkans and the
unpredictability o f the former Soviet states.56 It also greatly decreased the size of

“ Hyde-Price, 232.
36In an interview with H ospodarske Noviny, Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec
argued that, after the split with Slovakia, not only did Czech Republic find itself removed
from the turbulence o f the former Soviet Union and the Balkans and it is now a more
“clear-cut” Western state. Milos Sklenka, “Two States, Tw o Diplomatic Policies” (text).
Prague Hospodarske Noviny in Czech (19 January 1993). Translated by the Foreign
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minorities in the Czech Republic and freed its national politics o f the burden of dealing
with a relatively m ore backward Slovakia.37
The relatively favorable geopolitical position o f the new state among the countries
of Eastern Europe conditioned the relative absence in Czech foreign affairs of significant
security issues. In fact, this early period in the foreign policy of the state set in the
tendency of benign neglect of security policies by both the public and the political
leadership.35*A ccordingly, the national leadership did not lobby vigorously for
membership in N A T O .39 Only after the A lliance's decision in 1993 to expand did Prague
openly campaign for inclusion in the first round. NATO membership was seen more as
part of the overall policy of a return to Europe rather than as a security policy to
guarantee national sovereignty against any conceivable military challenge. The newly
independent state quickly identified itself as a W estern society which had been denied its
rightful place am ong democracies and with which it shared basic values and principles.
Thus joining the institutions of these democracies was defined as part o f the process o f
rejoining the West.

Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Dailx Report-East Europe. 22 January 1993 (PrEx
7.10: FBIS-EEU-93-013; p. 18-20).
37The division also greatly diminished the public’s perception o f threats posed by
minorities (See T able 18).
3XHad and Handl.
39Prime M inster Vaclav Klaus suggested in 1993 a '"French m odel” for the Czech
Republic's m em bership in NATO—after a long and careful process o f integration in the
Alliance the R epublic would gain membership w ithout its national troops being
subordinated to a united command. Tomas Smrcek, “Vaclav Klaus W ill Meet in Paris
with President M itterrand and W riter Kundera.” (text). Prague Lidove Noviny in Czech (4
November 1993). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily
Report-East Europe, 10 November 1993 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-EEU-93-216: p. 11-12).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

243

The lack of interest in security and defense issues resulted in a delay in the
formal, official conceptualization o f national security. In early 1993. the Czech
parliament received and noted principal guidelines for foreign policy, presented by the
foreign minister. The guidelines, however, did not represent a formal national security
concept.60 In the part relevant to national security, the guidelines observe that direct
military threats to the Republic have diminished significantly. Instead the document
identifies other, non-traditional and less-predictable threats such as the growth of militant
nationalism, ethnic conflict, refugees, and the possible disruption of supplies of raw
materials. The guidelines also define integration in N ATO, the EU and the WEU as well
as good relations with neighboring states as the means to guarantee the Republic's
security, a point over which there was already a wide political consensus. Indeed, in this
period the Czech Republic was m ore concerned with the uninterrupted flow of vital raw
materials including oil and gas rather than with any conceivable military threat as it went
to great lengths to quickly diversify its sources of deliveries.61
While the government still failed to produce an official security concept, the
Institute of International Relations (IIR), an advisory board to the Czech Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, produced two docum ents elaborating the nation's security policies.62

6<>For a discussion see Had and Handl. 132-3.
61“German Pipeline Halts Dependence on Russia” (text). Prague Radiozum al
Radio Network (25 March 1996). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information
Service. FBIS Dailv Report-East Europe, 26 March 1996 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-EEU-96-059;
p. 16).
62The two documents entitled Czech National Interests and The Security Policy o f
the Czech Republic were published in 1993 and 1997. For a discussion o f the two
docum ents see Andrew A. M ichta, “The Czech Republic: A Small Contributor or a Free
Rider?” in Andrew A. Michta, ed., A m erica's New A llies (Seattle: University of
W ashington Press, 1999): 112-48.
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According to these documents the goal of every Czech government is to sustain freedom
and independence. The way to achieve this goal is through establishing and sustaining a
democratic political system and a functioning m arket economy. Domestic policies to
attain this security goal must be supported by a com prehensive policy of integration o f
the country into a larger, democratic, market-based European area.63 According to the
1994 document, if there was any external threat to the Republic, it was, above all, the
developments in the former Soviet U nion/14 Even the raging civil war in the Balkans was
not seen as presenting similar threats as the political, ethnic, social and economic
conflicts in the form er USSR.
To the extent that there existed any threat from Russia, political leaders agreed
that the Czech R epublic’s integration in Western institutions, and especially in NATO
would eliminate this danger as a direct and specific threat to the state. For all the com fort
that distance from the former Soviet Union provided to the Republic, a realist assessm ent
of Russia’s geopolitical place in Europe was displayed by Czech political leaders.
Therefore, Russian membership in NATO was rejected as incompatible with the values
underpinning the Euro-Atlantic community as well as unrealistic considering Russia’s
size and pow er/0 The Russian assault in early 1995 in Chechnya only seemed to
reinforce those attitudes.66

^Institute for International Relations, The Security Policy o f the Czech Republic
(Prague: Institute for International Relations, 1997), 47.
6,For a discussion of this threat see a com mentary in Mlada Fronta Dries.
“Experts See a G reater Risk in the Former Soviet USSR Than in Bosnia” (text). Prague
Mlada Fronta D nes in Czech (23 M ay 1994). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast
Information Service. FBIS Dailv Report-East Europe. 31 May 1994 (PrEx 7.10: FBISEEU-94-104; p. 17-18).
6:>In an interview with French historian Jacques Rupnik, President Havel argued
that Russia w ould be unwilling to become just another member o f NATO, and in any
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The documents also specifically identify NATO, the EU, and the WEU as the
most significant elem ents of the European security architecture. At the same time, the
documents caution that small countries such as the C zech Republic need external security
guarantees together with membership in international security institutions as the best
means to guarantee national security. It explicitly states that the state should never again
become a subject o f manipulation by big powers or international organizations—an
implicit reference to the inability of Czechoslovakia to influence the great pow ers’
readiness to sacrifice its sovereignty before the Second W orld War.67
At the same tim e, however. Czech security experts and most citizens were
cognizant o f the R epublic's inability to influence its security environment and came to
accept the Westss responsibility for maintaining security, order and stability.68 Therefore,
the Czech political leadership faced a dilemma: the aw areness o f the limited security
capacities o f the Republic which required integration in Euro-Atlantic institutions
dominated by great European powers, especially G erm any, on the one hand, and fear that

event the Alliance was providing a balance to the overw helm ing power of the Russian
state on the continent. Jacques Rupnik, “We Constitute a Single Whole” (text). Krakow
Tygodnik Powszechny in Polish (26 June 1994). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast
Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-East Europe, 27 July 1994 (PrEx Translated by
the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS D ailv Report-East Europe, 7.10: FBISEEU -94-144;p. 7-10).
66Eva Hulkova (text). Prague Radiozunial Radio Network in Czech (10 January
1995). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-East
Europe, 11 January 1995 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-EEU-95-007; p. 5); Ivan Holan (text). Prague
Radiozum al Radio N etw ork in Czech (10 January 1995). Translated by the Foreign
Broadcast Information Service. FBIS D ailv Report-East Europe, 11 January 1995 (PrEx
7.10: FBIS-EEU-95-007; p. 5).
67For a discussion o f security concepts and policies o f the states in Central Europe
see Glantz.
68Had and Handl, 138-39.
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those great powers were capable of having a great impact on the security environm ent.
Not surprisingly, while the public seemed to see no threat posed by neighboring
countries. G erm any and R ussia scored high as perceived security threats by public
opinion (See Tables 25 and 26). It must be noted that the public fears of potential threats
from Germany and Russia w ere partially shared by the Czech leadership with one
important qualification: the Czech leaders believed the threat from the two countries
seemed unlikely to materialize. But if they were to endanger Czech sovereignty, the cost
would be enormous. In other words Germany, and especially Russia presented, an
unlikely but potentially costly threat. That explains why the Czech leadership very early
on became an enthusiastic proponent of the United States' continued engagem ent in the
continent, a C zech preference that endured throughout the 1990s.69
In the first years after the peaceful disintegration of Czechoslovakia the Czech
Republic failed to formalize a security concept. Thus the M inistry o f Defense undertook
the unusual step o f preparing the National M ilitary Strategy in 1995 and the National
Defense Strategy without the framework provided by a security concept.70 The official

69Tom as Smrcek, '‘Europe Lacks U.S. Decisiveness” (text). Prague C esky Denik
in Czech (9 O ctober 1993). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service.
FBIS Daily Report-East Europe, 19 October 1993 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-EEU-93-200; p. 4);
“Klaus Calls for U.S. to Stay in Europe” (text). Prague R adiozum al Network in Czech
(11 May 1996). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily
Report-East Europe, 13 M ay 1996 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-EEU-96-093; p. 13); Eva Hulkova.
“Conversations at Lany” (excerpt). Prague Radiozum al Radio Network (12 M ay 1996).
Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS D aily Report-East
Europe, 13 M ay 1996 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-EEU-96-093; p. 13).
7(>For a discussion o f the Republic’s military doctrine and strategy see Nastoupil.
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Security Strategy was finally approved by the Czech government on 17 February 1999 as
one of the requirements before joining NATO in March o f the same year.71
The Strategy distinguishes between security threat and security risk. It uses
“security threat” for dangerous phenom ena and processes stemming from willful
conduct” while security risk is defined as “phenomena and processes w hose direct and
indirect negative impact on society, the functions o f the state, or citizens is not a
manifestation of a willful conduct.”72 The vital national interests to be defended include
“sovereignty, territorial integrity, the principles of dem ocracy and a legal state, and the
creation o f the fundamental conditions o f the lives o f its citizens.”7’ The Strategy points
out that the end of the C old War resulted in a substantial relaxation of general tensions
and greatly diminished threat of worldwide confrontations. This development, however,
does not eliminate threats as they are now posed by states, non-governmental groups, and
organizations that do not respect international law. im plicitly referring to actors which do
not accept the existing status quo in international politics. The Strategy reinforces this
point by declaring that the threat of use o f nuclear weapons and other weapons o f mass
destruction had not been totally eliminated.
What distinguishes the Republic's Strategy from sim ilar security concepts is that
while the security conceptualization o f Eastern European states identifies the threats and
challenges to individual states, the Czech Republic sees the threats and risks to an area,
the W est, in which the Republic is alm ost completely integrated. In others words, the

7lGovemment o f the Czech Republic, Security Strategy o f the Czech Republic.
(June 2001). Available from http://www.m zv.cz: INTERNET.
72Ibid„ 2.
7’Ibid, 3.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

248
potential risks and threats challenge the international security of the Euro-Atlantic area
rather than face individual states. Thus, according to the document, the Republic is bound
to face these risks and threats as part o f a politically, economically, and militarily
integrated area rather than on its own.74 Accordingly, the threats and risks that the Czech
Republic faces are by definition identical to those faced by the Euro-Atlantic com munity.
The most serious threats to this area are developments in Southeastern Europe where
instability and conflict threaten to spill over. Other threats include the complex
developments in the Commonwealth o f Independent States, including Russia, and
especially in the Trans-Caucasus region and Central Asia, as well as in the Middle East
and Northern Africa. The Strategy points out, however, that in the medium term there is
no direct military threat to the Czech Republic.
Among the risks, the Strategy identifies widespread political and economic
migration, economic inequality among states, economic interdependence, and
communication opportunities. Once again, the document sees these risks as challenging
the Euro-Atlantic area rather than specifically the Czech Republic. Accordingly, the
Czech Republic’s only means to address these risks and threats is in the fram ework of
security-providing institutions of this area, including NATO. WEU. and indirectly, the
EU. Therefore, the R epublic's complete integration in these institutions is the most
important priority of the nation’s foreign policy.
The Strategy also addresses the internal dimension o f security. Significantly,
while the document identifies some o f the possible internal sources o f threats and risks to
security, it leaves no doubt in the strength o f political and state institutions. Instead, it
points out that some o f the threats and risks may pose a challenge to the proper
74Ibid„ 2.
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functioning o f these institutions. In addition, it details that the integration in EuroAtlantic institutions turns the Republic into an open state and society, both an opportunity
that must be preserved in order to prosper but also a challenge that makes the role of the
domestic security and law and order institutions more com plex.
The Security Strategy of the Czech Republic expired on 21 January 2001, and an
amended Strategy was approved by the government.75 A lthough it once again makes a
distinction between threats and risks, the document, very much along the lines of
Baldwin's conceptualization, defines security threat as a situation that can inflict damage
to the Republic. Accordingly, the amended Strategy includes natural disasters as one of
the possible risks. Reflecting the benign security environm ent, the document lists only
security risks, while adding that some of them may develop into threats in the future.76
Furthermore, it does not identify a specific region presenting either a risk or threat to
national security. Even a reference to the low probability o f nuclear confrontation
mentioned in the previous version, was this time omitted. Thus, while the Czech Republic
identified specific security threats in its pre-NATO security strategy, once it became a
member of the Alliance, its amended strategy specifies only risks, reflecting the official
perception o f enhanced security.
The change in the Czech Republic’s military expenditures reflected the
transformation o f security perceptions. During the Cold W ar Czechoslovakia was in the
center o f war scenarios and witnessed a great concentration o f both national arm ed forces
and Soviet troops. Accordingly, the state devoted great resources, both human and
75G ovem m ent o f the Czech Republic, Security Strategy o f the Czech Republic, as
amended on 22 January 2001 (January, 2001). Available from http://www.m zv.cz:
INTERNET.
76Ibid„ 3.
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economic, to national defense (See Table 17). After the Cold W ar, the government
quickly reduced defense expenditures—both in absolute terms and as a percentage of
G D P—and manpower, a move that met no public or even professional soldiers’ resistance.
Low regard for the armed forces and the need to divert resources to national reform led to
levels o f armed expenditures that were seen as unacceptably low for a future NATO
member.77 Only after the A lliance’s pressure did the Czech Republic agree to increase its
military expenditures to at least 2 percent of its G DP.78 In 1993 the armed forces had over
106,000 troops and after steady annual decline it reached 55,000 troops by 20 0 0 .79
The political elite’s neglect o f security and defense issues was reinforced by
similar perceptions and attitudes held by the public.80 The public does not view political
and national security risks as m atters that can threaten the state in the near future and. in
any event, doubts the ability o f the national military forces to defend the country
effectively.81 These attitudes are consistent with long-running pacifist tendencies
determined by history and politics.82 In the Second W orld W ar Czechoslovakia’s military

77On NATO’s criticism o f the Czech m ilitary’s shortcom ings sec Michta. 137.
78Simon, “The New NATO Members."
79Ibid„ 4.
80Stefan Sarvas. “Attitudes o f the Czech Public Toward National Security, the
Military, and NATO M embership," Journal o f Slavic M ilitary Studies 11. no. 3
(September 1998): 56-88.
8lIn the 1992-97 period, the majority o f the public believed that in case of a
military conflict, the Republic was not able to defend itself. A m ajority also believed that
it is futile to consider national defense because superpowers will decide the nation’s fate.
Sarvas, 60; See also Blasek.
82

An international Gallup poll conducted in 1995 found that only 12 percent of
Czechs expressed any fear that global conflict would occur w ithin the next ten years, the
lowest percentage o f all 50 countries in which the pool was conducted. Blasek, 90.
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was unable to defend the nation’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and in 1968 during
the Prague Spring—a national movement seeking the reform of the communist regim e—
the military failed to resist Soviet intervention. Recently, the armed forces have been a
constant target o f defense-issues reporting by the Czech media.8’ Not surprisingly, the
national military does not enjoy high public approval and it has a difficult time attracting
young men into the professional ranks.84
O f course, historical ambiguity about the ability o f the armed forces to defend the
nation is only one o f the factors explaining the relative lack of interest in security issues
among the public. T he society was also influenced by the calm security environm ent the
Czech Republic found itself in after the C old War and the split with Slovakia.83 Public
perceptions of traditional security, perceived as the lack o f threat to national sovereignty,
rapidly assumed that there was no strong enemy that could threaten the country. The only
exception was Russia, which was perceived by a great majority to constitute a potential
threat to the stability o f the country. A nother great power. Germany, with which the
Republic had an uneasy relationship regarding the fate o f property rights o f the G erm ans
expelled from Czechoslovakia after the Second World W ar and the German dom inance

8’Libor Hlavacek. “Some Contem porary Aspect o f the Portrayal o f the Armed
Forces o f the Czech Republic and Czech Mass Media,” Journal o f Slavic Military Studies
12, no. 1 (March 1999): 47-50.
84Jiri Hodny and Stefan Sarvas, “Conscripts and the Military Profession in the
Czech Republic,” Journal o f Slavic M ilitary Studies 12, no. 1 (March 1999): 34-46; Jiri
Hodny, ‘T h e Prestige o f Professional Czech Soldiers in the Eye of the General Public,”
Journal o f Slavic M ilitary Studies 11, no. 3 (September 1998): 97-104.
83A poll in late 1993 found the 58 percent of the public to be satisfied with the
Republic’s foreign policy. “People Are M ost Satisfied with Foreign Policy” (text).
Prague M lada Fronta D ues in Czech (16 December 1993). Translated by the Foreign
Broadcast Information Service. FBIS D aily Report-East Europe, 22 December 1993
(PrEx 7.10: FBIS-EEU-93-244; p. II),

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

252
of the Czech economy, seemed to divide public opinion (See Table 26).86 Thus the public
seemed to share with the political leadership the perception that the main external threat
to national security was the potential great pow ers’ collusion, particularly between Russia
and Germany, rather than a danger from a single country.87
It must be noted that the perceived threat from Russia and Germany should not be
exaggerated. The majority o f the public which identified the two countries as threats at
various times was asked to choose the m ost likely am ong several threats. However, when
asked whether there was any military threat to the Republic 78 percent o f the respondents
in 1996 believed that there was no military threat to the country while a year later as
many as 83 percent did not see any military threat.88 This public perception o f relatively
high traditional security is confirmed by the polls which indicated declining perceptions
of threats coming from the Balkans—a region specifically identified by the Czech security
experts as a potential source of threats and risks.81’ All in all, the Czech public perceptions

86According to a public poll conducted in 1995. while 5 1 percent o f the public
trusted Germany, 47 percent did not. An overwhelming majority, 84 percent, did not trust
Russia. "H alf the Population Does Not Trust Germany” (text). Prague M lada Fronta
Dues in Czech (14 July 1995). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service.
FBIS Daily Report-East Europe, 18 July 1995 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-EEU-95-137; p. 6).
On the public fear over possible Russo-German agreement to reject NATO
enlargement see Dusan Trestik, “Germany and Russia” (text). Prague Lidove Noviny in
Czech (21 February 1996). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service.
FBIS Daily Report-East Europe, 1 April 1996 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-EEU-96-063; p. 8-9).
H8

“Majority Says Czech Republic Not Threatened—Poll,” Czech N ew s Agency (27
February, 1997).
g<)

While in 1994 10 percent, and in 1995 as many as 14 percent o f the public
believed that the Balkans represented a sources of threat to national security, in 1998 only
4 percent believed so. “C zechs See Russia as Biggest Threat to Country’s S ecurity-P oll,”
Czech News Agency (20 M arch, 1998).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

253
of threats to national security gradually abated and by the time Czech Republic was
invited to join NATO, the public ceased to see any likely external threat to country.
After Czechoslovakia's split in 1993, the Czech public also ceased to see ethnic
minorities as a threat to national security (See Table 18). Therefore, security perceptions
underwent transformation as the public began to rank traditional security well below
other forms o f security.<M
) The society cam e to see internal sources of threats and
challenges as the top set o f factors affecting security, and social and individual threats as
priority concerns in the security field.
As in most other East European countries, a majority o f the Czech public
considers social and econom ic risks and threats as priority security concerns. This
tendency was reinforced by the econom ic crisis after 1996. which caused the depreciation
of the national currency, the failure o f several banks and an increase in unemployment.
In the early transition period the Czech Republic was seen as the model of post
communist transition as the Republic successfully im plem ented political and economic
reforms without the political turmoil and social tensions faced by the other East European
countries, either successful or not. The Klaus government was able to establish a market
economy and get rid o f inefficient industries while keeping unemployment, inflation, and
social dislocations under control (See Tables 19 and 20). Therefore, although the
generalization about domestic insecurities having greater im pact on citizens' security
perceptions than that o f any other external threats and risks remained true, gradually by

yoA public poll in 1995 fund that the public ranked m ilitary security to be seventh
among security priorities, well behind good family relations—ranked first—urban security,
social security, income security, ecological security and security o f democratic rights.
Blasek. 91.
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1994 the public’s sense o f internal insecurity diminished greatly.'M In other words,
internal insecurities initially rem ained greater because external threats and risks were
perceived to be low. The econom ic crisis of 1996-97, although tarnishing the Republic’s
image of success, did not alter these attitudes. The crisis did not disturb the sound
foundations of Czech transition and did not change public trust in and approval o f the
political system and its institutions.
Social indicators suggest that, indeed, the Czech population, in contrast to most
other post-communist societies, experienced a relatively smooth transition. The life
expectancy at birth and infant m ortality rates, both good indicators o f the quality of life
and the health care system, by the end of the 1990s had better indicators than at the
transition's beginning (See Tables 24 and 22). The Czech HDI too. although in decline in
the early 1990s, rebounded and the country improved its rank am ong all states. Even the
1996 economic crisis failed to cause the social tensions and dislocations common in
sim ilar developments elsewhere in Eastern Europe. Not surprisingly, economic hardship
was not associated with labor protests.

Lithuania's Security

Unlike the most other Eastern European states, Lithuania initially faced a severe
challenge to its sovereignty and territorial integrity; the very existence o f the newly
independent state was contested by the Soviet Union and later Russia. To ensure its
survival Lithuania adopted policies which simultaneously sought three objectives—
9lMagda Boguszakova and Ivan Gabal, ‘T h e Czech Republic," in Richard Smoke,
ed.. Public Opinion a n d Expert A ssessm ent in Europe's New D em ocracies (Manchester:
M anchester University Press, 1996): 64-71.
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gaining international recognition of its independence, concluding an agreement with the
Soviet Union on its sovereignty, and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Republic.
On May 12, 1990, a month after the parliament voted to restore Lithuania's
independence, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania established the Baltic States Council, which
was designed, among other objectives, to help all three republics reach these goals. In
fact, the geopolitical interests o f the three republics have coincided since they decided to
seek independence. Very early in this period, Lithuania em erged as the most ardent
proponent of an uncompromising approach to dealing with the Soviet Union. The
government in Vilnius, headed by the staunchly anti-communist Sajudis and its leader
Vytautas Landsbergis, saw the presence o f Soviet troops as the greatest threat to the
survival o f the state. The pressure Moscow exerted on Lithuania to rescind the
declaration o f independence, including the imposition of crippling economic sanctions
and the use of Soviet troops in January 1991, convinced all Lithuanian political parties
that the Soviet Union posed the greatest challenge to national survival. Not surprisingly,
the Lithuanian political elite reached a consensus on the need to eliminate Soviet
presence in the Republic as a precondition for national independence. Sajudis and the
LDLP. the two dominant parties, however, differed on the speed o f reaching an
agreement and the approach to negotiating w ith Moscow. W hile Saujdis demanded an
uncompromising stand even at the risk of provoking a conflict, the former communists
insisted on a step-by-step approach. At this early phase of consolidating Lithuania's
independence, however, it was Sajudis which dominated national politics.
The unsuccessful coup attempt in M oscow in August 1991 further motivated
Vilnius to seek the immediate withdrawal o f Russian troops. At the Baltic States Council
in October 1991 in Vilnius, Landsbergis insisted that the withdrawal was not a question
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of negotiations and that all Russian military forces should leave by the end o f the year.
Although Estonia and Latvia considered the deadline unrealistic, a document was adopted
making the withdrawal o f troops the major foreign policy goal o f the Baltic states.92 At
the time, there was over 34,000 strong Russian military presence in Lithuania at over 180
bases. Although the Sejma passed a law prohibiting the introduction of any new troops,
the newly independent state had no means to enforce the law and Russia maintained its
presence. Furthermore, in the ensuing institutional collapse and chaos following the
disintegration o f the Soviet Union, Vilnius found it problematic to find the appropriate
authority in Moscow to negotiate.
Lithuania’s hopes o f a withdrawal agreem ent with Russia increased in January
1992 when the Russian Supreme Soviet finally ratified the treaty signed in July 1991,
formally recognizing Lithuania’s independence. On the day of the ratification.
Landsbergis was able to convince Yeltsin to withdraw Russian troops. However, little
progress was made in subsequent negotiations. By then it became clear to Vilnius that
Moscow did not speak with a single voice, as Russian President Boris Yeltsin had a
difficult time keeping his promises and exerting authority over security and military
matters. In fact, some officials in Moscow suggested that the continued presence o f
Russian military forces in the Baltic states was a stabilizing security factor in this part of
Europe.9'

)2Saulius G im ius, “ Progress in W ithdrawal of Troops from Lithuania?” RFE/RL
Research Report 1, no. 34 (28 August, 1992): 29-33.
,JFedor Shelov-Kovedaev, Russian first deputy foreign minister, told reporters
that Russian bases in the Baltics as “an integral part of the world security system .” “News
Update,” RFE/RL Research Report 1, no. 35 (4 September, 1992): 42.
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Moscow’s refusal to consider an immediate troop withdrawal was caused by
growing pressure in Russia for a revision o f Yeltsin’s relatively pro-W estern policies.
There were calls for M oscow to take a tougher line tow ard the so-called “near abroad,’’
the area o f the form er Soviet Union.94 One of the reasons for the w orsening o f relations
between the Baltic republics and Russia was that the R ussian Ministry o f Foreign Affairs
failed to exert its authority over the process o f foreign policy decision m aking and instead
left the military leadership to handle the “near abroad.” Consequently, the military
establishment began to negotiate with the government o f Lithuania w ithout any political
oversight.93
As part of the policy of getting tough with the form er Soviet republics, Moscow
began to champion the rights o f ethnic Russians left outside Russia after the
disintegration of the USSR. The “ Karaganov Doctrine,” nam ed for Sergei Karaganov. an
early adviser to Yeltsin, justified Russian intervention in the domestic affairs o f the
countries in the “near aborad,” if the human rights and the rights of ethnic Russian were
violated.’6 Even as the Russian approach to the “near abroad” hardened, V ilnius and
Moscow continued to negotiate the withdrawal of m ilitary forces. In Septem ber 1992 in
the Kremlin, Lithuanian Defense Minster Audrius B utkevicius and his Russian
counterpart Pavel G rachev agreed on a schedule that provided for the withdraw al of
troops from Lithuania to be completed by August 1993.07 Even as the troops were being

94John Lough, “The Place of the “Near Abroad” in Russian Foreign Policy,”
RFE/RL Research R eport 2 no. 11(12 March, 1993): 21-29.
95Ibid„ 24.
96Clemens, 182-84.
97“ Russian W ithdraw al Schedule from Lithuania A greed," RFE/RL Research
Report I, no. 37 (18 Septem ber, 1992): 66.
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withdrawn, Russia continued to insist that the rights o f ethnic Russians were being
violated and threatened to halt the pullout.'w In O ctober 1992 the Russian president issued
an order suspending the withdrawal o f Russian troops from the Baltic states: however, the
pullout continued unabated.
Despite Russia’s intransigence Lithuania reached an agreement on troop
withdrawal by skillfully negotiating with Moscow and rallying support at home and
abroad. Recognizing the limits of its power, Lithuania relied on cooperation and
coordination of policies with Estonia and Latvia and sought the assistance o f international
organizations and individual states. Internally, the governm ent quickly granted automatic
citizenship to all ethnic Russians, thus denying M oscow one of the most successful cards
it used against the other tw o Baltic states. In an effort to discredit a Russian claim that
Lithuanians did not want the Russian troops to leave the country, the government held a
referendum on the question in June 1992; over 90 percent voted for the unconditional
withdrawal and compensation for the years of Soviet occupation.40
Lithuania's success of solving the problem o f Soviet military presence on its soil
ow ed not only to the relentless efforts to reach an agreem ent but also to geopolitics and
R ussia’s weakness. Even the Russian military establishment, despite its refusal to accept
psychologically or legally Lithuania's independence, had to accept temporary retreat as
the price for the future restoration of R ussia’s military might. In addition, Lithuania did
not have military installations of any strategic value and Moscow found it easier to part

98“Lithuania Criticizes Russian Stance on Pullout,” RFE/RL Research Report I,
no. 48 (4 December, 1992): 58.
"N orgaard, Johannsen, et al., 187.
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with its position there. Very importantly, Russia needed uninterrupted access to its
enclave o f Kaliningrad, a transit right that required Vilnius’ cooperation.100
Vilnius also successfully used the assistance of various states and international
institutions in its pursuit o f Russia’s military pullout. Along with the coordination of
policies among the members o f the Baltic States Council, Lithuania benefited from
involvement by the C SC E, the European Community, and especially the U.S. Even after
the withdrawal of the last Russian soldier from Lithuania in 1993 was com pleted, Vilnius
continued to side with Estonia and Latvia in their attempts in 1994 to achieve the same.
This stand stemmed not only from the com m itm ent Vilnius undertook in the BSC but
also from the belief that the security o f the country would be enhanced if M oscow pulled
out from all Baltic states.
Lithuania’s ability to establish working relations with Moscow was also greatly
enhanced by the change in power in Vilnius in 1992. While Sajudis and its leader
Landsbergis applied an uncompromising approach to negotiating with Moscow,
Brazuskas and the form er communists were willing to accommodate R ussia's concerns
and establish a better relationship with the K rem lin.101 The new approach was not an
indication o f an ideological affinity with Moscow, but rather based on the recognition
that Lithuania was still very dependent on Russia’s goodwill for economic development

l(K,Jakub M. Godzim irski, “Soviet Legacy and Baltic Security: The C ase of
Kaliningrad,” in O laf F. Knudsen, ed., Stability and Security in the Baltic Sea Region
(Portland, OR: Frank C ass Publishers, 1999): 29-54.
l0lEven after the Sajudis’ overw helm ing loss at the 1992 elections. Landsbergis
continued to insist that Russia exhibited “pro-empire” tendencies in its dealings with
Lithuania even as Russian troops were pulling out, and called for a no-compromise policy
toward Moscow. “Landsbergis on Russian Attitude Toward Vilnius” (text). Moscow
Baltfax in English (18 January 1993). FBIS Daily Report-Central Eurasia, 22 January
1993 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-93-013; p. 100).
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and even security. Brazuskas insisted that Lithuania was still unprepared to achieve
integration in the W est and saw the process o f seeking membership in Euro-Atlantic
institutions as a long and difficult one. In the meanwhile, Lithuania had no choice but to
establish good relations with M oscow.102 In this early phase o f independence, the ruling
form er communists did not see integration in N ATO and the EC as a politically realistic
m eans to guarantee national security.IOj Instead, the ruling elite considered the
accumulation o f national power and good relations with neighbors as the way to enhance
national security. M eanwhile, the opposition leader Landsbergis continued to insist that
Russia posed a great danger to Lithuania.104 Accordingly, while the Labor Democrats
preferred to strike a balance between the country's eastern and western orientation.
Sajudis insisted on quick integration in NATO and the EC.

l02During the presidential campaign in 1993, Brazauskas stated that he would seek
good relations with Russia and the East. “Brazuskas Outlines Foreign Policy Plans"
(text). Moscow Baltfcix in English (10 February 1993). FBIS D aily Report-Central
Eurasia, 11 February 1993 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-93-027; 63-64). Once elected as
president. Brazauskas continued to support the maintenance o f good relations with the
form er Soviet republics, especially Moscow, and suggested that a stable relationship with
Russia would alleviate Lithuania's economic problem s in the transition and speed up the
Russian troops' pullout from the Republic. “Supports East-W est Balance of Interests"
(text). Moscow Baltfax in English (21 March 1993). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast
Information Service. FBIS Dailx Report-Central Eurasia. 24 M arch 1993 (PrEx 7.10:
FBIS-SOV-93-055: p. 87).
llbJustas Paleckis, presidential aid for foreign policy, insisted that “Lithuania has
no good relations with the East, and is not interesting to the W est." He insisted that the
best way of guaranteeing national security is the unity of all national democratic forces
and the stability o f the country. “Presidential Aid Discusses Foreign Policy” (text).
M oscow Baltfax in English (12 May 1993). FBIS Dailx Report-Central Eurasia. 13 May
1993 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-93-091; p. 72).
l04“Landsbergis Warns o f Growing Russian Threat” (text). Moscow Baltfax in
English (11 March 1993). FBIS Dailx Report-Central Eurasia. 12 March 1993 (PrEx
7.10: FBIS-SOV-93-047: p. 74).
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Although Vilnius em braced cooperation with Estonia and Latvia in its quest for
membership in international institutions, differences am ong the Baltic states began to
strain their com m itm ent to cooperation.103 The constitutional crisis in Russia involving
President Yeltsin and the Parliam ent, the ascent of nationalist forces in the 1993 Russian
parliamentary elections, the establishm ent of a more assertive foreign policy toward the
“near abroad,” and the continued conflict in Chechnya forced the political leadership in
Vilnius to seek speedy integration in Euro-Atlantic institutions without necessarily
coordinating policies with its Baltic neighbors. Lithuania decided that domestic stability,
neutrality in foreign affairs and good relations with neighbors would not suffice to
guarantee national security. l06Yet, according to the ruling Labor Democrats, the process
of integration should not come at the cost of antagonizing the bilateral relationship with
Russia. Indeed, despite what was perceived to be w orrisom e domestic developments and
attitudes in Russia, Vilnius was w illing to downplay their potentially negative impact or
recognize some of them as legitim ate.107 In fact, the ruling elite perceived bilateral

"bLithuanian am bassador to the EC, NATO and the Group of 24 argued that
Lithuania could have joined European organizations very quickly if the country were
acting alone instead o f waiting the Estonia and Latvia to sort out their relationship with
their Russian minorities. "Inflexible” Baltic Laws H inder European M embership” (text).
Moscow Baltfax in English (12 N ovem ber 1992). FBIS Dailx Report-Central Eurasia. 13
November 1992 (PrEx^7.10: FBIS-SOV-92-220: p. 88).
l00National Defense M inster Audrius Butkevicius warned that there were forces in
Russia that seek to either restore the Soviet Union or to split Russia. Both of these forces
were represented danger to security in the region. Lithuania needed to address this danger
through integration in W estern security institutions. Valdas Sutkus, “Audrius
Butkevicius: “I Am Against the Concept of Neutrality” (text). Vilnius Lietuvos Aidas in
Lithuanian (27 March 1993). T ranslated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service.
FBIS Dailx Report-C entral Eurasia, 14 April 1993 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-93-070; p. 878 8 ).
l07President Brazauskas attributed some of the belligerent rhetoric toward the
“near abroad” as electoral cam paigning and defended R ussia’s willingness to send troops
in parts the former Soviet Union as based on legitimate security concerns to maintain
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relations to be good and attributed any problems to be part of the normal process of
establishing a relationship between two newly independent states.108
While during the rule of the Labor Democrats Lithuania seemed to have reached a
working relationship with Russia and to have attained the most basic conditions for
national sovereignty including international recognition, basic treaties with Moscow, and
the pullout of foreign troops, there remained questions about the significance of threats to
national security. An analysis of R ussia’s security and military policies indicates that, in
fact, Lithuania’s independence and security were m ore threatened than the perceptions,
especially those exhibited by the Labor Democrats, would have suggested.
In the chaos and uncertainty following the disintegration o f the Soviet Union, the
external environment seemed threatening to Russian foreign policy makers. Initially,
however, Moscow failed to elaborate on a clear concept for the country’s relations with
the diverse states em erging on its borders. In the ensuing vacuum o f foreign policy
visions and properly distributed areas o f authority the Defense M inistry assumed some of
the responsibilities for dealing with the former Soviet republics, while the Foreign
M inistry focused on relations with the rest of the world. Very early on the defense
establishment not only negotiated the status of form er Soviet troops on the territories of
the newly independent countries but also became involved in the many local conflicts.
The Ministry went as far as to include in its military doctrine the responsibility to defend
peace and stability on its borders. “Brazauskas on Nordic, Russian Relations. NATO”
(text). Vilnius Vilnius Radio Network in Lithuanian (3 December 1993). Translated by
the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS D ailv Report-Central Eurasia, 6
Decem ber 1993 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-93-232; p. 86-87).
l08Rytas Staselis. ‘T h e President Is Calm” (text). Vilnius Respublika in
Lithuanian (22 D ecem ber 1993). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information
Service. FBIS D aily Report-Central Eurasia, 4 January 1994 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-94002; p. 56-58).
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the rights and interests of ethnic Russians on the territory o f the former U SS R .109 Soon,
however, the intensity o f security threats forced the Russian political leadership to begin
the elaboration o f a cohesive foreign and security policy.
The continuing conflicts in the states along the Russian border, especially to the
South, forced M oscow to think o f its strategic interests in terms of sphere o f influence.110
Russia saw the em ergence of a security vacuum, which could potentially invite outside
powers willing to fill it. Instead M oscow established the concept of “'near abroad” and
claimed to be responsible for maintaining peace and stability in the whole post-Soviet
space.111 And while Russia came to accept the independence of the former Soviet states,
it perceived itself to have a legitimate right to be engaged in the region as it was seen as
home to millions o f ethnic Russians as well as a potential source of threats to Russia.
After the December 1993 parliamentary elections, which led to the rise o f the nationalist
right, some in Moscow did not rule out the use o f force to achieve these foreign policy
priorities.112

10*)

Lough, 22; See also Jeff Checkel. “Russian Foreign Policy: Back to the
Future.” RFE/RL Research Report 1, no. 41 (16 O ctober, 1992); 15-29.
ll0For an excellent study o f R ussia’s post-com munist security thinking sec
Alexander A. Sergounin, Post-Communist Security Thinking in Russia: Changing
Paradigms, occasional paper (Copenhagen. Denmark: Copenhagen Peace Research
Institute, 2001). Available from Colum bia International Affairs Online.
11'in early 1993 Yeltsin suggested that Russia be granted the United Nations
mandate to secure peace and stability in the former Soviet Union. “Landsbergis Criticizes
Yeltsin Peacekeeping Statement” (text). Moscow B altfax in English (3 M arch 1993).
Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Dailv Report-Central
Eurasia, 5 March 1993 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-93-042; p. 71-72).
ll2The policy cam e to be known as the Kozyrev Doctrine, proclaimed by the then
Russian Foreign M inster Sergey Kozyrev. Sergounin, 15-19.
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Russia paid increased attention to the “near abroad" after Foreign Minister
Kozyrev was replaced in 1996 by Evgeniy Primakov. Moscow began to think o f its place
in the world and its foreign policy in increasingly pow er relations terms. In its part
concerning the Baltic states, including Lithuania, the new Russian security
conceptualization envisioned the region as adhering to strict neutrality. Accordingly,
Moscow strongly objected to NATO expansion to include any o f the Baltic states." ’
Responding to the Baltic states’ quest to join the EU and NATO, Russia tried to
stall the process by threatening not to sign or ratify any agreement delimiting their
borders, a crucial requirement by both Euro-Atlantic institutions in order to gain
membership.114 Very significantly, Russian officials at the highest level questioned the
current borders and suggested that they should be rev ised ."3
In order to deny the Baltic states the choice o f membership in NATO, Russia
suggested that their insecurities could be addressed by bilateral security arrangements
with Moscow. In 1997 Moscow proposed to the Baltic and Nordic states a security
agreement offering individual states the option to conclude either a bilateral security
guarantee or a security agreement involving Russia, the U.S., or NATO itself."6 O f
course, no state accepted the offer, rejecting the idea o f separating Northern Europe from
1"ibid., 24-6.
" 4In 1997 the Russian D um a urged President Yeltsin not to hurry with signing the
Russian-Lithuanian Treaty on the state border citing that the treaty would deprive Russia
o f legal rights to Klaipeda territory, and would deny Moscow from affecting Lithuania's
policy of seeking NATO membership. See Paul G oble, “Putting Pressure on Baltics,"
RFE/RL Research Note (14 February, 1997). Available from http://www.rferl.ora:
INTERNET.
" 3On the Russian approach to NATO enlargement see Blank.
"°Olav F. Knudsen, “N ordic Perspectives on Baltic Security: A View Through
Diagnostic Statem ents,” International Politics 36, no. 1 (March 1999): 89-112.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

265
the rest of Europe as a region with separate security guarantees.117 In fact, any
suggestions that the security of the Baltic states could be somehow considered separately
from the process o f unconditional membership in NATO, caused fears in Lithuania.118
The subsequent Baltic Chapter concluded in 1998 between the Baltic states and the
United States, although not providing firm security guarantees, further committed
Washington to the security of the three states. Yet Russia persisted in its attempt to force
the Baltic states to conclude regional security arrangements long after the three states
firmly rejected any bilateral agreements and declared that NATO m em bership had no
alternative.11<>

II7In October 1997 President Yeltsin formally proposed to his Lithuanian
counterpart, Algirdas Brazauskas, that Russia was ready to guarantee unilaterally the
security of the three Baltic states. The presidents o f the three Baltic states rejected the
Russian offer of security guarantees in their summit meeting held in Lithuania a month
later. See RFE/RL New sline (27 Novem ber, 1997).
I iX

‘ Responding to a report in the Washington Times that the U nited States was
prepared to hand over the Baltic states into the Russian sphere o f influence, Lithuanian
officials quickly requested official information from the U.S. State Departm ent and later
assured the public that Washington had not changed its policy o f support for Lithuania's
membership in NATO. “Foreign M inister Rules Out New East-W est Partition” (text).
Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian (12 September 1994). Translated by the
Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-Central Eurasia, 13
September 1994 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-94-177; p. 74). See also “U.S. Response to
Formal Inquiry Noted” (text). Tallinn BNS in English (12 September 1994). FBIS Daily
Report-Central Eurasia, 13 September 1994 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-94-177; p. 74).
n<)Sergey Shakhray, security expert in the Russian Foreign and Defense Policy
Council, argued that M oscow could prevent the Baltic states' accession to NATO only by
offering them com mon security guarantees with the Alliance. “Russian Expert Says
Russia and NATO Should Together Ensure Baltic Security" (text). Tallinn BNS in
English (22 December 2000). FBIS D aily Report-Central Eurasia, 22 December 2000
(PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-2000-1222). Available from W orld News Connection;
INTERNET.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

266
Lithuania approved its first national security concept on 19 December 1996, and
the document was amended in 1998 and 2000.120 It must be noted that the differences
between the amended versions o f the Law are relatively minor and follow the themes and
approaches set by the original concept. The approach to conceptualizing national security
in all versions is very com prehensive and lengthy as it includes not only general
provisions but also identifies the institutions responsible for ensuring security, discusses
the development of the security system, and includes the legal regulations and the long
term program for strengthening national security.
The security concept does not identify specific threats but defines the nature o f
probable threats. Like the Czech security concept it includes risks and threats but, unlike
it, does not formally define the differences between them, although it appears that the
distinction is the degree o f threat. It divides the risks and threats into external risks and
dangers, and internal risks. Notably the internal challenges include risks but not dangers,
implying a relative confidence that the stability o f society and state institutions make
internal sources of dangers less probable. Among the external threats the Law identifies is
one of the most significant: the geopolitical environm ent, including the militarization of
the region and the instability o f dem ocratizing states. The concept focuses only on
regional political, military, econom ic, and criminal factors that could threaten national
security.1"1
The Law does not identify any specific threat, including any state or
contemporary development. However, the concept is explicit in its requirement that

l2,,Lithuania Parliament, Law on the Basics o f National Security, No. VII1-49.
Available from the Lithuanian parliament or from http://www.lrs.lt; INTERNET.
I2llbid„ 8.
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Lithuania's national security be developed as part o f the trans-Atlantic defense system ,
specifically discussing NATO, the EU, and the WEU. The national security is to be
guaranteed by the state not only through the strength o f national defense forces but also
through the country’s future participation in these institutions. In addition, citizens are
expected to play an im portant role in national security by preparing for total civil
resistance, developing civic associations, and fostering the resolve to defend Lithuania's
freedom .1"
Lithuania's security concept attempts to strike a balance between traditional
security conceptualization, including defense and alliance participation, and a focus on
soft-security issues including confidence-building m easures, strengthening of dom estic
institutions and people-to-people contacts with other societies. Yet, the priorities in the
Law imply that hard-core security factors, especially in the regional environment, are the
preconditions for national security. Although no country or region is specifically
identified as posing a threat or risk, references to probable adverse developments that
may cause acute dangers to the already achieved national sovereignty and internal
institutional stability implying that Vilnius sees Russia and Belarus as the only potential
security threats.
Although Russia was seen as the most significant threat to national security.
Lithuanian leadership was well aware that good relations with the giant to the East w as a
precondition for successful integration in the West. Even after 1997, when Russia seemed
to have finally established the fundamentals o f its foreign policy toward the former
Soviet republics including Lithuania, Vilnius did not significantly alter its approach to

‘"Ibid., 3.
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dealing with M oscow.12'’ While rejecting Russia’s attem pts to divert Lithuania's course
toward the integration in the Euro-Atlantic institutions, V ilnius went out of its way to
cultivate a working relationship with Moscow and address its security fears and concerns.
Even when the growing integration of Russia and Belarus was seen as creating a new
danger to national security as it was about to bring once again Russia to Lithuania's
border,124 Vilnius continued to assure Russia o f the benign nature o f its quest to join
NATO.
Russia, however, remained unconvinced and continued to aggressively reject
Lithuania's quest for NATO membership.123 That caused Lithuania to speed up its efforts
to join N ATO by lobbying for its inclusion in the 2002 round o f expansion, enlisting the

l2’Lithuanian Defense Minister Geslovas Stankevicius assured visiting NATO
Secretary General Javier Solana that despite continuing Russian objections Lithuania
would not change its position on the A lliance's expansion. “ Lithuania: Minister Rejects
Russian Opposition to NATO Expansion” (text). M oscow Interfax (15 June 1998). FBIS
Daily Report-Central Eurasia, 16 June 1998 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-98-167). Available
from W orld News Connection: INTERNET.
l24“ Lithuanian Speaker Concerned by Russia-Belarus Integration" (text). Vilnius
Interfax in English (28 December 1998). FBIS Daily Report-C entral Eurasia. 28
December 1998 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-98-362). Available from W orld News
Connection: INTERNET.
l23R ussia’s First Deputy Defense M inister N ikolay M ichailov insisted that
Kaliningrad should be used as a “deterrent and nothing m ore than that, to NATO
expansion.” “Russia: Russia Looks to Kaliningrad as D eterrent to NATO Expansion”
(text). M oscow Interfax in English (2 Decem ber 1998). FBIS Daily Report-Central
Eurasia, 2 D ecem ber 1998 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-98-336). Available from World News
Connection: INTERNET; See also “Baltics to Remain in Zone o f R ussia’s Vital
Interests” (text). Moscow ITAR-TASS in English (24 Seprtem ber 1999). FBIS Daily
Report-Central Eurasia, 24 September 1999 (PrEx 7.10: F B IS-SO V -1999-0927).
Available from W orld News Connection: INTERNET.
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support o f individual states, even at the expense o f coordinating policies with its Baltic
neighbors.126
Despite the prevailing perception o f external threats. Lithuanian military
expenditures did not seem to reflect a nation obsessed with the traditional defense o f
national territory and independence. Although Lithuania had to build m ilitary forces from
scratch, and in that respect was in a disadvantaged position compared to Bulgaria and the
Czech Republic, efforts to establish the basic structure o f a national m ilitary were initially
modest at best. In the first years of independence, the military budget did not reach 1
percent o f the GDP (See Table 17). O nly after NATO made it clear that one of the
preconditions for membership is the ability of the candidate countries to contribute
military power to the Alliance did Lithuania undertake a concerted effort to increase its
defense budget. Even then, the m ilitary establishment found it difficult to receive
sufficient resources to meet the basic requirements for building national defense.127 In
fact, Lithuania's military budget rem ained one of the lowest in Eastern Europe.
Lithuania’s public perceptions o f security followed a tendency sim ilar to those in
the rest in Eastern Europe. The public seemed to be more concerned with internal sources
l_6Vilnius, while still com m itted to cooperation and coordination o f Baltic
policies o f joining NATO, insisted that countries should gain membership based on the
countries progress of meeting the m em bership criteria. "Lithuania Not Strict About
Baltics’ Joint NATO Entry” (text). Prague CTK in English (21 September 1999). FBIS
Daily Report-East Europe, 21 Septem ber 1999 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SO V -1999-0921).
Available from World News Connection; INTERNET; Lithuania's activism alarmed its
neighbors Estonia and Latvia, which suspected that Vilnius was abandoning joint efforts
for membership. “Lithuania Surprised by Latvian Criticism of Security” (text). Tallinn
BNS in English (7 February 2000). F B IS Daily Report-Central Eurasia, 7 February 2000
(PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-2000-0207). Available from W orld News Connection:
INTERNET.
,27Brigadier General Janas A. Kronkaitis warned that the failure o f the Parliament
to allocate sufficient resources for national defense would endanger Lithuania’s chances
o f joining the Alliances. Huang, “So Far So Smooth.”

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

270
o f threats and risks and more attention, at least in the second half o f the 1990s, was paid
to personal and societal security rather than to traditional military security. Indeed, the
public's understanding o f security seem ed to have departed from the traditional power
relationship image and instead was increasingly linked with the concepts o f freedom and
liberties, free market econom y, social security, and the maintenance o f civil society.128
Remarkably, already in the mid-1990s the majority o f the public perceived the size of the
national military force as adequate or too large, while only 21 percent supported an
increase in the m ilitary.,2,> Accordingly, 45 percent of the public pointed to internal
dangers as probable threats to national security. This is not to say that the public was
oblivious to dangers posed by Russia. Instead the majority saw R ussia emerging as the
most likely threat in the case of Lithuania's failure to accomplish political and economic
reforms and the W est’s failure to open up to the Baltic states' m em bership in EuroAtlantic institutions. Indeed, while the great majority o f the public in the mid-1990s
believed that Russia represented a threat to Lithuania's stability, by the end of the decade,
the number of people believing so decreased (See Table 25).
Economic and social developments reinforced public perceptions o f the
significance of internal threats and risks to national security. Lithuania experienced one
o f the most dramatic, in terms of econom ic and social dislocations and suffering,
transition processes in Eastern Europe. In the early years following independence
declining economic growth, high unemployment and hyper-inflation caused social pain
and a rapidly declining standard of living (See Tables 19 and 20). Lithuania experienced

l28Rolandas Kacinskas, “The Lithuanian Public’s View on National Security in a
Changing Environment,” Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review no. 2 (1998): 77-86.
I2l,lbid„ 84.
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one of the steepest declines in HDl, a developm ent also reflected by declining life
expectancy and increasing infant mortality rates. However, the political stability and the
advance o f economic and social reforms in the second h alf o f the 1990s reversed this
trend and Lithuania quickly began to im prove personal and social conditions. In addition,
the public perceptions o f threats posed by minorities significantly declined, a remarkable
turnabout considering the long history o f nationalist and international confrontation.

Conclusion

Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Lithuania experienced varying degrees of
security through the first decade of post-communist transition. All three states perceived
security to be the presence of conditions under which the state’s sovereignty,
independence, and integration in the Western core was guaranteed. Domestically,
security was perceived as the enhancement and preservation o f the democratic nature of
the society, and the increase in economic and social prosperity. In other words, security
was seen as the low probability of damage to those values.
O f the three countries, the Czech Republic clearly enjoyed the highest level of
security (See Appendix III). After the withdrawal of the Soviet troops and the split of
Czechoslovakia, the Czech Republic found itself in a benign security environment,
surrounded by states which were either part o f the W estern core, which Prague aspired to
join, or were in the process o f joining the Euro-Atlantic institutions. In addition, no
neighboring state had any territorial claims on the R epublic and all of them had an
interest in seeing the state completing political, econom ic and social reforms and joining
the Western core.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

272
Czech leadership saw the level of security the Republic had as relatively high.
The country’s sovereignty and independence was seen as unchallenged by any significant
player or political development. In Czech security thinking, the potential threats and risks
to security were directed at the W estern core which the state strived to join, rather than
specifically at the Republic. The threats more specific to the Czech Republic were
associated with developments that challenged the country's quest to join the EuroAtlantic institutions. Even those threats, however, were not perceived to be intense and
were categorized by experts as risks rather than traditional hard-core threats.
Significantly, the economic and political instability in Russia in the mid-1990's although
perceived by Prague as a short-term risk, ultimately enhanced the Czech Republic’s
security in the long term as the Euro-Atlantic institutions and the national leadership
accelerated their efforts to integrate the state in the Western core.
The Czech public seemed to share official perceptions o f security. The benign
nature of the security environm ent and the success o f post-com m unist reforms created a
sense of security in the population not typical for East European societies. The public saw
neither a neighboring state nor a development that could possibly emerge as a significant
threat to national security. O f course, this conclusion requires a qualification as both
Russia and G erm any were seen as posing threats. This perception, however, was
consistent with the official im age o f threats to peace and stability o f the continent posed
by general confrontation among great powers rather than a threat specific to the Republic.
In addition, in the case of Germany, the risk was associated more with the powerful
neighbor’s econom ic presence in the country rather than with any clear attempt to
dominate politically.
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Conversely, Lithuania faced a fundamentally different security environment. In
the first years o f newly acquired independence the very survival and sovereignty o f the
state was questioned by the Soviet Union and later Russia. Therefore, Lithuania was the
only state in this study to face a challenge to the fundamental value o f national survival.
In the course o f post-com munist transition, however, the security threat subsided as
Lithuania concluded treaties with Russia recognizing its independence and secured the
relatively speedy withdrawal o f Russian troops from its territory. In addition, the country
gained international recognition and participation in major international organizations,
which validated its sovereignty. Although the country secured its sovereignty, the
security environm ent remained dangerous as the disintegration of the Soviet Union
created a new set o f neighbors with which Lithuania had yet to establish relations and
sort out long suppressed grievances and issues. The continuing instability in the former
Soviet area, however, spurred V ilnius’ efforts to reach an understanding with its
neighbors and create an area with them wherein military conflict seemed unlikely.
Lithuania also established a working relationship with Moscow and reached an
agreement on basic issues including demarcation o f borders, access rights to Kaliningrad,
the status of ethnic Russians, and economic and social cooperation. R ussia's rejection of
Lithuania’s policy o f joining NATO, on the other hand, instead of increasing the potential
for conflict between the two countries, forced Vilnius to maintain good relations with
Moscow. In fact, in Lithuanian security thinking, the success of the country's quest to
join the W estern core depended, among other factors, on maintaining a problem-free
relationship with Russia, an official attitude which dominated governments’ policy
toward the eastern neighbor after Sajudis' loss o f power in 1992.
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Lithuania’s public seem ed to have a less intense sense of external security
compared to either objective o r official evaluation of the security environment.
Lithuanians quickly shifted their focus from external to internal threats and risks to
security. Indicative o f this attitudinal change is that while Lithuania was still a Soviet
republic the population overwhelm ingly voted for Sajudis, which called for im mediate
independence and an uncom prom ising approach to dealing with the greatest threat to this
goal, the Soviet Union. After independence was achieved, however, the population voted
for the former communists w ho emphasized the collapse of the national econom y and the
accompanying social despondency. In addition, the labor democrats insisted on a more
moderate approach to dealing with Russia. Indeed, the consequent im provement in
economic and social conditions contributed to the further relaxations of perceptions of
external and internal threats, as both the ethnic minorities and Russia were seen by only a
small share o f the population as threats to national security.
Among the three states, Bulgaria scored worst on the dependent variable security.
Although at no point through the post-communist transition did Bulgaria confront a
challenge to its sovereignty and independence, the country faced a dangerous security
environment. The disintegration o f Yugoslavia, civil wars, and the appearance o f new
neighbors presented the country with an uncertain and turbulent environm ent in which
non-traditional security threats stemming from ethnic conflict, organized crim e, and
economic and social deprivation challenged B ulgaria's national security. O ne o f the
declared national values-joining the Western core—was threatened as continuing warfare
and unstable neighbors threatened to isolate the country and prevent it from establishing a
stable interaction with the Euro-Atlantic institutions. In fact, on occasion, including
during the K osovo conflict in 1999, Bulgaria found itself physically cut o ff from Western
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markets. Thus, although the country did not experience the type o f challenge Lithuania
faced to its sovereignty and independence in the first years o f post-communist transition,
it confronted a similarly intense danger to its national security stemming from the
regional environment.
The nature of the security perceptions o f Bulgaria’s political leadership reflected
for the most part the intensity o f objectively existing security threats. Well into 1996. the
political leadership felt extrem ely uncomfortable with the end o f firm external security
com mitments and tended to exaggerate the intensity of traditional security threats such as
the ones posed by a state to another state. Accordingly, Sofia searched for an immediate
remedy to its security conditions and fell back on traditional means, including the
maintenance o f strong military power and falling back on tested security arrangements.
After 1996, however. Bulgaria began to recognize the non-traditional nature o f security
threats and therefore embarked on a new approach to addressing challenges. Security
threats and risks, however, remained intensive.
The public in Bulgaria, like in the rest in Eastern Europe, shifted its focus from
external to internal threats and risks to security, and from state security to social and
individual security. The slow pace of political, economic, and social reforms created
social and econom ic deprivation that sustained the sense o f insecurity. Indeed, although
the number o f people who saw ethnic minorities and neighboring states as threats
decreased, the sense of insecurity remained high. It must be noted, however, that the
public, like the leadership, began to see integration in the W estern core as the means to
address the dangers fading national security.
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Appendix III
Figure 6 represents an attempt to provide a rough comparison of degree o f national security on a ordinal scale from
most secure to least secure. The figure measures the position of each country on the already discussed security variable.
The three counines arc ranked by summing the three variables by assigning values o f 3 to the highest ranking on each
variable. 2 to the next and I to the lowest ranking. In case two or more states share the same ranking, the states receive
the same value on the 1-3 scale. The assigned values represent the countries' ranking for the period 1990-2000
Security is estimated by using a 1-3 scale and assigning the value of three to the country, which has the highest degree
o f objective security, the highest o f security as perceived by national political elite, and the highest degree of security
as perceived by the population. The value o f one is assigned to the country which scores lowest on each of the same
variables.
Figure 6 .
Variable Security

(1 >

(2 )

(3)

Total

Average

Bulgaria

1

1

1

3

1 00

Czech R.

3

3

3

9

3 00

Lithuania

1

2

2

5

1.67

Note: Column headings are xs follows: ( I ) Objective security: (2) Official perception o f security: ( 3 1 Public perception
o f security.
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Tabic 17.
Military Budgets as Percentage o f GDP
1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

4.5

3.5

2.9

2.7

2.5

2.5

2.1

2.3

2.5

C/.ech R

2.6

2.3

16

1.9

1.9

2.1

Lithuania

0.7

0.5

05

0.5

0.8

1.3

Bulgaria

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. SII’RI Yearbook 2000: Armaments. Disarmament and
International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2000). 280.
Table 18.
Perceived Threat from Ethnic Minorities in the Country
(percentage of public)
1992

1995

1996

2000
43

Bulgaria

46

37

Czech R.

44

15
29

Lithuania

23

Note: Data for Lithuania includes ethnic Lithuanians only.
Source: Haerpfcr. W allace and Rose. 15: Rose. New llaltic Barometer II. 34: Rose. .Veir Baltic Barometer IV. 36:
Vitosha Research.
Table 19
Unemployment
(percentage)
1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

Bulgaria

1.7

11.1

15.3

16 4

12.8

1I I

12.5

13.7

12.2

16 0

17.9

Czech R.

0.8

4.1

2.6

3.5

3.2

29

3.5

5.2

7.5

94

8.8

0.3

1.3

4.4

3.8

6.1

7.1

5.9

5.4

8.4

12.6

Lithuania

Source: "Statistics: Annual." Business Central Europe (Julv-August. 2001) Available from http://www.bccmac.com:
INTERNET
Table 20.
Inflation
(percentage)
1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

Bulgaria

23.8

338

91

72.8

96

62.1

123

1.082

22.3

0.3

9.9

Czech R.

97

56

11

20.8

10

9 1

8.8

8.5

10.7

2.1

3.9

Lithuania

8.4

225

1.161

188

45

35.7

13.1

8.4

2.4

2.5

Source: Ibid.
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Table 21.
Infant Mortal itv Rates
1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

Bulgaria

14.4

14.4

16.9

15.9

15.5

16.3

15.6

14.8

17.5

14.4

Czech R.

10.0

10.8

10.4

9.9

8.5

7.9

7.4

60

59

5.2

Lithuania

10.7

10.2

14.3

16.5

16.0

14.1

12.5

10.1

10 3

9.2

Source: United Nations. Department o f Economic and Social Affairs. United Nations Demographic Yearbook. IW 6
(United Nations Publications: New York. 1998). 432-33: United Nations. Department o f Economic and Social Affairs.
IW S Demographic Yearbook (New York: United N ations Publications. 1998). 363-4.
Table 22.
Life Expectancy at Birth
1980-1985

1990-1995

1995-2000

Bulgaria

Male: 68.5
Female: 74.3

Male: 67.8
Female: 74.9

Male: 67.6
Female: 74.7

Czech R.

Male: 67.2
Female: 74.3

Male: 68.8
Female: 75.2

Male: 70.3
Female: 77.4

Lithuania

Male: 66 .1
Female: 75.5

Male: 64.9
Female: 76.0

Male: 64.3
Female: 75.6

Source: Department of Economic and Social Affairs Statistic Division. United Nations. Statistical Yearbook (New
York: United Nations Publications. 2000). 87-88.
Table 23.
Human Development Index
1990

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

I99S

1999

Bulgaria

0.854
(40)

0.796
(65)

0.773
(62)

0.780
(69)

0.789
(67)

0.758
(63)

0.758
(63)

0.772
(60)

0.772
(57)

Czech R.

0.892
(26)

0.872
(38)

0.872
(37)

0.882
(39)

0.884
(39)

0.833
(36)

0.833
(36)

0.843
(34)

0.844
(33)

Lithuania

0 881

0.762
(71)

0.719
(81)

0.762
(76)

0.750
(79)

0.761
(62)

0.761
(61)

0.789
(52)

0.S03
(47)

(29)

N ote: Figures in parenlhescs are country's rank among members of the United Nations.
Source: United Nations Development Programme. Human Development Report (New York Oxford University Press.
1992-20011
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Tabic 24.
Death Rate Caused by Homicide. Injury. Purposely Indicted by O ther Person and Other Violence
(number o f deaths per 100.000)________________________________________________
1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

3.6

4.0

5.2

6.7

63

7.7

6.0

6.9

15.3

17

Bulgaria
C/.ech R.
Lithuania

11.2

12.7

13.0

19.5

1995

18.2

Source: United Nations. Department of Economic and Social Affairs. United Nations Demographic Yearbook. 1996.
765-854.
Table 25
Perceived Russian Threat to Security
(percentage of public)
1992

1995

1996

Bulgaria

6

5

C/.ech R.

39

55

68

Lithuania

2000

50

Note: Data for Lithuania includes ethnic Lithuanians only.
Source: llaerpfer. Wallace and Rose. 6: Rose. New Baltic Barometer If. 34: Rose. New Baltic Barometer IV. 36.
Table 26
Perceived German Threat to Security
(percentage o f public)_____________
1992

1996

Bulgaria

3

3

Czech R.

38

44

Lithuania

2000

5

Note: Data for Lithuania includes ethnic Lithuanians only.
Source: Hacrpfer. Wallace and Rose. 9: Rose. New Baltic Barometer II. 32: Rose. New Baltic Barometer IV. 36.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION

C hapter VII summarizes the main findings o f the dissertation. It joins two major
debates—the sources o f security in Eastern Europe and the security o f small states.

The Three Case Studies

Bulgaria, like the other East European states, recognized early on the changing
nature o f threats and security. However, the political elite failed for m ost o f the 1990s to
reach a consensus on the specific threats and policies to guarantee the nation's security.
While there was no disagreement on what values to protect—including sovereignty,
independence, and dem ocratic practices, among others—the elite disagreed on the policies
to lower the probability o f damage to these values. In fact, Bulgaria is a good example o f
the lim ited ability of the neorealist approaches to predict the country's behavior in its
search for security as consecutive governing elites formulated different foreign policies in
response to sim ilar factors in a relatively stable international system. In other words, the
country's foreign and security policies changed not in response to any significant changes
in the international environm ent but rather in response to changes in internal politics.
The early period o f post-com munist transition witnessed the pow er domination o f
the former com m unist party and the inability of political elites to agree on the basic rules
and principles o f the political system. The lack of an encom passing political consensus
and the dom inance o f old political elites forced Bulgaria to postpone a com plete break
from old security and foreign policy patterns. The country continued to perceive
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historical foes including Greece, Yugoslavia, and especially Turkey as the most likely
and immediate threats to national security. The disintegration o f the Warsaw Pact and the
end of firm external security commitments to Bulgaria's security faced the country with a
dilemma: the post-communist transition required that the state increase its distance from
Russia and improve relations with the West including Turkey and Greece, while the
imperative of national security, according to the former communists, required that
Bulgaria maintain good relations with Moscow and rely on the former ally for security.
During this period even the opposition, while seeking to bring Bulgaria closer to
the West, did not object to the efforts o f the ruling elite to seek a Russian security
commitment to national security. The ruling elite was preoccupied with regional threats
and danger and not surprisingly did not see any of the great European powers, including
Russia, as a threat to the country. These perceptions were shared by the public as history
conditioned the population to see neighbors as threats, while the great powers—however
meddlesome in the international politics of the Balkans—had never directly occupied the
country for long. Indeed, w hile in most other East European countries it was Germany or
Russia, or both, which were seen as the past and potential imperial power, in Bulgaria it
was Turkey that was seen as the past imperial ruler and a possible future danger.
Accordingly, official Bulgarian security thinking continued to focus on a hard-core
security threat—including to sovereignty and territorial integrity-em anating from
traditional sources and at the same time relying on the traditional means to address these
threats including maintaining, although in a less formalized form, tested alliances.
Similarly, along with seeking a traditional external means to enhance security, the old
elite resorted to traditional internal policies to guarantee security by maintaining a large
military, sustaining the ability o f the Bulgarian economy to increase the national military
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power, and policies designed to increase the ability of the government to mobilize the
population to resist external threats.
Several developm ents, however, convinced the Bulgarian opposition to com m it
itself to firm, pro-NATO policies. The decision of the Alliance to maintain only the
robust security institutions in Europe and continuing instability in the East, including
Russia's inability to build democracy and implement reforms as well as M oscow ’s return
to more traditional realpolitik. exposed Bulgaria’s perilous security position in staying
away from the process wherein post-communist states were already seeking a com plete
integration in the West, even at the expense o f a com plete break with the East.
Concurrently, the UDF recognized that the already declared policy o f integration in the
European Community, a goal shared by all national political actors, was inconsistent with
neutrality and staying out o f NATO. Furthermore, the opposition decided that the
country's limited political, economic, and social capacities would inhibit any attempts to
reform unless Bulgaria sought complete integration in all Euro-Atlantic institutions
including NATO. In other words Bulgaria could achieve its main objectives including
security, democracy, and free market only though full integration in the West.
Thus by the mid 1990s the dominant political players held different views on the
country's security and the policies to ensure it. The Socialists continued to conceptualize
Bulgaria's security conservatively, focusing on policies aimed at the internal m obilization
of resources as a means to increase national power and relying on old alliance patterns to
ensure external guarantees to security. The reliance on Russia forced B ulgaria’s Socialists
to make sure that their policies of integration in the W est were aimed at m em bership in
the European Union but not in NATO. The ruling elite insisted that a m em bership in the
Alliance would be considered only after its transformation into a European-wide security
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organization in which Russia was a member. This policy was not lost on the W est and
soon Bulgaria’s lack o f reform and stability and its ambiguous integration strategy
relegated the country to international isolation.1 At the end neither Bulgaria’s objective
security nor the perception of security increased as the ruling elite and the public
continued to see various intense threats to security, both internal and external. The
country found itself dangerously exposed as the failure to achieve a substantial level
integration in W estern institutions, similar to the one achieved by most other post
com munist countries in Eastern Europe, exacerbated the sense o f isolation while
revealing the inability of the country to achieve internal political and economic stability
without those sam e institutions.
The failure o f the Socialists’ rule and the ascent to power o f the UDF in 1997
marked a w atershed in Bulgaria’s security policies. The former opposition implemented
very different foreign and security policies. W hile still considering the region as the main
source of external dangers to national security, the new government embarked on a
process of unam biguous integration in W estern institutions including NATO as the
means to achieve security. Neighboring states ceased to be seen as potential threats to
national security in the traditional sense and instead the new elite defined various
developments in the region as the sources o f danger. Furthermore, the government began
the implementation o f thorough economic and political reforms both as a policy to meet
the requirements for membership in the W estern institutions and as a means of building a
stable political system and a market economy. In other words, the reforms were seen as
both achieving integration in the W est and consolidating domestic institutions. This
policy adequately addressed the requirements o f the security conceptualization defined by
'Gareth Jones, “Close Russia Ties Push Bulgaria to Back o f NATO Q ueue,”
Reuters (10 April, 1996)
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the p o st-1997 rulers—international integration and domestic institutional consolidation
were defined as the strategies to achieve security.
During the rule o f the UDF the Socialists still remained skeptical o f the
governm ent’s security policy and opposed, until at least early 2000, integration in NATO.
This time, however, the Socialists’ opposition did not translate into an ambiguous
national security policy as the BSP w as relatively inconsequential as an opposition party
and the other significant political parties supported the country’s integration in the
Alliance. Therefore, Bulgaria was able to maintain the appearance of a security policy
based on national consensus. In addition, the public became more com m itted to the
process o f integration in NATO.
The policy o f integration and reform paid off when new challenges to the
country’s security em erged in the late 1990s. The Kosovo crisis, seen as a significant
source o f threat to the state, prompted the Alliance to provide security guarantees,
although short of formal com mitments. The crisis also prompted the EU to invite
Bulgaria to begin membership negotiations despite the country's obvious shortcomings,
and further committed the Union to its stability. Bulgaria received further financial
assistance, and visa restrictions on its citizens were eliminated. The Kosovo crisis and its
aftermath marked the end of the country’s isolation and made its security and stability a
matter o f greater NATO and EU interest. Thus in the course of the U D F’s rule the
external security of the country was enhanced. Internally, however, the weaknesses of the
econom y and the instability and ineffectiveness of domestic institutions—all factors with
deep and long systemic shortcom ings—remained significant sources of societal and
individual threats to security.
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From a security point of view, the Czech Republic is the country with perhaps the
best geopolitical position among the states in Eastern Europe. The only clear danger to its
sovereignty, the presence o f Soviet troops, was addressed quickly and w ithout political
struggle in the first year o f transition. Surrounded by states seeking to completely
integrate the region in the West, the Republic boasted the most stable political system and
the most advanced econom y, making it the best-suited candidate for membership in
Western institutions.
The Czech reform ers were able to steer the Republic into a quick transition to
post-communist politics without having to contend with old elites. The new elites were
able to reach a consensus on the nature and direction o f all major reform s, including on
foreign and security policies. The basic rules of the political game and the structure of the
political system were sw iftly established and did not at any point becom e a matter of
political contention. The basic policies o f democratization and marketization were widely
accepted by political parties and the public. Similarly, the early governm ent's security
and foreign policies were even less contentious as the benign security environm ent and
the lack o f public interest made the formulation of policies non-political and pragmatic.
In the early phase of the transition the governing coalition led by Vaclav Klaus defined
integration in the West as the main the foreign policy priority. Accordingly, the Republic
sought quick membership in EU, although it was less than insistent on NATO
membership until the Alliance declared its policy of enlargement. The opposition parties
found this objective and the policies to achieve it uncontroversial, and for most of the
1990s foreign policy w as not a political issue in domestic politics.
The political elites also achieved a wide-ranging consensus on the structure o f the
political system and the nature of the political, economic, and social reform s. Having met
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no opposition from the old com m unist elite, the reform s were able to build a political
regim e that satisfied the interests and preferences o f the significant political actors. The
government o f Vaclav Klaus was not only able to implement the reforms but also to meet
the economic and social expectations o f the public. Although the public understanding of
security was increasingly associated with internal threats and risks and focused on
econom ic and social factors, the government, at least until 1996. was able to address
these concerns. Even the econom ic crisis after 1996 did not challenge the process o f
institutional consolidation and integration in the W est. Although the economy stagnated
the population did not experience the economic and social pain inflicted by sim ilar
developments in the rest o f Eastern Europe. Thus neither the public nor any significant
political force challenged the stability o f the political regime and the country's foreign
policy. The electorate simply booted Vaclav K laus’ government and elected the Social
Democrats to power. By relying on Klaus’ party to rule, the minority government o f
M ilos Zeman in effect continued its predecessor’s policies although at a different pace.
The slow-down of reforms did not threaten the R epublic’s integration in the West.
The success of reforms and the stability o f the Czech Republic made it a frontrunner for membership in both the EU and NATO. Not surprisingly, the Republic was
invited to begin negotiations to join the Union and became along with Poland and
Hungary the first East European state to join NATO. The gradual integration in the West
eased perception of risks and threats on official and public levels. Experts ceased to see
any o f the neighboring states as presenting any threat to national security. Most o f the
potential risks and threats were seen emanating from the former Soviet Union and the
Balkans. Not surprisingly, instabilities in these regions only increased the determ ination
o f the political elite to seek quick integration in the Euro-Atlantic institutions. G radually,
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however, there em erged a recognition that the regions o f instability were relatively
distant and did not present direct threats to the national security. Instead, as the Czech
Republic was becom ing further integrated in the West, any potential threats em erging
from the regions o f instability were seen as affecting the Euro-Atlantic area rather than
individual states. In other words, experts saw the Republic as joining an area in which
security is indivisible.
The public, too, gradually relaxed its perceptions o f external threats. Although
Russia continued to be seen as the greatest probable threat to national security, when
asked whether there were any military threats to national security the overwhelming
majority of the public by late 1990s believed that there were none. Even the Balkans, a
region which experts tended to identify as a potential source o f threats and risks,
gradually ceased to be seen by the public as a security danger, regardless of the
continuing violence in the area. While external security issues did not attract public
attention the population was much more concerned with the dom estic dimension o f
security. Yet even societal and individual security concerns w ere tempered by the
political and econom ic stability of the Czech transition. The extension of political and
civil liberties and freedom s accompanied by the continued grow th o f living standards
guaranteed that the m ajority of the public would gain a sense o f security quite unique
among the societies in Eastern Europe.
O f the three countries in this study, Lithuania experienced the most intense threat
to its national security in the early phase of post-communist transition. Unlike in
Bulgaria, however, the political elite reached a consensus on how to address the threat to
national sovereignty even before the Republic formally seceded from the Soviet Union.
In fact the intensity o f external threats played a positive role in the early years o f
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Lithuania’s independence as it forced all significant political players to work together and
craft basic rules o f the political game so they were accepted by all. The two main political
parties saw the stability o f dom estic institutions as a guarantee against the Soviet
encroachment.
Sajudis and the former communists reached an agreem ent on the basic political
institutional structure and the means to sustain national independence, including the
withdrawal o f Soviet and later Russian troops. Even as the political elite reached a basic
consensus on the most important issues in the post-com m unist transition, there emerged
some disagreem ent that clearly marked the future divisions am ong political parties. While
Sajudis insisted on an uncompromising approach to negotiating with Moscow, a clear
break with the East and quick integration in the West, the form er communists argued a
more conciliatory approach towards Moscow and balanced relations with both the East
and the West. Ironically it was the former com m unists who reached an agreement with
Moscow and the speedy withdrawal of Russian troops from Lithuania and also restored
economic stability after the chaotic and econom ically disastrous rule o f Sajudis.
The Labor Democrats' rule brought about not only som e economic and political
stability but also enhanced national security by achieving the withdrawal of Russian
troops and setting the course for integration in the West, including the EU and NATO.
Lithuania became an associated member of the EU and a PfP partner. The country also
denied Russia the ability to interfere in its dom estic affairs by granting all ethnic Russians
on its territory automatic citizenship and ensuring their political participation. Lithuania
also felt safe enough to develop a normal relationship with M oscow both as an attempt to
cultivate acceptance of Lithuania's independence Russia and as a response to the EU and
N A TO 's requirements to maintain good relations with its neighbors. In fact, Lithuania's
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policies of integration in the W est by requirement included the cultivation of
relationships with neighbors, which in the past presented-and som e still do~security
threats and risks. Thus the very process of seeking membership in the Euro-Atlantic
institutions enhanced Lithuania’s security as the country had to sort out historically
burdened relations and apply confidence-building policies. For example, Poland quickly
turned from an old foe suspected o f seeking to incorporate parts o f Lithuania’s territory
into a partner and ally in the process of joining NATO and the EU .2
Lithuania’s relatively tenuous security position and limited power forced the
country to seek a cooperative approach to enhancing its security. Given the internal
consensus on security and foreign policy, the country was able to sustain a cohesive
strategy of seeking the form alized assistance of various states and organizations in order
to increase not only its internal power but also its ability to utilize the power o f various
international institutions. The early political cooperation and coordination am ong the
three Baltic states was institutionalized and, although differences in geopolitics and
reform progress soon strained commitment to cooperation, enabled Lithuania to utilize
capacities provided by international institutions to support this process in the Baltic
region.
The Baltic states were able to attract the political and econom ic com mitments of
Western states and institutions. Even in the security realm, the three states were able to
commit the U.S. to increase its interest in the maintenance o f peace and stability o f the
region by signing the Baltic Chapter. Although short of a formal security com m itm ent,
the Chapter represented an elevated degree o f Baltic integration in the Western arena.

2Parts o f present-day Lithuania used to be part of Poland in the interwar period.
After the Second W orld W ar the Soviet Union acquired Polish territory as part o f the
post-war settlement.
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While maintaining its cooperation with Estonia and Latvia, Lithuania also pursued
bilateral policies to increase its pow er and to achieve speedy integration in the W est by
seeking close relations with states with interests in the region including Poland and
Denmark.
A fter the initial steep decline in econom ic activity, Lithuania was able to
im plem ent market reforms and achieve a stable and rapid economic growth. The creation
o f a currency board severely limited the ability o f governments to apply economic
policies that would potentially lead once again to inflation and unrestrained public
spending. In fact, the currency board regime and the application of the EU requirements
for m em bership inhibited any political tendency to select policies that would have
destabilized the Lithuanian economy. The econom ic stability and growth soon helped
reverse the trend of falling living standards, and the basic indicators o f life quality began
to improve.
The intense threat to Lithuania’s security in the early transition years also
dam pened public dissatisfaction inflicted by the break with the Soviet Union. Once there
emerged a public belief in the country’s basic parameters of independence and
sovereignty, the population became willing to accept a more moderate and gradual
approach to strengthening the country’s pow er and security. The public increasingly
became more confident in Lithuania’s ability to withstand external threats and instead
focused on the domestic sources o f threats and risks to security. Security came to be
associated with personal and societal security. The heightened sense o f insecurity
prompted by the initial pain o f reforms did not, however, translate into political
instability as the institutional design proved efficient; the voters or the parliament were
able to follow constitutionally prescribed paths for political changes and avoiding any
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challenges to the established institutional order. In other w ords, economic and social
disenchantment did not translate into political instability as political and state institutions
proved capable o f channeling political participation and m obilization.

The Study o f Security o f the Small States in Eastern Europe

The changing structure o f the international security system after the end o f the
Cold W ar has significantly increased the opportunity o f small Eastern European states to
operate autonomously in pursuit o f their preferences. Although great powers still define
the nature of the international system, post-communist states are able to select from
among diverse policies. Serious dangers are created, however, where these small states
face severe military and economic threats em anating from regional rivalries, hostile
ethnic groups, or declining econom ic development. The transition countries o f Eastern
Europe face even more com plex challenges as along with providing for their national
security after the disintegration of long-lasting security arrangem ents they em barked on a
difficult process o f fundamental political, economic, and social reforms.
Most o f the literature on East European security is based on the traditional
neorealist paradigm. Accordingly, the international security o f the area is seen in the
context of the security vacuum left by the end o f the Cold W ar, and the national security
of individual states as the search o f new alliance arrangem ents to guarantee the national
sovereignty and independence. M ore specifically, NATO is seen as the means to address
the problem o f the existing security vacuum and provide a security framework capable of
facing any outside threat and rendering conflicts among m em ber states highly unlikely.
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Realists differ among themselves as to how much explanatory power is to be
attributed to the international system .3 For neorealists, the system is a material structure,
which functions as a significant independent variable influencing the states that are part
o f this system. However, according to traditional realists, including Wolfers, Morgenthau
and Kissinger, w hat is also very significant is the nature of the state; there is a difference
between imperialist, revolutionary and revisionist states which seek to alter the nature of
the international system on the one hand, and status-quo states, which seek to preserve
the international system and their places in it on the other. A nother group, the so-called
modified structural realists, while accepting the insights of neorealism , attempts to
incorporate international institutions and domestic factors as explanatory factors of state
behavior.4
A m odified realist approach, concentrating on the behavior of individual states
and incorporating internal and external variables into the analysis, can provide insights on
the international behavior of small states of Eastern Europe.3 Deborah Larson suggests
that the dom inant elite of a weak state seeking external allies may not necessarily act out
’F o ra short discussion see Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, International
Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Global ism, and Beyond (Boston; Allyn and Bacon.
1999). 82-84.
4For a review o f the m odified structural realism see Randall L. Schweller and
David Priess, “A Tale of Two Realisms: Expanding the Institutional Debate,” Mershon
International Studies Review 41, supplement 1 (M ay 1997): 1-32.
3Within the realist body o f literature, the em erging trend is known as neoclassical
realism. For a discussion of neoclassical realism see Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism
and Theories o f Foreign Policy,” World Politics 51, no. 1 (O ctober 1998): 144-72. For
good examples o f neoclassical realism see Thom as Christensen, Useful Adversaries:
Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-58
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); W illiam C. W ohlforth, The Elusive
Balance: Power an d Perception during the C old War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1993); Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual O rigins o f Am erica’s World
Role (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).
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o f concern for the territorial integrity o f the state, but rather seek its ow n political
survival.6 Alignment with an external hegemon m ay help a weak regim e by eliminating
external threats and providing political and econom ic assistance, thus enhancing the
dominant elite’s domestic legitimacy. Analyzing the international behavior of Third
World countries, Steven David argues that the elites o f weak regimes are willing to
accommodate secondary external threats and concentrate on battling primary domestic
threats.7 In other words, elites seek external resources to deal with internal threats.8 O f
course, one may correctly argue that the experience o f Third World countries in creating
alliances provides no valuable insights into the foreign policy formation o f East European
states, especially the ones in which there are relatively stable and legitimate political and
state institutions and a high consensus on the dom estic and foreign policy objectives
among the elites. However, this approach reveals that the formation o f alliances is not a
simple function o f the presence o f external threats, but is also linked to the domestic
objectives of national elites. It is also linked to the political, social, and economic
constraints on the elites' ability to mobilize internal resources needed to ensure the
territorial integrity o f the state and their own political survival. In an attem pt to illuminate

6Deborah W elsh Larson. "Bandwagon Image in American Foreign Policy: Myth
or Reality,” in Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder, eds.. Dominoes and Bandwagons:
Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rim land (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1991).
7Steven R. David. "Explaining Third World Alignment,” W orld Politics 43. no. 2
(January 1991): 233-56: See also Steven R. David, Choosing Sides: Alignm ent and
Realignment in the Third World (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1991).
8In a study o f Egypt's foreign policy, M ichael Barnett and Jack Levy reach
sim ilar conclusions by pointing out that domestic threats to the ruling elite shaped its
decision to ensure its survival by concluding external alliances. Mark Bam ett and Jack
Levy, "Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: The Case of Egypt, 1962-73."
International Organization 45, no. 3 (1991): 369-95.
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domestic factors in the states' international behavior, Randall Schweller goes even further
by insisting that the most important determinant o f alignment is the com patibilities of
political goals, rather than the distributions of pow er or threats.'*
Some authors go even further and call for a synthesis combining elem ents of
realism and pluralism. Robert Keohane and John Ruggie, among others, propose that
analysis must begin with the realist focus on power and the state which provide the
context to understand the actions and behavior of actors and political structures.10
The scarce literature on security in Eastern Europe, applying mostly realist
approaches, fails to incorporate insights provided by the modified approaches to the study
o f state behavior. Thus the traditional approaches provide limited understanding o f East
European security as it still conceptualizes security in the traditional terms as freedom
from threats to the sovereignty and independence o f the states. The post-com m unist states
and societies, however, defined security in more com plex, inclusive terms. In addition,
policies designed to attain what the states consider to be national security were based not
simply on the possibilities and limitations posed by the international environm ent but also
by domestic processes. In other words, it is domestic actors involved in domestic
processes who make the assessment o f the international context and the choices necessary

yRandall L. Schweller. “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State
Back in,” InternationaI Security 19, no. 1 (January 1994), 105; See also Randal L.
Scheweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and H itler's Strategy o f World C onquest
(New York: C olum bia University Press, 1998).
l0John G erard Ruggie, “Continuity and Transformation in the W orld Polity:
Tow ard Neorealist Synthesis.” World Politics 35, no. 2 (January 1983): 261-85; Robert
O. Keohane, “T h e o ry of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond,” in Ada W.
Finifter, ed., Political Science: The State o f the Discipline (Washington, DC: American
Political Science Association, 1983); See also Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony:
Cooperation and D iscord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1984).
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for national security. Therefore, the traditional approach to the study of East European
security does not systematically account for the differences in paths taken by the post
com m unist states in search of security. The actual paths were determ ined by what
individual ruling elites and societies understood to be national security, what they saw as
threats to this value, and the process of form ulating o f the proper policy responses. Thus
although the three states analyzed in this dissertation operated in the same international
environm ent and, from a realist perspective, had sim ilar positions in the international
system, domestic politics determined variations in preferences an d choices and
consequently variations in outcomes.
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